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The Devil in the Details: ‘‘Life Force
Atrocities’’ and the Assault on the
Family in Times of Conflict
Elisa von Joeden-Forgey
University of Pennsylvania
This article introduces the idea of ‘‘life force atrocities’’ and investigates the role
they have played in twentieth-century genocides, arguing that genocide is a gen-
dered crime intimately associated with institutions of reproduction. Using exam-
ples from established cases of genocide, such as the Armenian genocide, the
Holocaust, Bosnia, and Rwanda, as well as from conflicts not generally under-
stood as genocides, such as Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), the article outlines two types of life force atrocities that have been common
features of these conflicts: inversion rituals and ritual desecrations. Each of these
instances of ritualized atrocity targets the family unit within victim groups and
betrays a preoccupation with the group’s life force in its physical and symbolic
dimensions. Since life force atrocities play on gender roles and hierarchies to tor-
ture family members, this article focuses on the relational way in which ge´no-
cidaires instrumentalize gendered violence to destroy the sacred realm of the
family as part of the larger effort to destroy a group. The presence of life force
atrocities during a conflict can therefore function as an early warning sign of a
genocidal logic at some level of the political or military hierarchy. They also offer
us insight into the state of mind of the perpetrators who, I argue, see themselves as
engaged in a battle with the generative force of the victim group. In some cases, as
in Sierra Leone and the DRC, this battle becomes generalized, and soldiers target
the life force as such, attempting to destroy (via families) the civilian world in
its totality.
Key words: gender, rape, family, reproduction, genocide, prevention, life force
atrocity
‘‘Our family tree was obliterated by the genocide. That’s where our family begins.’’
This is how Art Tonoyan, a graduate student of religious studies and grandson of
survivors of the Armenian genocide, described the genocide’s impact on his family.
Speaking to the Waco Tribune-Herald in 2005, he told of how his grandfather and
grandmother were orphaned by the genocide. His grandmother was too young to re-
member the details of her orphaning; his grandfather, as a little boy of eight, was
forced to watch as Turkish soldiers raped, tortured, and killed his parents and sib-
lings in front of him. The soldiers told him that they would leave him alive so that,
in their words, he could ‘‘see what we are capable of.’’ He later witnessed the entire
village being herded into a church and burned alive. ‘‘I will never forget my grand-
father’s eyes,’’ Art Tonoyan told the reporter. ‘‘He was a very sad person. I rarely re-
member him smiling. He never got over seeing his family murdered.’’1
As Tonoyan’s family story shows, genocide, while directed at the destruction of
larger groups, is a crime that is inextricably tied to families. What we hear repeatedly
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in the stories of survivors of twentieth-century genocides is the terrible way in which
genocidal violence is embedded in the most sacred aspects of their family lives. This
embedding is not just a matter of individual memory or of the transgenerational
trauma that genocide can cause. It begins with genocide itself, with the intimate
ways in which ge´nocidaires target their victims. This is so much so that the perpe-
trators often become woven into the origin stories of survivors’ families. We are
acquainted with the two Turkish killers of Tonoyan’s family, for example, because
they addressed their young victim personally; they chose him to be the audience to
their performance of genocidal violence, raping his mother and his sister in front of
him before killing them. Embedded in this dramatization of their concept of power
was a message—a message they were sending to him, as an Armenian child in
1915 Anatolia, and to the rest of the world; a message we are still receiving up to
this day.
Unfortunately, the message witnessed by Tonoyan’s grandfather is one that
countless numbers of people have been forced to witness in the twentieth century
alone. The scenario of power that the perpetrators enacted in front of the terrified
little boy and their decision to let him live as a witness to their spectacle are charac-
teristic of genocidal violence across widely disparate times and cultures. In this arti-
cle I wish to examine this and other genocidal scenarios and the messages they are
meant to send by looking at the integral role played by family institutions in geno-
cidal patterns of violence. I argue that the crimes committed against Art Tonoyan’s
family members are examples of a specific kind of crime that can be called life force
atrocity. For the purpose of definition, life force atrocity is a ritualized pattern of
violence that targets the life force of a group by destroying both the physical symbols
of its life force as well as its most basic institutions of reproduction, especially the
family unit. It exists alongside and in conjunction with other, more frequently dis-
cussed, genocidal patterns of violence, and with them can act as evidence of an
emerging genocidal logic during times of conflict.
The violent acts I will examine are often the most difficult to discuss, much less
fathom. They involve two interrelated types of rituals: first, violent inversion rituals
that seek to reverse proper hierarchies and relationships within families and thereby
irrevocably to break sacred bonds. Such acts include forcing family members to
watch the rape, torture, and murder of their loved ones and forcing them to partici-
pate in the perpetration of such crimes. The second type of ritual involved in geno-
cidal violence against families is the ritual mutilation and desecration of symbols of
group reproduction, including male and female reproductive organs, women’s breasts
as the sites of lactation, pregnant women as the loci of generative powers, and
infants and small children as the sacred symbols of the group’s future.2
This article will make the argument that understanding life force atrocities
is crucial to understanding the genocidal process and how it differs from other in-
stances of mass murder, most notably war. It treats life force atrocities outside of
the frameworks of atrocity and rape in which they have long languished. Life force
atrocities are not generic in nature, and they are not synonymous with ‘‘rape’’ or
with ‘‘sexual violence,’’ although they may involve both. They are directed at men
as well as women, boys as well as girls, using each to inflict maximum damage to
the spiritual core of those generative and foundational units we call families. They
betray a specific state of mind among perpetrators, who are not merely engaged in
killing but also in a subjective metaphysical struggle with the life force itself. When
viewed from the perspective of life force atrocities, genocide appears to be a crime
whose perpetrators are uniquely preoccupied with wresting power from that mysteri-
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ous force that accounts for human life on this planet, a violent appropriation that
they demonstrate in the highly symbolic ways in which they kill.
The Ritual Performance of Genocide
The types of atrocities that I am calling life force atrocities are often cited as incon-
trovertible evidence of perpetrator perversity—and they are certainly that. But our
understanding of them should not be left at this, or we risk treating patterned vio-
lence as incidental and, in the process, making invisible a key feature of genocide.
Instead, when we single out these acts for sustained analysis, we are able to offer
another means of identifying genocidal intent in the absence of documentary proof.
Just as the US Atrocities Documentation Team recently has identified village razing,
cattle slaughtering, mass rape, and the use of racist epithets during killing in Darfur
as de facto evidence of genocidal intent on the part of Janjaweed militias and the
Government of Sudan,3 the presence of specific acts of violence directed at families
can also serve to alert us to the dangerous presence of genocidal logic in conflict
situations—potentially at a very early stage in a conflict, before a full-blown root
and branch genocide is in the works. Life force atrocities may signal—and act as
evidence of—intent on the part of the state authorities in control of the conflict
region, or they may offer a warning that a certain militia or cadre within an armed
force is behaving genocidally.
Scholars have only recently begun to treat the ritual cruelties that characterize
the ‘‘interim stage’’ of genocide as subjects in their own right that are in need of clas-
sification and clarification. The dismal and timeless character of genocidal cruelty
has made it appear to be little more than an inchoate reminder of humanity’s end-
less capacity for evil. When we consider that certain cruelties are repeated from one
genocide to the next, however, and that they seem to share a deep symbolism, there
suddenly appears to be a method to the madness. Much of the analytical work being
done on the particularities of genocidal cruelty is going on within the framework of
gender studies.4 The reason for this is because when one breaks victims down by
biological sex, patterns of cruelty immediately suggest themselves and demand
explanation. While the majority of this important work has focused on the different
experiences of men and women during genocide, I intend to focus on how genocidal
cruelty aims precisely at the ties that bind men and women together. The expe-
riences of men and women within a victim group are inextricably related to one
another by virtue of the perpetrator’s intent.
A harrowing example from Rwanda shows how genocidal cruelty is relational,
and how perpetrators use both inversion rituals and ritual desecration simultane-
ously to destroy family bonds in the process of targeting a defined group. The UN
Secretary General’s Special Representative to Rwanda in 1994, Shaharyar Khan,
tells us that during the genocide,
the Interahamwe made a habit of killing young Tutsi children, in front of their
parents, by first cutting off one arm, then the other. They would then gash the neck
with a machete to bleed the child slowly to death but, while they were still alive, they
would cut off the private parts and throw them at the faces of the terrified parents,
who would then be murdered with slightly greater dispatch.5
The horrendous spectacle Khan describes is not simply an example of the evil of
some very extreme sadists, though it is certainly that too. It was, as he notes, a
‘‘habit’’ among members of the Hutu killing squads, a kind of ritual practice. Thus,
like rituals, it can be analyzed for the insights it offers us into the ‘‘culture’’ of the
‘‘Life Force Atrocities’’ and the Assault on the Family in Times of Conflict
3
killers, insights generally not available in documents or in perpetrators’ accounts of
their own behavior.
Also, a similar preoccupation with generative symbols structured much of
‘‘interim stage’’ violence of the Holocaust. In fact, the Nazi death camp system was
perhaps the most sustained and involved inversion ritual and ritual desecration in
the history of genocide. The camp system was organized around the purpose not
just of mass killing but also of turning life on its head, of creating a living world
of death that was to be witnessed by the Nazis’ victims before their own murder.6
Emblematic of this inverted world is the Nazis’ treatment of Jewish children. As
Daniel Goldhagen has put it, ‘‘Children, as a rule, were not allowed to stay alive in
German camps (except ghettos) because, among other reasons, they symbolized the
renewal and continuation of the Jewish people, a future which the Germans sought
to obliterate emotionally and in deed.’’7 Jewish children were usually sent with
their mothers or grandparents straight to the gas chambers, or, when the crematoria
were overburdened, to open pits of fire. Babies born in the camps were immediately
destroyed, along with their mothers.8
A shocking example of symbolic cruelty from this death-affirming world is the
little ten-year-old Jewish boy who was personally trained to kill other Jewish
inmates by Christian Wirth, the commander of the notorious ‘‘Clothing Works’’
camp near the Lublin ghetto. One survivor remembered:
I have personally seen that this SS commander led a Jewish boy, who was about 10
years old, whom he kept and whom he fed chocolate and other goodies, to kill with a
machine gun here and there 2 or 3 Jews at a time. I myself stood about 10 meters
away when this boy carried out such shootings. The SS commander, who rode a white
horse and who had given a horse to the boy, joined in the shooting. These two human
beings together killed—in my presence—among the several occasions some 50 to 60
Jews. Among the victims were also women.9
Other survivors reported that the boy had been made to kill his own parents. As
Goldhagen notes, ‘‘Nothing could have driven home the point more painfully: the
world had been turned upside down, and this was for the Jews a surreal place of
pain and misery from which they were unlikely to emerge alive.’’10
These three examples of life force atrocity—from the Armenian genocide,
Rwanda, and the Holocaust—each demonstrate how genocidal cruelty can be ritual-
ized and aimed at symbols of generative powers and narratives of family integrity.
In the Armenian case, a little boy was forced to watch the desecration of his mother
and sister as well as their murder and that of his entire family and town. In the
Rwandan case, ultimate symbols of the life force, little children, were singled out for
unspeakable brutalities that focused on their generative organs while their own
parents were forced to watch helplessly. In the case of the Clothing Works during
the Holocaust, a little boy—the heartbreaking symbol of the Jewish community’s
future—was trained to kill that very community from which he came, possibly
including his own parents. In each of these cases the inversion and desecration of
sacred familial hierarchies are the primary organizing principles of the violence;
they are the method to the madness.
Rituals, even genocidal ones, are, in the words of anthropologist Stanley Tambiah,
‘‘medium(s) for transmitting meaning, constructing social reality . . . [and] for that
matter, creating and bringing to life the cosmological scheme itself.’’11 They are also
powerful means of communication and of the production and reproduction of
power.12 In peacetime, public rituals are generally aimed at the reaffirmation of
Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:1 April 2010
4
long-standing collective values and structures.13 Genocidal ritual, in contrast, is
aimed not at the reaffirmation but at the transgression of long-standing cultural
truths. The cosmological scheme that it brings to life is an anti-cosmos, the embrac-
ing of an inverted world based on death and transgression rather than the main-
tenance of and respect for life.
Ordinary ge´nocidaires often allude to this space of the anti-cosmos themselves
when they refer to the time of killing as a separate universe, a madness, or a dia-
bolic inspiration. During the genocide in the Nyamata district of Rwanda, for exam-
ple, regular religious rituals were suspended and replaced with killing and festivities
related to it. ‘‘During the killings,’’ one ge´nocidaire told the journalist Jean Hatzfeld,
‘‘we had not one wedding, not one baptism, not one soccer match, not one religious
service like Easter. We did not find that kind of celebration interesting anymore.
We did not care spit for that Sunday silliness. We were dead tired from work, we
were getting greedy, we celebrated whenever we felt like it, we drank as much as
we wanted.’’14
The atrocities that result from this performance of the anti-cosmos are drama-
tizations of a particularly genocidal ‘‘scenario of power,’’ according to which the per-
petrators as doing battle not only with the individual lives of members of a targeted
group but also with the very life force that brings them into being. This ultimate
offense—not just of killing people, but of killing the very life force responsible for
their existence—may account for some of the ecstasy of transgression that has been
documented to exist among perpetrators at the time of the commission of such acts.15
Unlike staged public rituals, genocidal ritual is often not well organized or hierar-
chal, nor is it always ordered (or condoned) by the command structure of an army
and state committing genocide. Many genocidal rituals are the innovations of well-
trained killers and zealous militias, who then spread them though their charismatic
leadership within the violence. The innovative nature of life force atrocity within
specific genocidal processes makes it all the more interesting that we can find such
similarities within the logic of genocidal cruelty across time and space.
As Christopher Browning has shown, the repeated performance of transgression—
a performance that often includes mind-altering substances—can facilitate surpris-
ingly quickly the normalization of atrocity by constructing new social realities and
new values to go along with them.16 In this way, genocidal rituals are formally very
similar to non-genocidal and even normatively legitimate desensitization processes
involved in training people to kill, whether they be ordinary soldiers or professional
assassins. What distinguishes genocidal violence from other types of collective killing
and brutality is the obsession it shows for the life force in all of its worldly manifes-
tations. If we look at the details of the atrocities committed by the Hutu Intera-
hamwe against young children, for example, the focused assault on several different
aspect of the life force become clear: children as physical proof of the community’s
future, parental love and protectiveness as the bond that promotes family and com-
munal unity, and sexual organs as the biological conduits of life-giving powers. This
hostility towards symbolic and physical manifestations of the life force is a theme
running through many if not most of the forms of torture used by ge´nocidaires in
the process of killing.
If genocidal rituals institutionalize the transgression of mundane social norms,
they do so for the specific purpose of the destruction of a ‘‘national, ethnical, racial
or religious group,’’ to use the language of Article II of the UN Convention on the
Crime of Genocide. The fact that perpetrators see their victims as part of a larger
organic community explains why so much of the violence committed during genocides
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is deeply preoccupied with generative symbols. For perpetrators, these symbols—
whether they are people of a specific status (such as mothers, ‘‘battle-age men,’’ or
religious figures) or relationships (such as marital, parental, or filial bonds)—are
points of access to the ultimate threat, which is that power that continues to give
birth to the community in the first place. This deeply metaphysical aspect of the
crime of genocide makes it rare to find among perpetrators well-articulated defini-
tions of the victim group (the Nazis being a notable exception) or clearly articulated
plans to destroy it in whole or in part. Instead, perpetrators will understand genera-
tive power in culturally and historically specific ways, and in many cases their
understanding of it will be so deeply ingrained and taken for granted that it will
never be made explicit, at least not in words.
One way in which perpetrators’ understanding of and plans for their victims do
emerge rather clearly is in the way they torment them. When the torment appears to
seek to destroy not only the individual human being but also that power that made
him/her and what he/she (in the perpetrators’ mind) essentially is, then I would
argue a genocidal logic is at work at some level of the conflict. By looking at the devil
that is clearly in the details of genocidal cruelty, we can better separate genocide
from other crimes with which they share a superficial similarity.
The Family Theater of Genocidal Violence
The fact that the family takes such center stage in the enactment of genocidal cru-
elty can be explained in a variety of ways. The family is the social institution that
organizes the life force of groups, so exploiting the family is one way that perpetra-
tors express genocidal rage.17 Families focus, channel, and organize the life force of
groups in several ways. They organize, of course, the basic reproduction of human
life—the bringing of children in to the world. They also are the central sites of
cultural and ethical or religious education, especially in children’s early years. Fur-
thermore, they are the creative centers of emotional and spiritual life; in families,
children (ideally at least) first learn love, tenderness, loyalty, and responsibility. All
of this creation is founded upon certain norms and taboos, which ge´nocidaires target
as a core locus of their obsessions. Furthermore, members of a targeted group are
frequently found in households at the time of the attack, so the family unit also
becomes a convenient site for the performance of genocidal rage.
When we look at genocide through the lens of a perpetrator’s obsession with
family life and generative power, we see clearly the central importance of what
Michael Sells has called ‘‘desecration’’ to the crime itself. In all of the cases of inver-
sion ritual and ritual desecration I have discussed thus far, the killers showed a dia-
bolical creativity in the ways they tortured their victims in excess of—and, in some
cases, instead of—physically killing them. These tortures were, I believe, intended to
demonstrate to the victims the radical, annihilatory nature of the perpetrators’
designs. The desecration of families and family life in genocides therefore demon-
strates a deep level of intent on the part of the perpetrators, a commitment to de-
struction so total that it exceeds physical killing. Psychologists have pointed out the
extent to which genocidal violence is patterned and linked to psychological processes.
Alan Jacobs, for example, has written about perpetrators’ obsession with and depen-
dence on mass graves for their own sense of well-being. Mass graves become a neces-
sary symbol of their power over death, of their ‘‘onliness.’’18 In a similar fashion, I
would propose that violence against family bonds and institutions, as well as against
the physical symbols of generative powers, works to express a particularly genocidal
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rage against the life force, a zero-sum battle against creation that is fought through
the institutions that respect and nurture it.
Because of the multiple ways in which the family organizes the reproduction of
the group, people are often singled out for gendered forms of torture based on their
perceived and actual family roles. This was perhaps most clear during the genocide
in Bosnia, where inversion rituals, mutilations of generative symbols, and genocidal
rape were used with particular frequency and ubiquity. While the majority of
Bosniaks killed were ‘‘battle age’’ men, and the majority of Bosniaks raped and
expelled were women and children, the atrocities that accompanied this gendered
division struck at the very heart of what ties men and women together, the family.
Thus, fathers were forced to watch their daughters raped, husbands to watch their
pregnant wives’ bellies eviscerated, mothers had sons wrenched from their arms to
be killed. The importance that the Serbs placed on the male role in reproduction
seems in fact to have led to a particular frequency of sexual torture of men, including
brutal castrations and coerced father–son rapes. According to one Croatian psy-
chiatrist and survivor of a Serb concentration camp, men were beaten on the geni-
tals while being told ‘‘You are never going to give birth to any more little Croats [or
Muslims].’’19
The Bosnian case shows how important it is that we look beyond gender and
ethnicity when assessing the nature of political violence and consider the victims’
families and reproductive status. A clear example of a reproductive group that is
singled out for particularly gruesome tortures during genocide is pregnant women,
who are targeted because they are the living, breathing carriers of the life force
inside of them. Pregnant women—commonly viewed as the most harmless of
civilians—are, for ge´nocidaires, a direct and double threat: they are themselves
agents of creation rather than destruction, and as creators they threaten the goal of
annihilation of the targeted group. In all genocides it appears that pregnant women
have faced immediate death by evisceration, and their unborn children and infants
have been killed in unimaginably brutal ways, often being smashed against the
ground or rocks or used for target practice.20 This is frequently done in front of the
restrained husbands and fathers.
In her pathbreaking article on the Bosnian genocide, ‘‘Turning Rape into Porno-
graphy,’’ Catharine MacKinnon reports that a Bosnian Muslim soldier, whom she
calls ‘‘Haris,’’ told her that
he watched a man and a woman—who appeared to be seven or eight months pregnant—
being taken to a clearing in the woods. The woman was tied vertically to a cross, legs
pressed together and arms extended. They ripped her pregnant belly open with a
knife. ‘‘It was alive . . . it moved.’’ The woman took about 15 minutes to die. The
man, apparently her husband and the father of the baby, was bound to a nearby tree
and forced to watch. The attackers attempted to force him to eat the baby’s arm. Then
‘‘they hacked him up, cut the flesh on him so that he would bleed to death.’’ While
they were doing this, they were laughing . . . ‘‘We’re going to slaughter all of you.
This is our Serbia.’’21
The following is a description of Janjaweed atrocities in Darfur, from the photogra-
pher and former US Marine Brian Steidle, whose story has been told in the recent
documentary The Devil Came on Horseback. His description of the violence is a
description of widespread inversion rituals and ritual desecrations, which should
settle once and for all the debate about whether or not the Sudanese counterin-
surgency constitutes genocide:
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The Janjaweed militias don’t distinguish at all between whether it’s a baby, a woman
or whether it’s a man. The difference is what they do to them. If it’s a man they’re
often castrated and then executed. Sometimes sexually assaulted before being executed.
They take kids and throw them in the air and catch them on bayonets. They
smash little kids’ faces in. They will take the children from the mothers and throw
them into the huts while they’re burning so that [the mothers] can hear the children
screaming. There have been stories of women who have been pregnant and have been
cut open and had the babies taken out.22
These are just a few examples from thousands that highlight the similarities
in the treatment of pregnant women and babies during genocides. They show that
because genocide is a crime targeting the life force of groups, in discussing it, we
must look at more than the individual, on the one hand, and the larger ethnic, reli-
gious, or national group, on the other. In between the two stands the family unit,
and for ge´nocidaires, it is a major theatre for enacting their ultimate preoccupations.
Because the family plays such an important role in the genocidal process, we risk
missing one of the most agonizing aspects of victims’ experiences of genocide when
we categorize victims individually, solely based on sex, age, profession, or ethnicity
rather than familial status. We also risk overlooking key markers of genocidal
violence.
Given the importance of the destruction of families in the lives of genocide survi-
vors, it is hard to explain why the perpetrators’ treatment of the family unit at times
of genocide has received such little sustained scholarly attention.23 Perhaps we sim-
ply assume violence against families during times of genocide because the family is a
core institution of the groups targeted by the crime of genocide. Families reproduce
groups—so, in studying the destruction of ‘‘national, ethnical, racial, and religious’’
groups as such, we are studying families by default. Another factor is that the social
sciences have not paid a great deal of attention to families. More interested in the
organization of production than reproduction, social scientists by and large were
‘‘inclined to see [reproduction] as responding, like everything else, to the material
forces reshaping our world.’’24 The process of reproduction was not, in and of
itself, an important line of inquiry, and the family therefore tended to be assumed
in studies of genocide as other historical phenomena.
Another reason that genocidal violence against families goes unrecognized as a
discernable type of atrocity is that families are largely absent from the international
legal documents relevant to genocide. Raphael Lemkin’s oft-quoted definition of
genocide, from Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, does not mention the family. There he
defines genocide in the following way:
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of
a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It
is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of
annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegra-
tion of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, reli-
gion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the per-
sonal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging
to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the
actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but
as members of the national group.25
Here we have individuals, on the one hand, and the national group on the other.
The family unit is perhaps assumed under the rubric of ‘‘social institutions,’’ though
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Lemkin does not mention it in his subsequent discussion. In this understanding,
which has structured our concept of genocide both legally and sociologically, inver-
sion rituals and mutilations of symbols of generation are to be understood according
to their individual or their larger group attributes—in other words, they fall under
the definition of torture of individual persons and the attempted genocide of a group.
Neither of these frameworks is sufficient to fully recognize and understand the moti-
vated assault on people’s most cherished personal bonds and relationships.
The fact is that much genocidal violence is committed through the small-scale
institution of the family. Ge´nocidaires often find their targets in family situations
and take advantage of this to inflict the most severe tortures imaginable, essentially
using the individual family as a symbolic stand-in for the group to be destroyed. But,
despite the family-based location of much life force atrocity, the identification of
genocides still tends to focus solely on the large-scale violence directed at the
group.26 This makes early identification of a potential genocide almost impossible
and the final determination of genocide contingent upon large numbers or per-
centages of dead. One consequence of this is that cases in which a genocide was
halted—such as in the case of the NATO intervention in Kosovo—there is little
means of establishing empirically the presence of a specifically genocidal logic with-
out access to clear statements of genocidal intent from the highest state and military
authorities.
Focusing on families as the immediate representatives of the victim group can
help us identify genocidal elements early on in conflicts, within smaller-scale mas-
sacres, before they reach the enormous proportions usually necessary to claim geno-
cide. If we have a term like ‘‘life force atrocity’’ that we can use when we hear of the
presence of inversion rituals and ritual desecrations within the context of war and
occupation, we will have a powerful policy tool for identifying early-stage genocides.
In the case of Serb aggression in Kosovo, testimonies of women survivors of gang
rapes are full of examples of genocidal inversion rituals. Two examples gathered by
Human Rights Watch show how the presence of inversion rituals can help us identify
the presence of a genocidal logic targeting a group’s generative powers through the
exploitation of family relationships and symbols of reproduction.27 In one, a woman
was raped in a room adjacent to her other family members, including several chil-
dren, and then brought back into the room and killed at point-blank range in front
of them:
They took my sister-in-law into the front room, and they were hitting her and telling
her to shut up. The children were screaming, and they also screamed at the children.
She was with the paramilitary for one half- hour. She was resisting, and they beat
her, and the children could hear her screaming. I could only hear what was going on.
I heard them slapping her. The children did not understand that they were raping
her. After they raped my sister-in-law, they put her in line with us and shot her.
In another, a pregnant woman was taken from her mother and young child and
raped, in the course of which her tormenters attempted to force the abortion of her
child while mocking the sexual bond between husband and wife:
Because I was pregnant, they asked me where my husband was . . . One of them said
to another soldier, ‘‘Kick her and make the baby abort.’’ They did this to me four
times—they took me outside to the other place. Three men took me one by one.
Then they asked me, ‘‘Are you desperate for your husband?’’ and said, ‘‘Here we are
instead of him.’’
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Inversion rituals and violence against symbols of generation like these formed a
pattern of attack in Kosovo alongside gang rapes, and, like gang rapes, they also
‘‘were used deliberately as an instrument to terrorize the civilian population, extort
money from families, and push people to flee their homes.’’28 Because they make
explicit an intention on the part of the immediate perpetrators to destroy the gen-
erative powers and institutions of their victims, they can stand as powerful indica-
tors of genocidal intent, especially in the context of a clear policy of ethnic cleansing.
Women, Sexual Violence, and Life Force Atrocity
As suggested by the two examples from Kosovo, when inversion rituals and ritual
mutilations are reported, they most often appear in the record of women victims.
This, too, may explain why violence against families has been so little highlighted
as a subject for study in its own right. Women’s experiences in general have not yet
been fully mined for the insights they offer into genocidal processes. There are many
reasons that women’s experiences and testimonies might involve more violence
against people specifically as members of families. Women are universal symbols of
generation, and their bodies are therefore potent theatres for genocidal expressions
of rage against the life force. Women also are universally accorded primary care-
taking responsibilities for children, the elderly, and the household, roles that are
culturally defined; therefore, their testimonies will tend to highlight the painful
transgressions and betrayals of these roles by their tormenters. Moreover, as Adam
Jones has shown, one early phase in most genocides is the separation of military-age
men from the rest of the community, so the inversion rituals associated with geno-
cidal violence will often involve women, their children, and elderly members of the
household.29 Also, male family members are more likely to leave home before vio-
lence reaches their communities to attempt to secure exit visas for family members,
to join resistance forces, or to escape persecution, in the erroneous assumption that
the women and children they leave behind will be spared.30
Whatever the reasons, women’s testimonials offer deep insight into the logic of
genocide. The testimonies of women survivors of Auschwitz, for example, are woven
around the theme of family ties and familial loss. The survivor Isabella Leither
explicitly draws the connection between the Nazis’ violence against families and
their genocidal aims throughout her memoir, Fragments of Isabella. Perhaps her
most direct identification of Auschwitz with the murder of life force itself is in her
description of the birth—and murder—of a baby in the camp:
The little baby born yesterday, whose mother remained alive because her pregnancy
was not noticed, is off now to the crematorium. She was born only to die immediately.
What was your hurry, little baby? Couldn’t you have waited until the house painter
was dead, so you could have lived? Couldn’t the gods have arranged for a longer preg-
nancy so that evil, not life, would be murdered? For a moment, for just a moment,
we had a real smell of a real life, and we touched the dear little one before she was
wrapped in a piece of paper and quickly handed to the Blockelteste so the SS wouldn’t
discover who the mother was, because then she, too, would have had to accompany
the baby to the ovens. Are we ever to know what life-giving feels like? Not here.
Perhaps out there, where they have diapers, and formulas, and baby carriages—and
life.31
Later in her memoir, Leitner laments the death of a young girl by highlighting
the loss of future children that her death signifies:
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Rest in peace, young girl. The flickering stars above must be the weeping children of
your womb. The womb, the glorious womb, the house that celebrates life, where life is
alive, where the bodies of young girls are not carried out into the night.32
And, finally, Leitner locates her own resistance to the Nazis’ final solution in her
birth-giving powers:
Mama, Mama, I’m pregnant!
Isn’t that a miracle, Mama? Isn’t it incredible, Mama?
I stood in front of the crematorium, and now there is another heart beating within
that very body that was condemned to ashes. Two lives in one, Mama—I’m pregnant!
Mama, we’ve named him Peter. You know how much I like that name. It translates
into stone, or rock. You were the rock, Mama. You laid the foundation. Peter has
started the birth of the new six million.
Mama, you did not die!33
Like other women Holocaust survivors, Leitner writes about the Holocaust from
the perspective of a person who is closely tied to the life-giving powers both of the
European Jewish communities that were targeted by the Nazis and to the future of
all humanity. This perspective offers us an important insight into what genocide is.
From the point of view of a young Jewish woman in Auschwitz, the genocidal process
emerges as a specific kind of violence that targets a group’s generative powers in the
process of seeking their wholesale annihilation. The ritualized violence against sym-
bols of group reproduction appears here as an integral part of the genocidal process
rather than the ancillary consequences of a genocidal policy.
Because of the close association of women with reproduction and with families,
and because women are so often caring for children and the elderly at times of geno-
cide, the body of scholarly work on genocide that has brought the most attention to
family violence is the recent focus on the crimes that are most frequently committed
against women, especially genocidal rape. The genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda,
where sexual torture was such a central component of the violence, brought interna-
tional attention to rape as a war crime. These genocides also raised awareness of a
specifically genocidal type of rape, which includes sexual torture and mutilation,
forced impregnation, and the attempt to compromise the reproductive capacity of
male and female survivors.34 Almost always embedded within stories of genocidal
rape are instances of ritual inversions and desecrations. So, for example, atrocities
listed as instances of sexual violence by the US State Department’s Atrocities Docu-
mentation Team in Darfur have included the following acts:35
e the killing of young childrene the use of infants as weapons against their parentse the slashing of pregnant women’s bellies and the murder of their babiese the rape of people in front of other family memberse the mutilation of women’s reproductive organs, including their breasts
In many cases, these acts were performed concomitantly with rapes; in others, they
were performed without rape but were still understood under the rubric of rape.
The problem with embedding reports of life force atrocities within studies of
sexual violence against women is that although life force atrocities may include
rape, they are not derivative of this crime. Their origin lies in the genocidal men-
tality of the killers, who seek to destroy a group by targeting its life force. Further-
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more, when human rights watchdog groups associate these atrocities solely with the
rape of women, they miss the way that evidence of genocide is embedded within
cultural understandings of the family and the relationships that sustain it. So, if we
were to treat such crimes solely as part of the rape of women, we run the risk of not
fully appreciating the significance of this violence to our broader understanding of
the nature of genocide as principally a crime preoccupied with generation, involving
the entire community and its institutions of reproduction. It must be noted that the
inversion rituals that characterize genocidal killing include many kinds of torture
that involve and often single out men and boys, including their rape and sexual
mutilation, the forced intercourse between family members, and the coerced killing
of children by parents, or parents by children, in addition to a host of predatory tor-
tures that involve a similar logic.36
Life Force Atrocities and Cultural Beliefs about Reproduction
Looking at genocide through the lens of life force atrocity exposes the important role
played by culture in the ultimate form taken by genocidal policy. Ge´nocidaires pur-
sue annihilation in different ways that are inextricably linked to deeply held beliefs
about social and biological reproduction. In other words, while the methods used by
perpetrators to kill and torment their victims prey on universally cherished values
and relationships, the exact form of the acts involved in such violence will differ
according to cultural understandings of reproduction. This means that numbers of
dead may not be the best evidence of genocide, since perpetrators may use means
other than mass death to pursue the annihilation of the group, focusing instead on
those institutions of reproduction that guarantee the groups’ future.
In Bosnia, for example, women were often singled out for genocidal rape rather
than outright murder because Serbian forces believed men were the defining element
in ethnic reproduction. The bodies of Bosniak (and Croatian) women were seen as
vehicles for the reproduction of future Serbian nationals and their reproductive
powers were co-opted by ge´nocidaires for use in the genocidal process.37 Forcible
impregnation, alongside the incarceration of impregnated women up to their third
trimester, was believed to be a means of destroying the group. In Nazi Germany, on
the other hand, reproduction was understood according to the racialist interpretation
of biology, in which women contributed to the ‘‘racial composition’’ of children.
Accordingly, Jewish women and girls were believed to be important carriers of the
‘‘Jewish race’’ and were therefore targeted for indiscriminate slaughter along with
Jewish men and boys.38 In the case of Rwanda, women had a double status; on the
one hand, the essentialism of Hutu Power ideology determined that Tutsi women
were considered to be innately, and sometimes quintessentially, Tutsi, even if they
were married to Hutu men; Hutu perpetrators were therefore instructed to kill all
Tutsi, male and female. On the other hand, given that women had taken their
husbands’ social identity at marriage, Tutsi women were sometimes understood to
be ‘‘less Tutsi’’ than Tutsi men and frequently targeted for direct killing only after
all the men in a community had been hunted down and killed.39
The presence of these rituals across genocides shows that while ge´nocidaires
physically target individual bodies for torture and killing, they do so in the context
of targeting families as reproductive units by assaulting directly the bonds of love,
trust, and tenderness that tie individuals to one another. Similarly, although men
and women face sex-specific types of treatment during genocides, this gendered vio-
lence is often simultaneously aimed at other family members. In some cases, this
logic has been expressed explicitly by ge´nocidaires. So, for example, the famous
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RAM plan that was crafted by Serb officers in the Yugoslav army before the war
framed terror and ethnic destruction in terms of family structures. According to
Beverly Allen, one version of the RAM plan reasoned:
Our analysis of the behavior of the Muslim communities demonstrates that the
morale, will, and bellicose nature of their groups can be undermined only if we aim
our action at the point where the religious and social structure is most fragile. We refer
to the women, especially adolescents, and to the children. Decisive intervention on
these social figures would spread confusion . . . thus causing first of all fear and then
panic, leading to a probable retreat from the territories involved in war activity.40
Separating and killing ‘‘battle-aged men’’ in this context is a way of decapitating the
family basis of the religious and social structure, much as the targeting of intellec-
tuals is aimed at decapitating the institutional basis of the public life of a group.
Men are killed to expose women and children, women are raped to humiliate men,
children are tortured to destroy parents—this relational logic is the core of genocidal
violence against families.
In stating this, I do not mean to erase the importance of sex-selective killing, of
‘‘gendercide,’’ during genocides.41 I simply mean to point out that sex selection in
and of itself can be also a way of torturing family members. As R. Charli Carpenter
has recently noted, ‘‘Men and women are also indirectly victimized by harm to loved
ones of the opposite sex, a point which should not be invalidated in attempting to
define who the ‘true victims’ are.’’42 She quotes Anne Goldstein, who, in writing
about genocidal rape, notes that
men too are injured by the sexual assault of women for reasons untainted by offen-
sive, antiquated notions of chivalry and ownership. To watch helplessly as someone
you love is tortured may be as bad or worse than being tortured yourself, and inter-
national law should be able to reach and punish such crimes.43
Equally, women are victimized by harm done to the men in their lives. This is true
because women love the men in their lives; it is true because women pride them-
selves on nurturing and protecting those around them; and it is true because in
most societies, women gain rights, enjoy protection, and find economic security only
or principally through the men in their lives.
Perpetrators know this and count on it. This may be an obvious point, but the
implications of it have been underanalyzed. Perpetrators use the sacrosanct status
of family relationships, and the tenderness and protectiveness that family members
feel for one another, as a way to destroy their victims emotionally, spiritually, and
psychically before engaging in their physical destruction in whole or in part. They
know this and they appear to derive great satisfaction from doing this.
Life Force Atrocities without Genocide?
By way of conclusion, I would like to note that the particular forms of violence that
I single out here as inherently genocidal are not necessarily confined to commonly
recognized, root and branch, genocides. Inversion rituals and the ritual mutilation
and desecration of sacred symbols of generation have been key features of recent
wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, to cite two examples
from Africa.44 They also played a significant role in Japan’s occupation of East Asia
in World War II and were particularly evident in Japan’s Imperial Army’s sex
slavery system.45 What does this mean about such violence being in and of itself
evidence of genocidal intent?
‘‘Life Force Atrocities’’ and the Assault on the Family in Times of Conflict
13
One way to look at this question is to place life force atrocities within the longer-
term reproductive process. Life force atrocities aim to compress total annihilation,
which occurs over time, into one moment of ultimate destruction in which a group
is destroyed in its past, present, and future tenses through targeting its temporal
symbols—pregnant women, infants, the elderly—and undermining the bonds neces-
sary for group cohesion and therefore for biological and cultural reproduction.
Because life force atrocities are committed in immediate and clearly circumscribed
social and political spaces—in a household, a front yard, a village square, a military
encampment, and so forth—they become, for the perpetrators, microcosms of the
potentially massive crime itself. The perpetrators of these crimes may or may not
be acting according from directives received from higher authorities. Genocidal
intent need not be institutionalized in a state or military in order for it to exit.
Generally speaking, however, such institutionalization is necessary for the crime to
reach the mass proportions that we associate with it.
As the above discussion suggests, I believe that life force atrocities suggest that
genocidal intent can be inferred before mass death. It can sometimes form rather
quickly within the context of warfare or civil strife, and can be expressed in ‘‘limited’’
ways during these processes. Whether or not it becomes the main purpose of warfare
will depend on many factors, including the nature of the regimes engaged in hostili-
ties. Genocidal intent can appear and thrive on the peripheries of an armed force
without having been ordered or organized by a particular state or military leader-
ship. When the ethos of destruction exceeds the pragmatic task of defeating the
enemy armed forces, and instead begins to form a military culture that sets itself
up against civilian life, eschewing as effeminate the relations and institutions of
affection that are the key to human survival, then it is easy for genocidal thinking
to creep in. What we recognize as atrocities against civilians can be a sign of an
emerging genocidal logic within small units of soldiers or an entire army—whether
directed from above or not—if such atrocities show a patterned obsession with sym-
bols of family integrity and generative power. In such cases, the existence of such
violence suggests that perpetrators have begun to form a concept of the victim group
that has the same logic as those historical group categories identified by the Geno-
cide Convention, even in those cases where the victim group does not easily conform
to any of the common definitions of a ‘‘national, ethnical, racial, or religious’’ group.
Incorporating the concept of life force atrocity into our understanding of the
crime of genocide will allow us to approach the plain language of the Genocide Con-
vention in an historically informed way, thereby better capturing the intended mean-
ing of the convention’s recognized victim groups than is offered by overly literal and
ahistorical interpretations that seek to determine whether a victim group is indeed,
by virtue of some social-scientific criteria, ‘‘national, ethnical, racial, or religious’’ in
nature. When killers begin to incorporate life force atrocities into their repertoire of
killing techniques, we can be on the alert for a genocide-in-the-works, even in cases
where the victims appear from the outside to constitute a political or social group, or
an economic class. If the perpetrators, by engaging in inversion rituals and ritual
desecrations, demonstrate that they are targeting victims’ generative forces, I think
we can be fairly safe in assuming that they have developed, at some level of their
organizational hierarchy, a concept of the victim group as an ‘‘organic collectivity,’’
to use Scott Straus’s very useful formulation.46
In the case of Sierra Leone, where inversion rituals were widespread, the impli-
cations for the twenty-first century are very serious. In this case, the rebel militias
committed genocidal violence against civilians frequently without regard to ethnicity.
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Indeed, the identities that seemed most formative of the violence distinguished
between members of the fighting cadres on the one hand, and everyone else on the
other. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) soldiers therefore targeted families for
unspeakable cruelties regardless of their affiliation with any specific group recog-
nized by the Genocide Convention. The presence of inversion rituals and ritual muti-
lations and desecrations here can be seen as a kind of omnicide, to use the term
coined by Israel Charny to refer to a nuclear holocaust and other such threats to
human life. In other words, life force atrocities have the potential to constitute an
assault on generative powers as such, which means that the violence will become
universalized, destroying anybody outside of the perpetrator cadre.47 So, in the case
of Sierra Leone, the children who were forced to kill their own parents before being
kidnapped to serve as RUF members were given this hideous task not simply to
create cold-blooded murderers out of them in the name of enhancing the RUF’s
chances of achieving certain political and economic ends, but also to initiate them
into the genocidal violence that was the core feature, and in some cases the core pur-
pose, of RUF fighting. A similar logic seems to be behind the life force atrocities
documented in the eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In these
cases, the ritual repetition of life force atrocity becomes, for some soldiers, a primary
goal of the fighting itself.
This suggests that genocide always threatens omnicide, and that, perhaps,
within the particular group crime of genocide lies the more universal crime of what
Nuremberg prosecutor Franc¸ois de Menthon called ‘‘crimes against the human
status.’’48 In other words, genocide, a crime focused against the human status of spe-
cific groups, is simultaneously, because of the universality of our generative process,
a crime against the continuation of the human species as such. Certainly we know
that perpetrators’ definitions of target groups are capacious and consequently able
to expand to include entirely new sets of victims. In this way, the intent to destroy
the life force of one group can spread to destructive actions aimed against the life
force more generally, a tendency that has expressed itself in scenarios like the
warfare in Sierra Leone and the DRC and in state attempts to coercively manipulate
reproduction within its supposedly ‘‘favored’’ groups. Indeed, perpetrators’ hostility
to the life force may, in fact, predate the implementation of genocidal strategies
against specific groups.
This latter possibility was raised by Hannah Arendt in her analysis of the trial of
Adolf Eichmann. She wrote that
[h]ad the court in Jerusalem understood that there were distinctions between discrim-
ination, expulsion, and genocide, it would immediately have become clear that the
supreme crime it was confronted with, the physical extermination of the Jewish peo-
ple, was a crime against humanity, perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish people,
and that only the choice of victims, not the nature of the crime, could be derived from
the long history of Jew-hatred and anti-Semitism.49
While historical categories and processes will determine how genocide plays
itself out in the here and now, the crime itself predates all historical category forma-
tion and is bound up with a rejection of the human status as such. The way in which
this linkage between the particular and the general works in the perpetrators’ con-
ceptualization and commission of genocide is something that needs to be researched
in much greater depth.
Whatever the final analysis about the relationship between genocide and more
generalized, omnicidal tendencies, outlying cases suggest the possibility that, in the
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twenty-first century, more and more genocidal violence will be the product of quasi-
state and non-state actors. This means that genocide has the potential to proliferate
much more rapidly than in a system where states are the principal agents. There is
growing evidence that today’s ge´nocidaires are sharing knowledge and strategies, an
issue that is vital to global security given the astronomical increase in the presence
of mercenaries in conflict situations. The original Janjaweed militias in Darfur, for
example, share a Libyan connection with the former president of Liberia, Charles
Taylor, who terrorized the Liberian population and backed RUF leader Foday
Sankoh, whom Taylor had met in a Libyan training camp in the 1970s.50 Serbian
mercenaries are reported to have committed atrocities in the Democratic Republic
of Congo.51
Because genocide is rarely self-limiting, it is imperative that we learn to recog-
nize genocidal patterns outside of state-sponsored genocides before we are presented
with large numbers of dead. Life force atrocities offer one way of identifying evidence
of possible genocide in the absence of clear statements on the parts of belligerents,
and it can help analysts overcome accusations that the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ is
nothing more than a (highly politicized) matter of semantics. Precisely because of its
destructive engagement with life forces, genocide tends to spread out from an initial
target group and become an end in itself, a lifestyle, even, eventually causing mas-
sive suffering and regional instability. Because life force atrocities are the cause of
such indescribable suffering and life-long trauma to survivors and their descendants,
they demand swift intervention once they have been shown to constitute a pattern of
warfare and communal violence.
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On the Timing of Genocide
Deborah Mayersen
The University of Queensland
This article offers new insights as to the timing of genocide. Current models of the
preconditions of genocide offer value information as to its antecedents, but do not
adequately explain how these factors develop and coalesce over time. The present
article follows the temporal development of the risk of genocide in both the
Ottoman Empire prior to the Armenian genocide of 1915 and Rwanda prior to
the 1994 genocide. Through analyzing these case studies, it suggests that there
are substantial commonalities in the progression of risk of genocide over time. A
new model is proposed that incorporates temporal progression as an integral com-
ponent of understanding the factors that lead to genocide.
Key words: genocide, genocide prevention, timing of genocide, causes of genocide,
Armenia, Rwanda
It is a paradox that the eruption of genocide is unpredictable, yet never seems to
occur without prior warning. Two different observers of the Armenians in Turkey,
for example, accused the Ottoman government of a ‘‘policy of extermination’’ toward
the Armenians in 1880; in 1895, a third observer declared ‘‘the extermination of the
Armenians’’ imminent.1 In 1962, a United Nations commissioner accused the ruling
party in Rwanda of ‘‘a social policy apparently designed to eliminate . . . the Tutsi
minority’’: according to this commissioner, the Tutsi were at serious risk of imminent
extermination.2 All these observers were ultimately correct, as the Armenian and
Rwandan genocides of 1915 and 1994 testify. Yet their dire predictions were wrong
in one crucial aspect: the timing of when genocide would occur. In both cases, the
predictions were wrong not by weeks or months, but decades. These examples high-
light the difficulty of attempts to plot the path that leads to genocide. Despite wide-
spread acknowledgement that societies at risk of genocide can be recognized as such,
there remains an inability to predict accurately when the risk of genocide is likely to
be realized. Yet understanding why genocide occurs when it does is a crucial com-
ponent of understanding the nature of this heinous crime. Furthermore, attempts to
prevent genocide are contingent upon the ability to accurately predict its onset.
This article, therefore, will offer new insights into the timing of genocide through
the presentation of an explanatory model. Developed through research tracing the
progression of risk over time in the case studies of the Armenian and Rwandan
genocides, it extends previous models of the preconditions for genocide, to elucidate
a model that includes temporal progression as an inherent component. The eight
stages of the ‘‘temporal model’’ are briefly outlined below, prior to a fuller discussion
of its development and components:
1. The presence of an out-group. This can be defined as a relatively powerless
minority, with whom relations are politicized, and which is subject to legal
discrimination.
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2. Significant internal strife. Significant, ongoing destabilization that affects
the dominant group and the out-group, and for which there is no clear
solution.
3. The perception of the out-group as posing some kind of existential threat to
the dominant power.
4. Local precipitants and constraints determine the nature and time of the
dominant group’s response. A violent response is typical, with the onset of
massacres quite likely.
5. A process of retreat from the intensity of the circumstance, or further
escalation. While the process is commonly one of retreat, repeated cycles
of escalation through the preceding stages followed by retreat ultimately
facilitates further escalation.
6. The emergence of a genocidal ideology within the dominant power, typically
accompanied by concerted efforts by the dominant group to further augment
their power, and a deepening perception of the out-group as posing an
existential threat.
7. An extensive propaganda campaign, a key component of which features
attempts to present the victim group as a grave threat to the dominant
power.
8. Case-specific precipitants and constraints determine the precise timing of
an outbreak of genocide.
This model focuses on genocide as a specific crime, rather than a broader discussion
of mass atrocities or crimes against humanity. There are very real challenges asso-
ciated with the prediction and prevention of all of these crimes, and many common-
alities in their antecedents. It is also recognized, however, that genocide is a unique
and distinct crime, and it is on this specific phenomena that the present article is
focused.
‘‘A genocide is a poisonous bush that grows not from two or three roots but from
a tangle of roots that has mouldered underground where no-one notices it,’’ re-
marked one survivor of the crime.3 In the last three decades, genocide scholars have
made great progress in exploring those roots. Several models have been proposed
that seek to identify and define the preconditions of genocide. The groundbreaking
model of the sociologist Helen Fein, for example, outlines four factors that together
constitute the ‘‘necessary and sufficient’’ preconditions for genocide.4 According to
Fein, these key factors are that ‘‘the victims have previously been defined outside
the universe of obligation of the dominant group,’’ that ‘‘the status of the state has
been reduced by defeat in war and/or internal strife,’’ the rise to power of ‘‘an elite
that adopts a new political formula to justify the nation’s domination and/or expan-
sion, idealising the singular rights of the dominant group,’’ and finally ‘‘the calculus
of costs of exterminating the victim . . . changes as the perpetrators instigate or join a
(temporarily) successful coalition at war against antagonists who have earlier pro-
tested and/or might conceivably be expected to protest persecution of the victim.’’5
Complementary to Fein’s model is that of Florence Mazian. Mazian’s six-stage model
identifies as additional key factors ‘‘destructive uses of communication’’—both ‘‘that
supporting the superiority of the dominant group, and that of reducing the inhibi-
tions of the masses and justifying the genocidal goals’’—and ‘‘failure of multidimen-
sional levels of social control’’—including the failure of religious institutions and
other nations to intervene on behalf of the victim group.6
On the Timing of Genocide
21
Other models have focused primarily on societal rather than political risk factors
in attempting to analyze the antecedents of genocide. The psychologist Ervin Staub,
for example, identified ‘‘difficult life conditions,’’ ‘‘cultural-societal characteristics,’’
and a progression along a ‘‘continuum of destruction’’ as key preconditions for geno-
cide. According to Staub, initial acts that cause limited harm result in psychological
changes that make further destructive actions possible.7 In contrast, the psychologist
Israel Charny chose not to focus upon inherently pathological processes in his ten
‘‘Genocide Early Warning Processes,’’ but rather ‘‘a series of natural psychocultural
processes . . . [that] may be turned by society toward support of life, or they may be
turned toward momentums of increasing violence toward human life, culminating in
genocide.’’8 The ten major early warning processes include such general factors as
how a society values human life, more specific processes such as the machinery for
managing escalations of threat, and finally processes more typically connected with
risk for genocide, such as dehumanization of the victim group. The model also in-
cludes an interesting process largely omitted elsewhere: namely, ‘‘perception of
victim groups as dangerous.’’ Similarly, Greg Stanton’s model ‘‘The Eight Stages of
Genocide’’ has sought to traverse the spectrum from potentially genocidal features
of normal societies, such as the tendency to classify social groups with names, sym-
bols, and a conception of ‘‘us versus them,’’ through to polarization, organization, and
extermination, with denial as the last stage of genocide.9 Finally, political scientists
such as Matthew Krain and Barbara Harff have conducted quantitative analyses of
potential risk factors for genocide—although utilizing a much broader definition and
larger numbers of cases of genocide than typically considered elsewhere.10
Such models offer valuable insight into the factors that lead to genocide. Each
presents a unique contribution to our understanding of the etiology of the crime;
together they form a largely complementary corpus of knowledge. Yet individually
and collectively they offer surprisingly little information as to the time periods over
which the identified preconditions might be operative. Mazian, for example, sug-
gested only that ‘‘earlier stages . . . combine according to a certain pattern before the
next stage can contribute its particular value . . . As different components enter into
the . . . process, the range of possible outcomes becomes progressively limited.’’11
Similarly, Stanton has proposed that ‘‘Genocide is a process that develops in eight
stages that are predictable but not inexorable . . . The later stages must be preceded
by the earlier stages, though earlier stages continue to operate throughout the pro-
cess.’’12 Beyond providing an approximate order in which risk factors for genocide
may become operable, there is little that specifically considers their temporal pro-
gression. The few quantitative analyses in this area offer some enticing hints as to
what may be gleaned from further investigations—such as Krain’s findings that
war, civil war, and decolonization leading to civil war are all significant predictors
of genocide.13 Similarly, Harff ’s findings indicate that it may be possible to em-
pirically anticipate the escalation of a high-risk situation into genocide in the year
preceding the eruption of violence.14
There are also several valuable studies that focus on the dynamics that lead to
the decision to adopt genocidal policies, and the triggers for the eruption of genocide.
The political scientist Manus Midlarsky, for example, has proposed genocide as an
elite reaction to loss. According to Midlarsky, in states with a vulnerable target
group, socioeconomic shrinkage (which can incorporate loss of physical territory, eco-
nomic loss, and/or loss of relative status) ‘‘is the single most important long-term
progenitor of genocide.’’15 The political scientist Benjamin Valentino has suggested
a ‘‘strategic’’ perspective is most useful for understanding the causes of mass kill-
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ing.16 Valentino has contended ‘‘mass killing occurs when powerful groups come to
believe it is the best available means to accomplish certain radical goals, counter
specific types of threats, or solve military problems.’’17 However, both theories
contribute more to evaluating why genocides and mass killings occur than when.
The political scientist Scott Straus has more specifically explored how the regional,
national, and local dynamics affected the timing of the Rwandan genocide both as a
whole and in specific regions of Rwanda.18 As Straus himself has acknowledged,
however, there remains a need for further investigation of the timing of genocide.19
Crucial questions surrounding the timing of genocide merit further research. Can
a society progress from a low risk of genocide to a high risk of genocide rapidly, for
example, or is it a process more likely to take decades? Is the progression necessarily
a linear one, or can there be stagnation at particular levels of risk, or even a re-
gression? What triggers risk escalation? And, most importantly, could improved
knowledge in this area inform future efforts at genocide prevention?
The present study considers these important questions through a historical in-
quiry into the events that culminated in two of the major genocides of the twentieth
century—the Armenian genocide of 1915, in which approximately one million
Ottoman Armenians perished; and the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which approxi-
mately one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were slaughtered. In each case, there
was a lengthy period prior to the ultimate genocide in which the minority can clearly
be identified as vulnerable and at risk of being targeted. This study will consider
how that risk emerged and developed. It will consider when, in each case, particular
risk factors became operable, and if they remained consistently operable thereafter.
It will investigate the triggers that led to an escalation of risk, as well as the pre-
sence and effectiveness of any constraints that may have been operable. Rather
than adopting a singular model of the preconditions for genocide as a guide, the
wisdom of multiple models will be utilized, enabling the investigation of individual
risk factors as they become salient in each case study. This approach allows for
maximum flexibility in identifying those factors of most impact upon the temporal
progression of risk of genocide; it also allows for the identification of new factors
that may influence risk modulation processes. Through a close focus on how risk fac-
tors for genocide developed over time in both Ottoman Turkey and Rwanda, poten-
tially common features of the risk escalation process may be identified. These could
provide an important new contribution to our understanding of why genocide occurs
when it does.
Even retrospectively, it is challenging to identify a precise ‘‘beginning’’ of the pro-
cesses that lead to genocide. Features we commonly associate with risk of genocide,
such as the presence of a pariah minority group, or a stratified society, may also be
features of non-genocidal societies. Fein, for example, has remarked that ‘‘[f ]or over
a millennium preceding their annihilation, both Jews and Armenians had been
decreed by the dominant group that was to perpetrate the crime to be outside the
sanctified universe of obligation.’’20 The presence of an out-group, while commonly
considered the first precondition of genocide, does not always provide useful insight
as to the likelihood of its incidence in a foreseeable time period. In order to deter-
mine an appropriate period from which to commence this investigation, therefore,
the time period during which minority identity first emerged as a significant political
issue for both the Tutsi in Rwanda and the Armenians in Ottoman Turkey was
chosen. This subtly different ‘‘beginning’’ may offer a more precise conception of the
risk of genocide.
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In considering the Armenian case, as Fein has noted, in some ways Armenians
were regarded as an out-group within the Ottoman Empire for centuries prior to
the 1915 genocide. Under Ottoman rule, the Armenian people were considered
giaours, or infidels, subject to official discrimination. They had to pay special taxes,
were forbidden from bearing arms, and Christian evidence was inadmissible in
Ottoman courts of law. The Armenian minority was subject to long-standing oppres-
sion and discrimination.21 In comparison to the subsequent mass outbreaks of
violence, however, this period might be considered as relatively peaceful.22 There
was a recognized place for the Armenian minority as a millet, or national com-
munity, and relative stability. It was through the course of the nineteenth century
that conditions considerably worsened.23 The reasons for this appear to be twofold:
the increasing politicization of relations between the Ottoman government and
society and the Armenian community, and the increasing strain under which the
empire labored as the nineteenth century progressed.
In contrast, Hutu-Tutsi sub-group identity can be considered as a significant
feature of Rwandan society well before the Tutsi can be identified as an out-group.
In at least some parts of precolonial Rwanda, sub-group identification became linked
with the stratification of society.24 Cattle, owned and managed by Tutsi pastoralists,
became the central symbol of wealth and status within the society. Tutsi also domi-
nated positions of political power. Hutu were generally agriculturalists, and con-
sidered to be of a lower status than Tutsi. Intergroup relations were characterized
by patron-client relationships. Yet, while the historical existence of the Hutu and
Tutsi identities must be acknowledged, it must equally be acknowledged that
societal stratification was strongest only in central Rwanda, where the authority of
the Rwandan kingdom was at its greatest strength. Even there, relations were tem-
pered by a range of other sub-group identities, such as those of lineage and clan, and
a number of other mitigating factors. It took more than a half-century of colonial rule
to augment and harden sub-group identity, and a massive reversal of colonial policy
at its conclusion to leave the historically privileged Tutsi as an out-group following
decolonization.
Together these histories suggest that there are three key components to identify-
ing an out-group as one at some risk of genocide. First, the group must be relatively
powerless to effect change regarding its status within wider society, and it is often
vulnerable more generally. Second, the group, or its members, face legal discrimina-
tion because of their group identity. Third, relations between the group and main-
stream society and/or government are politicized to some extent. That is, intergroup
relations are commonly discussed in the media, are regularly an issue in political cir-
cles, and differences of opinion on other issues tend to align with intergroup identity.
Together, these three markers appear to distinguish between an out-group vulnera-
ble to a process of risk escalation that might potentially culminate in genocide and a
group that might have some pariah features, but nevertheless is able to exist stably
within a society.
Utilizing this definition of an out-group, the Armenian minority in the Ottoman
Empire can be classified as such from around the middle of the nineteenth century—
and most certainly by 1878. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin, by seeking to mandate better
conditions for the Armenian minority through Articles 61 and 62, effectively ensured
the politicization of Armeno-Turkish relations. Ironically, the resentment of the
Ottoman government at these provisions meant they led to deterioration—rather
than improvement—in conditions for the Armenians. In the Rwandan case, Hutu-
Tutsi relations were heavily politicized in the fractious decolonization process in the
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late 1950s and early 1960s. Following Rwandan independence in 1962, the Tutsi
minority could be clearly defined as a relatively vulnerable out-group. In both cases,
the classification of these minorities as out-groups remained salient through to the
genocides of 1915 and 1994. Yet in both cases, several decades passed between the
societies meeting this first precondition and the eventual outbreak of genocide. Given
that this suggests that out-groups can and do exist for long periods quite stably
within societies, it then becomes salient to question what might trigger the escala-
tion of risk beyond this point.
A number of models of the preconditions for genocide, including those of Fein
and Mazian, identify significant internal strife as a key risk factor. For the present
purpose, internal strife is defined as significant, ongoing destabilization that affects
both the dominant group(s) and the out-group, and for which there is no clear solu-
tion. It may be economic, political, or involve threats to territorial integrity. For
example, the Ottoman Empire’s dire economic position in its final decades or the
repeated incursions of Tutsi refugees into Rwanda following independence both con-
stitute internal strife. In both the Armenian and Rwandan cases, periods of signifi-
cant internal strife were repeatedly associated with a marked increase in out-group
vulnerability. The internal strife was not always related in any way to the presence
of the out-group, nor did it necessarily lead to any immediate deterioration in con-
ditions specifically affecting it. Yet the out-group, relatively powerless and already
subject to discrimination, appears extremely vulnerable to being targeted at such a
time of national stress. In Rwanda, that is precisely what happened. In periods of
internal strife between late 1963 and early 1964, in 1972–1973, and again during
the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Tutsi minority in Rwanda became markedly
more vulnerable to violence. Similarly, as the Ottoman Empire declined through the
last decades of the nineteenth century, so too did the security and safety of the
Armenian minority. In each group, there was a much greater awareness of their vul-
nerability, and the potential danger of their circumstances, than when only the first
precondition was present. For example, in the Rwandan case these times of in-
creased risk are closely aligned with surges in Tutsi refugees fleeing the country.
There was a clear perception of an escalation of risk.
There is, of course, a tension between the assertion that internal strife leads to a
marked increase in out-group vulnerability and that it does not necessarily lead to
an immediate deterioration in conditions of life for the out-group. Yet internal strife
appears singularly insufficient to provoke violence directed toward the pariah minor-
ity. Rather, it seems to facilitate a cascade of events that culminates in outbursts of
violence. In particular, there is a distinct intervening factor likely to become opera-
tive at this juncture, destabilizing the already precarious situation, and dramatically
increasing the risk profile of the out-group. That is, the out-group comes to be per-
ceived as posing, or at the very least associated with, an existential threat to the
dominant group. It is perceived as posing a threat to the very existence of the domi-
nant group or power structure, at least as it is presently constituted. Such a percep-
tion, it is important to note, is always a construction of the dominant power.25 There
may be a real and serious threat to the dominant power or the mainstream society;
however, the link between such a threat and the out-group as a whole is typically
tenuous and manipulated by political power-brokers. More often, such a threat may
have some factual basis but is distorted, exaggerated, or otherwise manipulated by
the relevant powers, if not wholly manufactured. Indeed, the role of the dominant
power in the characterization of the out-group as an existential threat is crucial.
Intellectuals and politicians in a society with an out-group may at times view this
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group as a threat; however, it is only when the genuine power brokers of the nation
embrace such a view that it becomes dangerously toxic. The presence of significant
internal strife often facilitates such circumstances, as powers seek a convenient
scapegoat for wider troubles.
Some examples from the Rwandan case study provide further clarity. In
Rwanda, there were multiple instances when the Tutsi as a group—for varying
reasons—came to be perceived as an existential threat. The Bugesera Invasion in
Rwanda in December 1963, for example, when a few hundred lightly armed Tutsi
refugees crossed into Rwanda from Burundi, and were joined by several hundred
more internally displaced Tutsi, led to all Tutsi being perceived as threatening to
the survival of Rwanda as a Hutu nation, at least temporarily.26 Thus the prefect
of the Gikongoro region responded to the attacks: ‘‘We are expected to defend
ourselves. The only way to go about it is to paralyse the Tutsi. How? They must be
killed.’’27 This sparked an indiscriminate massacre of Tutsi men, women, and chil-
dren.28 In 1972–1973, Rwandan Tutsi were again perceived as an existential threat,
this time in response to the massacres of Hutu by (mostly) Tutsi soldiers in neigh-
boring Burundi. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion by second generation
Ugandan Tutsi refugees in October 1990 also led to further perceptions of Rwandan
Tutsi as posing an existential threat to the nation. Thus, according to the infamous
‘‘Hutu Ten Commandments’’ published in December 1990, ‘‘all the Tutsi . . . only
work for the supremacy of their ethnic group.’’29 In each of these cases, there was a
sizeable leap between the actual threat and the resulting manipulation and distor-
tion of the circumstance to characterize the Tutsi out-group as a whole as posing an
existential threat. That happened in each of these cases, and signified a considerable
and dangerous escalation of the risk of violence and a dramatic destabilization of
conditions.
At this stage, the roles of precipitants and constraints become crucial. By nature,
an existential threat to the dominant group is one that requires a concerted response
if that group is to maintain its position of power. The case studies suggest that
the result will typically be violent, with the onset of massacres quite likely. Several
factors can influence the strength and timing of the dominant group’s response: the
potency and immediacy of the existential threat, and how directly the threat is or
can be linked to the out-group. At this juncture, however, on the precipice of vio-
lence, precipitants and constraints specific to the local circumstance are likely to be
the most important determinants. The diversity of accelerants that can be operable,
combined with any constraint needing to override the strong motivation of the domi-
nant power to deal with the perceived or proclaimed threat, makes endeavors to pre-
vent violent outbreaks at this point fraught with difficulty.30
Consideration of the circumstances surrounding the outbreaks of violence in
Ottoman Turkey in both 1894 and 1895, for example, aids in understanding the cen-
tral role of precipitants and constraints. By 1894, Sultan Abdul Hamid II had long
characterized the Armenians as an existential threat to his crumbling empire. In
1878, following Ottoman defeat in the Russo–Turkish war, the San Stefano Treaty
had made Russian withdrawal from Ottoman Armenian territories it had occupied
conditional upon reforms to improve the conditions for the Armenian population.31
While the Treaty of Berlin adopted a softer approach, Article 62 effectively granted
the Armenians civic equality—inimical to the millet system that formed the basis of
the empire.32 The severe constraints against violent retaliation toward the Armenian
population operable then—including the weakness of the empire after its wartime
defeat, and the very real threat of further European intervention—had prevented
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major violence. However, as these constraints weakened by the early 1890s, the
stipulations of the Berlin Treaty remained valid, but never realized, and the per-
ceived existential threat of the Armenians remained. The government, apparently
looking for a pretext, allowed a number of minor incidents in Sassoun to trigger a
retaliatory massacre out of all proportion to any actual threat. In response, the
European powers renewed many of the demands of the Berlin Treaty in a new
memorandum—effectively reigniting Ottoman perceptions of the Armenians as an
existential threat.33 According to the missionary to Ottoman Armenia and Secretary
of the National Relief Committee Frederick Greene:
These reforms, though partial in application, involved, in principle, the civic equality
of Christian and Moslem, and this, from the Turkish standpoint, would imperil the
foundation of the State. The mere asking of such reforms and the intrusting their
execution to the Turks, was a stultification on the part of the diplomats who de-
manded them; for it does not lie within the power of Abdul Hamid, as the Caliph of
Islam and the successor of the Prophet, to grant them.34
In response to international pressure to sign the memorandum, another minor
incident—this time a protest march—was used as a convenient trigger to launch a
much more intense and widespread burst of massacres. In each case, once the pre-
disposing factors were in place, it was precipitants and constraints specific to the
particular circumstance that influenced the onset of a violent response to resolve
the perceived existential threat.
Thus far, therefore, we have seen that the presence of an out-group in a society
can be a long-term and relatively stable feature of that society. The advent of signi-
ficant internal strife, however, leads to a marked increase in out-group vulnerability.
Internal strife, while insufficient as a singular causative factor, is likely to provoke
a cascade of events that result in violent outbursts targeted toward the vulnerable
out-group in the short to medium term. This analysis informs our grasp of the
triggers that lead to an out-group becoming at increased risk of massacre and/or
pre-genocidal violence.
The next stage, however, is perhaps the most crucial to determining the timing
of genocide. It can be described as a process of review requiring either retreat or
escalation. First, the more common process of retreat—that is, to a lower level of
risk—will be discussed. Two separate drivers can determine a path of retreat. One
is that a level of resolution of the existential threat that is deemed acceptable to the
dominant power may remove the need for continued violence—a factor that can often
coincide with a desire to restore some stability to the nation through the restoration
of peace. Alternatively, the process of retreat may be driven by the authority’s
relative lack of power, that is, an inability to realistically contemplate escalation.
Very often, some combination of the two factors will influence the outcome in a given
circumstance.
If we consider once again the example of the Armenian massacres in the 1890s,
this process can be seen clearly. The massacres of 1895, for example, were pre-
cipitated by the perceived dual threats of Armenian pressure for greater rights and
security (expressed in this case through an Armenian rally protesting the lack of
a concerted response to the Sassoun massacre a year earlier) and international pres-
sure in support of their cause. The British Ambassador Sir Phillip Currie who was
stationed at Constantinople demonstrated a keen grasp of these pressures and their
potential danger. In November 1894, he reported:
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The Sultan, I am told, declared quite recently to a foreign Representative that
nothing would induce him to introduce reforms into his Asiatic provinces, and it
is not likely that he would yield without the employment of force. If the attempt
were made without being carried through to a successful issue, the position of the
Armenians would become even worse than it is at present.35
To a considerable extent, the massacres from October to December 1895 can be
regarded as functionally effective in dealing with these threats to the empire. The
Armenians were terrified into submission—at least temporarily. The bluff of the
international powers was called and found wanting—weakening their position and
credibility.
At the same time, however, it was not clear that the international powers would
not intervene in the event of a more global or deadly campaign against the Armenian
minority. In 1896, for example, when violence broke out in Constantinople—
witnessed by European diplomats—for a short time, at least, there appeared to be
a real threat of international intervention.36 The British charge´ d’affaires told the
sultan he would land British sailors.37 According to Viscount James Bryce, British
parliamentarian and keen observer of Armenian affairs:
The perpetration of this massacre under the very eyes of the Ambassadors and the
European residents, and the reign of terror which followed it, roused the attention of
Europe in a way which the even more frightful and far more extensive massacres
of the preceding autumn and winter, carried out in the cities of the interior, had not
done. A cry of horror arose in England . . . [Sultan] Abdul Hamid . . . recoiled in terror
from his own act, and the Turkish population expected the immediate appearance of
European fleets to punish or depose him.38
Undoubtedly, the threat of intervention was a decisive factor determining the cessa-
tion of the massacre in Constantinople, and likely contributed to the cessation of the
massacres of that period generally. Ultimately, the Ottoman sultan chose a process
of retreat rather than escalation. The solution was a limited one: the existential
threat posed by the Armenians had been resolved to the maximum extent possi-
ble, given the relative powerlessness of the sultan with respect to the international
powers.
The extent of the retreat seems to vary according to the particular circumstance.
The more substantial the retreat, however, the more stable it will be, and interest-
ingly, the more the dominant power will have an investment in that retreat. Con-
sider, for example, the anti-Tutsi massacres in Rwanda in December 1963–January
1964, in the wake of the Bugesera invasion. Quite rapidly following these events,
it became clear that there would not be a Tutsi-led coup attempt in Rwanda. The
precondition of internal strife was no longer operable, and the nation returned to a
lower-risk profile for genocide, in which only the continuing presence of the Tutsi
out-group may be noted. As this occurred, the Rwandan government actively called
for tolerance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in a statement: ‘‘Rwanda
wants to be a tolerant and peaceful nation. This is the will of all the people, and
this is the will of all its leaders.’’39 In this document, furthermore, the government
clearly differentiated between the petit Tutsi refugees, whom they explicitly stated
were not responsible for the ‘‘terrorist attack,’’ and the ‘‘great feudal criminals’’ who
were.40 President Kayibanda did not homogenize, dehumanize, or vilify the Tutsi
out-group and actively sought at least some level of rapprochement.41
In circumstances where the retreat is more limited, by contrast, with two or
more risk factors remaining operable, such reconciliation is less likely to be sought,
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and the situation is inherently less stable. In the Ottoman Empire, for example, dire
economic pressures and ongoing territorial threats constituted continuing internal
strife in the wake of the 1890s massacres. Thus, conditions for Ottoman Armenians
remained far more hostile and uncertain. Missionary Reverend Edwin Bliss com-
mented in late 1896, ‘‘Massacre has been followed by persistent persecution, less
prominent, perhaps, but not less effective.’’42 One European resident of Constantino-
ple recorded:
The massacre of the Armenians came to an end . . . but the persecution of them which
went on for months was worse than the massacre. Their business was destroyed, they
were plundered and blackmailed without mercy, they were hunted like wild beasts,
they were imprisoned, tortured, killed, deported . . . The poverty and distress of those
left alive in Constantinople was often heartrending, and many women and children
died of slow starvation . . . this persecution still continues in a milder form.43
A vital element in understanding the development of risk of genocide over time
is to consider the cyclic pattern that emerges at this stage of retreat/escalation. In
both the Armenian and Rwandan cases, one can plot the risk profile reaching this
stage multiple times and then retreating to an earlier stage, in a cyclic process that
lasted (in each case) for several decades. In Rwanda, for example, the risk profile
escalated to this stage in 1963–1964, 1972–1973, and 1990. The repeated cycles
of progression and then retreat in both case studies suggest the importance of the
entrenchment of this process prior to further escalation. As previously mentioned,
Staub has explored the role of a ‘‘continuum of destruction’’ as a precondition for
genocide, whereby initially limited acts of harm psychologically facilitate subsequent,
more destructive actions. Gradually, feelings of responsibility for others’ welfare and
inhibitions against killing break down.44 The cyclic process that preceded both the
Armenian and Rwandan genocides seems to have greatly facilitated the normaliza-
tion of ethnic violence within Ottoman and Rwandan societies, and the dehumaniza-
tion of the out-group as vilified ‘‘Other.’’ Similar cycles of escalation and retreat can
be observed prior to the Holocaust and the genocide in Darfur. Over time, a lasting
suspicion or distrust of the out-group comes to permeate the society, even in the
absence of a specific cause for distrust at a particular point. Thus, even when the
Young Turk regime had officially granted Ottoman Armenians citizenship, it con-
tinued to refer to them by the derogatory descriptor giaours (infidels).45 This
entrenched distrust can later be of great significance, as would-be perpetrators seek
to impose their own interpretation of the history of majority–out-group relations
onto a society. In particular, they can be manipulated by authorities to link the out-
group to an existential threat. During times of internal strife or crisis, vilification of
the out-group is thus a readily available strategy for the political elite. The longer
the period over which these cycles occur, and the more often they do, the more avail-
able and ‘‘normal’’ such a strategy becomes.
Three profound effects of this cycle facilitate further escalation to potential geno-
cide. The first is that the strategy of utilizing the out-group as a convenient scape-
goat in times of national crisis can be quite effective at rallying the majority in the
desired political direction, while decreasing the focus on any more awkward issues
for the political elite. As the strategy is used repeatedly at times of internal strife,
the out-group can become inextricably linked to the nation’s difficulties. It can
appear that the authorities are always trying to resolve the ‘‘same’’ issue—for which
the out-group is held responsible. In such circumstances, the temptation for ‘‘final’’
escalating violence is clear—although far from inevitable. The second effect of this
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cycle is that the risk to which the out-group is exposed is not limited to the tenure
of any particular ruling power. The repeated politicization of ethnic issues, the
repeated scapegoating of the out-group, and the distrust and suspicion toward this
minority become embedded features of the society. The out-group remains vulnerable
to political manipulation by successive regimes. Thus, the Armenian massacres of
the 1890s took place under the rule of Sultan Hamid II, while the genocide was
engineered by the Young Turks who overthrew him. The third effect of this cycle
is what Vahakn Dadrian has termed the ‘‘legacy of impunity.’’46 That is, as ruling
powers discover that they can provoke ethnic violence, and even massacres with
little consequence, they are emboldened to act increasingly recklessly. For example,
the lack of a concerted international response to the Sassoun massacre of Armenians
in 1894 facilitated the subsequent massacres; similarly, the lack of an international
outcry at the limited anti-Tutsi massacres in Rwanda in the early 1990s encouraged
further violent outbreaks.
Such outcomes may influence regimes to contemplate further escalation, rather
than retreat, at this critical juncture. In the Armenian and Rwandan case studies,
each ruling group ultimately preferred a process of escalation—placing the nation
at grave risk of genocide. Instead of a retreat, the emergence of an ideology that
could be used to legitimize genocide—or at least its emergence from the radical
fringes—came to be a feature of each society. Moreover, in each case the presence of
such an ideology proved conducive to the formation of a genocidal plan; once such a
plan developed, the ideology in turn became increasingly radical and more specifically
about justifying genocidal goals. In Ottoman Turkey, this ideology was that of pan-
Turkism. A nation, according to Turkish ideologue Ziya Go¨kalp, who joined the inner
sanctum of the Young Turk party in 1911, was ‘‘a society . . . of people who speak the
same language . . . and are united in their religious and aesthetic ideals.’’47 What
emerged as an ideology that excluded the Armenian minority from membership
in the newly conceived concept of ‘‘Turkish society,’’ led quite rapidly to a plan for
their physical elimination from that society. In a dialectical process, as the plan was
formulated, justifying it required further ideological radicalization. The Armenian
minority was no longer simply excluded; rather, it was seen as actively and dan-
gerously threatening. In just six short years, the Young Turk leader Enver Pasha
went from declaring the Armenians ‘‘brothers’’ to declaring ‘‘they will have to be
destroyed.’’48
Critical to escalation at this stage are the dual drivers of the entrenched power
of the dominant authority and deepening perceptions of the out-group as an existen-
tial threat to the nation. Evidence from the Armenian and Rwandan case studies has
indicated that a regime without sufficient resources to contemplate genocide realisti-
cally will not attempt or threaten to do so. For example, consider Rwanda in 1963–
1964. In many respects, this appears as a society at far greater risk of genocide than
Rwanda in the late 1980s. Hutu powers had not only just secured independence for
the nation but also managed to secure almost all organs of power under their own
leadership in the process. Victory had resulted from a fierce, racially driven cam-
paign, which pitted Tutsi as foreign invaders and oppressors, ‘‘who imposed their
rule . . . by cunning and cruelty.’’49 Then, after eighteen months of quite peaceful
nation building, the Bugesera invasion shook the country deeply. Superficially at
least, the risk of the emergence of a genocidal ideology at this point seems great.
The Kayibanda government, however, simply did not have the resources or sufficient
control of the country to contemplate such a course of action. Its army was woefully
inadequate; its leadership only just grasping the rudiments of running a country.
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Thus the rhetoric very quickly returned to themes of unity and cooperation.
‘‘Rwanda wants to be a tolerant and peaceful nation,’’ declared Kayibanda.50 A
quarter of a century later, by contrast, Habyarimana and the akuzu had a far tighter
grip on the nation as they contemplated genocide.
The second driver of the emergence of an ideology that facilitates genocide is
a deepening perception of the out-group as posing an existential threat to main-
stream society or the nation, or both. Such perceptions are themselves at least
partially manipulated by the dominant power. Usually the threat is presented as
intractable—somehow justifying the escalated approach being contemplated. ‘‘Who
could tell the difference between the inyenzi who attacked in October 1990 and
those of the 1960s?’’ asked Hutu propagandists in 1993.51 Indeed, characterizing
the out-group in this way is crucial for the potential success of genocidal plans.
Regime leaders possessed of a genocidal ideology appear to grasp that a particularly
effective approach to reducing the natural inhibitions of humankind toward the mass
murder of other humans is to present such actions as necessary self-defense. In order
for this to be feasible, however, the out-group must be regarded as being dangerously
threatening to the dominant group, irrespective of the reality. Thus, in the wake of
the RPF invasion of Rwanda in October 1990, Habyarimana exaggerated the ongoing
risk posed by the RPF rather than publicizing its very serious losses.52 As the 1990s
progressed, official propaganda presented the RPF as posing a grave existential
threat to Rwanda, refusing to acknowledge a more balanced view that might have
recognized their willingness to share power under the auspices of the Broad-Based
Transitional Government and participate in democratic elections. The reality of the
situation mattered less than the potential for such threats to be considered real,
grave, and pressing by the population.
The emergence of an ideology that facilitates genocide, usually shortly followed
by the outlines of a genocidal plan, is further characterized by a huge drive for
control by the potential perpetrators. This can take multiple and very diverse forms,
but each with the central goal of ensuring sufficient power and means to conduct
the contemplated actions. Thus, in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in
Ottoman Turkey, it initially took the form of factional jousting for seats on the
Central Committee for the extremist faction. Later, as the genocide was imminent,
tactics included the disarming of all Armenians, separation of men from their fami-
lies, and specific strategies to deal with areas of previous resistance. In Rwanda, too,
pro-genocidal parties maneuvered within government circles for sufficient political
power to enact their plans; massive imports of arms were ordered; and there was a
massive build up of troops.
Characteristic, too, of a society in which this precondition is operable is a num-
ber of ‘‘tests’’ of the power of the dominant group. Typically, these tests will be to
gauge the support of the population, and/or test the international reaction to the
proposed course of action—that of both allies and enemies. For example, as the
genocidal ideology took root in Rwanda in the early 1990s, a number of massacres
occurred. According to Twagilimana, at least one of the purposes of the Bugesera
massacres in March 1992, in which approximately 277 people were killed, was ‘‘to
verify the feasibility of massacres in the political south.’’53 Similarly, Prunier has
remarked upon the Hutu government’s close attention to the reaction of their French
ally to the massacres of the early 1990s. According to Prunier, after each massacre,
the Habyarimana government ‘‘[w]atched to see how the French were going to react.
The Hutu were pleased by France’s tolerance and understanding, and they began to
raise the level of violence. Had the French made it clear that they did not support
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this extremism, the situation might not have deteriorated so badly.’’54 While care
must be taken not to let knowledge of the subsequent genocide influence our con-
sideration of these massacres, they do provide some evidence of preparation for fur-
ther violence.
The emergence of a genocidal ideology appears to be very rapidly followed by an
extensive propaganda campaign, in both the Armenian and Rwandan cases. Exten-
sive efforts were made to dehumanize the out-group, which might be labeled as
dogs, cockroaches, devils, or any other derogatory classification. Hutu propaganda
declared: ‘‘A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach . . . a Tutsi stays always
exactly the same.’’55 The importance of such propaganda has already been elucidated
by a number of scholars of the preconditions for genocide. Leo Kuper identified ideo-
logical legitimation as a necessary precondition for genocide to occur; Fein referred to
the necessity of the elite adopting a political formula that justifies the nation’s dom-
ination and idealizes the singular rights of the dominant group.56 Mazian’s model
most clearly highlights the vital communicative aspect of this precondition. Termed
‘‘Destructive Uses of Communication,’’ Mazian’s precondition refers to both commu-
nications that support the superiority of the dominant group, and those that reduce
the inhibitions of the masses and justify the genocidal goals.57 Stanton, Richter, and
others have also referred to ‘‘mass incitement’’ as a key warning sign of impending
genocide.58
By this stage, the situation is on the brink of disaster. The risk factors that pre-
dispose a nation to genocide are all present. As prior to the outbreak of massacres,
case-specific precipitants and constraints now come to govern events. A striking
feature of this stage in both the Armenian and Rwandan case studies is the ‘‘acce-
lerant’’ role of a specific event that led to a sharply heightened perception of the
out-group as an existential threat. In the Rwandan case, for example, the military
superiority displayed by the RPF in early 1993 in the ongoing civil war, and their
ability to return to the subsequent Arusha negotiations in a position of strength,
was interpreted by the Hutu extremists to view the Tutsi as an ever more real and
severe threat to Rwanda as they conceived of it. By mid-1993, for example, Hutu
propagandists asserted, ‘‘We know that they have attacked us with the intention of
massacring and exterminating 4.5 million Hutu and especially those who have gone
to school.’’59 A similar picture had emerged in Turkey by 1914. There, Russian inter-
vention had led to Turkey signing a new Armenian Reform Agreement under duress,
which the Young Turks regarded as an attack on Ottoman sovereignty.60 As Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs Serge Sazonov recalled, the Turkish attitude to the
reforms was one of ‘‘undisguised ill-will,’’ as the Young Turks perceived them as ‘‘an
attempt on Turkish independence.’’61 The Armenians themselves were thus seen as
highly threatening to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In both cases, these
events heightened the existential threat these out-groups were perceived to pose. In
both cases, this spike occurred almost exactly fourteen months prior to the onset of
the subsequent genocides. This suggests the important role of the perception of the
out-group as posing an existential threat in this final stage before the outbreak of
genocide.
Beyond the key accelerant role of perceptions of the out-group as an existential
threat in facilitating the onset of genocide, precipitants and constraints appear to be
locally driven. They can vary widely. In Rwanda, for example, the prospect of there
being no further way to delay the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords—
that is, the seeming imminence with which the Hutu power brokers would have had
to cede their hegemony over the nation—played a precipitating role in the onset of
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the genocide.62 Concerning Ottoman Turkey, numerous scholars have commented
upon the crucial role of the start of the First World War in removing a powerful con-
straint against genocide—that of the threat of international intervention. By this
stage of the process, ruling elites have invested heavily in the genocidal process.
They are not simply reacting to circumstances as they arise, but actively attempting
to manipulate those circumstances to their own advantage. Thus, they may be
attempting to create triggers or remove constraints in order to facilitate the onset
of genocide. For example, Dadrian has suggested that the desire to annihilate the
Armenians may have played a role in influencing Turkey’s decision to enter the
war.63 Similarly, while it has never been proven, scholars of the Rwandan genocide
have suggested it is possible that Hutu extremist members of President Habyari-
mana’s own entourage were somehow responsible for shooting down the presidential
plane. Whether or not that really happened, the sharp variability of what can
function as a precipitant or constraint at this stage, combined with the dominant
authority’s heavy investment in a genocidal strategy and desire to manipulate cir-
cumstances to its own advantage, make this stage inherently grossly unstable and
unpredictable. The only possible caveat to the above is to note that, even for a
regime that has invested heavily in a genocidal strategy and that may conceive it
as the only route possible for the nation, actually making the decision to initiate
genocide appears to be a significant hurdle. In both the Armenian and Rwandan
cases, the situation remained poised on the brink of genocide for several months
before the final leap was taken.
Tracking the development of risk of genocide over time in the case studies of the
Armenian and Rwandan genocides suggests substantial commonalities in the tempo-
ral progression of such risk. The temporal model, presented earlier in this article,
lays out these commonalities to incorporate temporal progression as an integral com-
ponent of understanding risk of genocide. It is important, however, to clarify how
this model improves our understanding of the progression of the risk of genocide.
A key finding is the identification of stage five, a cyclic process of retreat or
escalation, in determining the short- to medium-term outcome in a particular cir-
cumstance. It is at this stage that we can clearly identify the paradox inherent in
predicting genocide—that it can be fiendishly difficult to predict in any given time
period, yet it is often clearly foreseeable, and indeed foreseen. Interestingly, while
this stage of a cyclic process of retreat or escalation has never been elucidated previ-
ously in a model of the preconditions of genocide, it has instinctively been recognized
by observers of specific instances. In an at-risk society, it is at this stage that geno-
cide will often first be predicted. Observers of this stage may sense a very real risk of
genocide, sufficient to express it officially in high-level warnings. Thus, to recall the
paragraph with which this article commenced, when the observers of the Armenians
in Ottoman Turkey in 1880 and 1895, and of Rwanda in 1962, spoke of the threat
of the extermination of the Armenian and Tutsi minorities respectively, they un-
wittingly identified peak points in this cyclic process—points where escalation to
further violence might well have been contemplated.
Yet this highlights one of the difficulties of attempting to track the path that
leads to genocide—this is a critical juncture, but an early one that more often will
lead to a process of retreat rather than escalation. Rulers at this stage must choose
between a process of escalation, potentially leading to future genocide, or a process of
retreat. It is here that the temporal model can offer some insight as to which choice
is more likely in a given circumstance. First, the political elite in a nation that has
reached this juncture previously and retreated to an earlier stage in the model—and
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particularly a nation that has cycled through this process multiple times—may be
more likely to consider escalation as a serious option. This is particularly so if previ-
ous cycles of more limited violence, as occur at stage four of the model, have been
conducted with impunity. Further escalation may also be more likely if the out-group
has repeatedly been made a scapegoat in times of national crisis. Alternatively, a
dominant power without sufficient resources to conduct more massive violence will
almost certainly prefer a process of retreat. This decision will also be influenced by
the strength and intractability of the perceived existential threat posed by the out-
group, or linked to the out-group. Paradoxically, this can be a somewhat dialectical
process, as the dominant power at least partially manipulates this perception of
threat, but then acts to counter it seemingly without consideration of its own role in
the process.
The cyclical nature of the way in which risk of genocide fluctuates over time
highlights the inherent difficulty of attempts to predict genocide. The most common
process at stage five of the temporal model is a process of retreat—meaning nations
can exhibit some risk factors for genocide for long periods. Indeed, this model con-
firms the generally long-term nature of these processes. Alternatively, however, if a
regime opts for a process of further escalation at this stage, there can be quite a
short time period between early and late stages of the model. For example, in
Rwanda between the late 1980s and 1994 there was a very rapid and dramatic pro-
cess of risk escalation. Such variability has contributed to a generally poor under-
standing of the development of risk for genocide over time. The temporal model,
however, provides a logical lens through which to interpret such variability.
Beyond offering an explanation for the difficulties associated with early-stage or
pre-crisis prediction of genocide, the temporal model offers valuable insight into the
timing of genocide as it becomes increasingly likely. Indeed, it is a sign of strength of
the temporal model that once a situation has escalated beyond the cyclic process of
stage five, it begins to offer a very real timeline for the onset of genocide. Quite spe-
cifically, the Armenian and Rwandan cases suggest stages six to eight of the model
cluster together very closely, and that there is a severe risk of genocide occurring
between eighteen months and five years from the onset of stage six—that is, the
emergence of a genocidal ideology in the dominant power. Considering the Armenian
genocide, for example, even early estimates of the emergence of a genocidal ideology
within the CUP in Ottoman Turkey, such as Dadrian’s estimate of ‘‘the outlines of
a genocidal scheme’’ being in place by the close of 1910, suggest a very short period
between the emergence of this ideology and the onset of genocide.64 In the Rwandan
case study, the time periods under consideration are even shorter. Again, taking a
relatively early estimate of the emergence of a genocidal ideology of late 1991 would
still leave a period of only two and a half years until the onset of genocide—and
there are competent arguments to suggest that date might be closer to late 1992.65
Potentially, the time period between the emergence of a genocidal ideology and the
onset of genocide therefore could be as short as eighteen months. The Holocaust
suggests a slightly longer time period. While Hitler espoused his anti-Semitic ideol-
ogy for some while prior to taking power, it is not until 1933 or even 1934 that
the Nazi Party can be regarded as the dominant power in Germany. By mid-1941,
the Einsatzgruppen mobile killing squads had commenced the ‘‘Final Solution.’’
Together, these cases suggest that once this stage is reached, the society is at
extreme risk of genocide, and the situation is inherently unstable.
Finally, beyond offering an improved understanding of how risk factors for
genocide develop over time, the temporal model also provides a new perspective on
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at-risk but non-genocidal societies. The model highlights the important role of con-
straints in impeding outbreaks of genocide, in a way that previous models have not.
Indeed, the absence of constraints is as important as the presence of precipitants in
determining the onset of genocide. Once the predisposing factors are in place, it is an
interplay of precipitants and restraints that governs the outbreak of violence, both
when that violence is somewhat limited, in stage four of the model, and when the
nation is on the brink of genocide. Moreover, the type of constraints that are opera-
ble on a regime at stage five, as government leaders consider a process of retreat or
escalation, are critical determinants of that choice. Evidence from the Armenian and
Rwandan case studies suggests that regimes that do not realistically wield sufficient
power and resources to conduct genocide at a particular time will not seriously con-
template doing so. Thus Sultan Hamid II, for example, constrained by the threat of
European intervention in the Ottoman Empire, did not escalate the violence against
the Armenians to a genocidal level. In seeking to understand the timing of genocide,
the crucial role of constraints as contributors to the outcome must not be overlooked.
The quest to understand the timing of genocide highlights that it is a complex
variable, with many contributing factors and case-specific determinants. One of the
key challenges facing scholars in this field is to avoid the simplified conclusions hind-
sight renders all too tempting: that events were predictable, inevitable, and inexora-
ble. Explanations, interpretations, and assumptions can gradually transform the
often unpredictable reality into a seemingly foreordained series of events that belies
the palpable uncertainty as they transpired.66 At the same time, however, modeling
that can offer some genuinely predictive capacity is a crucial component of efforts to
prevent future outbreaks of genocide. There remains much further work to be done
to explore the temporal progression of risk of genocide. The present model offers sub-
stantial insight, yet it is constrained by its reliance on two case studies. Further
analysis is required. Nevertheless, the findings presented here contribute to a deeper
appreciation of how—and when—particular factors are likely to converge to result in
an outbreak of genocide.
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‘‘Ethnic Cleansing’’ and Genocidal Intent:
A Failure of Judicial Interpretation?
Douglas Singleterry
Dughi & Hewit, Cranford, NJ
This article analyzes the similarities and distinctions between ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’
and genocide in the context of both Bosnia’s and Croatia’s genocide claims against
Serbia brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It examines the
institutional role of the ICJ and the criticisms on how the Court handled Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro. The legal definition and elements of
genocide as contained in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) are discussed, with a particular emphasis on the
required intent to ‘‘destroy’’ a protected group. The article reviews case law from
other international tribunals and argues that evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ may
demonstrate the intent to ‘‘destroy’’ a protected group and support a finding of
genocide.
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Genocide Convention, Serbia, Croatia
On 18 November 2008, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that it had
jurisdiction to examine Croatia’s allegation that Serbia committed genocide during
the 1991–1995 Croatian War.1 The country was seeking compensation for what it
described as ‘‘a form of genocide which resulted in large numbers of Croatian citizens
being displaced, killed, tortured, or illegally detained as well as extensive property
destruction.’’2 This development carries important implications both for the adjudica-
tion of genocide and the role of the ICJ. Notably, it marks only the second time in
the ICJ’s sixty-five-year history that the Court has agreed to review a claim arising
from the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (UNCG).3
Just a year and half earlier, the ICJ had decided similar claims in Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro. (The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became
known as Serbia and Montenegro after 2001 and as Serbia following Montenegro’s
succession in 2006.) On 26 February 2007, the ICJ found that Serbia did not commit
genocide during the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995. However, the Court did find
that Serbia violated its obligations under the UNCG by failing to prevent genocide
in the Bosnian community of Srebrenica in 1995. The Court further ruled that
Serbia was liable for not fully cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), including the failure to bring Ratko Mladic (Chief
of Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska) to the tribunal for trial. Furthermore,
the Court held that Serbia should take steps to punish those responsible for the
genocide but that it did not have to pay reparations.4 Consequently, this heralded
the first time a nation-state was in any way deemed responsible for violating the
UNCG.
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This landmark ruling established that a nation-state, as opposed to individuals,
could be held accountable for genocide under the Convention. The opinion also inno-
vatively confirmed that nation-states must deploy ‘‘all means reasonably available
to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible . . .’’5 Despite the import of
this holding, the decision is limited by the finding that genocide only occurred in
Srebrenica and that Serbia was not an active participant. Moreover, the Court has
been roundly criticized for its reliance on the corresponding work of the ICTY, the
standard of proof employed, and the methodology used to examine evidence.6 These
factors could influence how similar claims, such as Croatia’s, are handled. They also
expose the Court’s institutional limitations, prompting some to question whether the
ICJ is even an appropriate forum to contest genocide claims.7
These deficiencies most likely contributed to the Court’s limited conclusions,
despite widespread evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ coupled with murder and other
abuses. Further, the opinion raises questions over how evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’
should fit into the broader legal framework when evaluating claims of genocide. As
we will see, genocide and ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ are distinct concepts that share similar
features. Specifically, how do the motivations behind ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ elucidate
contentions over the genocidal intent to ‘‘destroy’’ a particular group? As the Court
assays Croatia’s allegations, it is worth reviewing the institutional role of the ICJ,
the characteristics of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and genocide, and the issues presented by
both Bosnia and Croatia.
The World Court
Situated at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the ICJ, also commonly referred to as
the World Court, is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.8 The Court
seats fifteen judges, who are nominated by nations and approved by the Security
Council and General Assembly for nine-year terms and who are distributed by re-
gion.9 Like its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the ICJ
has a dual mandate: to decide contentious cases and render advisory opinions.
Contentious cases involve disputes between nations and the Court’s judgement is
considered binding. Only nations may be parties to contentious cases.10 Advisory
opinions comprise legal questions submitted by other United Nations’ organs, includ-
ing the General Assembly.11 While technically non-binding, advisory opinions are
regarded as authoritative. The ICJ may also issue provisional orders prior to a final
decision to preserve the rights of a party.12
In contentious matters, the Court has jurisdiction13 in three instances: (1) by
‘‘special agreement’’ where parties to a dispute agree to submit their case to the
court;14 (2) cases authorized by treaty establishing that future disputes emanating
from the treaty will be adjudicated by the ICJ;15 and (3) cases between nations that
have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.16 Accordingly, jurisdiction is
either consensual or compulsory based on prior agreement. Article 9 of the UNCG
gives the ICJ jurisdiction over state disputes arising from the UNCG. The issue of
jurisdiction over Bosnia’s claims was complicated by questions involving state succes-
sion and the status of Serbia’s membership in the UN following the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. It was ultimately determined that the Court did have jurisdiction under
the UNCG, which Yugoslavia ratified in 1950.17
If a nation refuses to comply with a final Court decision, the only recourse is for
the prevailing party to petition the Security Council for ‘‘assistance’’ in obtaining
compliance.18 Various studies suggest that, despite lack of a strong enforcement
mechanism, compliance with ICJ rulings is relatively favorable. A 1987 study con-
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cluded that compliance with final ICJ decisions was approximately 80%.19 An updated
analysis found a 60% compliance rate from 1987–2004.20 The apparent decline most
likely reflects a stricter standard used to measure and define ‘‘compliance.’’21
In an exhaustive study, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of
Justice, Constanze Schulte also concludes that overall compliance with final judge-
ments is often realized.22 However, the author notes that compliance can be difficult
to achieve when the dispute arises from a highly charged political situation.23 Fur-
ther, Schulte emphasizes the lack of compliance with provisional orders. This largely
results from interim measures being ‘‘almost exclusively’’ requested in judicial pro-
ceedings launched unilaterally by a party when the Court’s jurisdiction is in ques-
tion.24 These compliance factors raise concerns specific to genocide cases, particularly
in the context of ongoing armed conflict rooted in long-standing civil strife.
Prior to the 1990s, the Court had little experience with issues pertaining to
human rights, let alone genocide and armed conflict. The ICJ has traditionally been
regarded as a consent-based arbitrator of disputes between nation-states. During
the Cold War (1947–1989), most contentious suits dealt with land, maritime, or fish-
ing boundary disputes.25 There were four that concerned self-determination in the
context of decolonization,26 while several other disputes did feature human rights
issues such as apartheid,27 political asylum,28 unlawful detention of diplomats,29
and prisoners of war.30 Only two cases, both arising from the Contra war in
Nicaragua, involved ongoing armed conflict.31 Likewise, most of the Court’s advisory
opinions related to internal issues of the UN and other international bodies or
nations.32 Four addressed the collective right of self-determination,33 and only two
others, adjudging reservations to the genocide treaty and the right of UN human
rights rapporteurs to travel,34 touched on human rights.
The period following the Cold War has been characterized, in part, by factually
complex cases that encompassed highly charged political disputes, frequently in the
context of human rights and armed conflict. Examples include the 1996 advisory
opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons35 and the controversial 2004 advisory
opinion on the construction of Israel’s wall in the Occupied Territory.36 The Court
has entertained disputes involving the right to consular assistance in death penalty
cases.37 Additionally, Serbia sued members of NATO after the military intervention
in Kosovo,38 and Congo sued the Rwandese Republic for violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law.39 (In the NATO and Congo cases, the Court
found it lacked jurisdiction.) In addition to Croatia’s current genocide claims, the
ICJ has agreed to provide an advisory opinion on the status of Kosovo’s indepen-
dence.40 These chapters of the Court’s post–Cold War era began on 20 March 1993
when Bosnia and Herzegovina sued Yugoslavia for alleged genocide, which was
docketed during the still early stages of the conflict.41
‘‘A Problem from Hell’’
The dissolution of Yugoslavia officially began in June 1991, when Croatia and Slovenia
declared independence.42 Likewise, a proclamation of Bosnia and Herzegovina sover-
eignty in October 1991 was followed by a referendum for independence in March
1992, which was supported by the Muslim and Croatian population. The Bosnian
Serbs (31% of the population) opposed succession and announced their own inde-
pendent state of Republika Srpska.43 War immediately broke out between the two
entities and was divided along ethnic lines.44 Efforts by the international community
to broker a cease fire were futile.45 Instances of organized massacres, rape, torture,
and other serious abuses were reported.46 A study undertaken by the UN’s Commis-
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sion of Experts concluded that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ was being perpetrated, defining
this term as ‘‘rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimida-
tion to remove persons of given groups from the area.’’47
The first report of the Special Rapporteur, published under the auspices of the
UN Commission on Human Rights, underscored the various methods used in ‘‘ethnic
cleansing,’’ including
[r]eplacement by extremists of those elected representatives who refused to cooperate
with ethnic cleansing, harassment, discrimination, beatings, torture, summary execu-
tions, expulsions, forced crossing of the confrontation line, confiscation of property,
dismissal from work, intimidation, destruction of mosques, use of the siege and cut-
ting off supplies of food and other essentials to civilian population centres. The report
[of the Special Rapporteur] drew on the experience of the city and region of Bihac as
well as Bosanska Dubica, Celinac, Sanski Most and Sarajevo.48
The Special Rapporteur’s second report documented ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ in and
around Bosanski Novi, Prijedor, Doboj, Kotor Varos, Trabnik, and Trnopolje.49
The Special Rapporteur subsequently reported on
[a]ccounts and testimonies which are characteristic of the information which is
increasingly becoming available from refugees regarding the systemic nature of ethnic
cleansing as well as the human rights and humanitarian law violations. They show
the methods by which violent change in the demographic map of Bosnia and Herze-
govina has been achieved, leaving 810,000 people displaced internally and 700,000
refugees in other countries . . . not only Croats and Muslims are the victims of ethnic
cleansing; Serbs who refuse to cooperate with this policy have also been victimized.
There are reports of the arbitrary execution of such Serbs, for example in Teslic on 2
June 1992 when three Serbs were reportedly killed for refusing to cooperate with the
Yugoslav national Peoples’ Army (JNA) and Serbian Democratic Party militia in per-
secuting Muslims and Croats.50
It was further emphasized that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ was being perpetrated through the
widespread use of rape:
Rape is an abuse of power and control in which the rapist seeks to humiliate, shame,
degrade and terrify the victim. In all his reports, the Special Rapporteur has empha-
sized the variety of methods used to achieve ethnic cleansing. Rape is one of those
methods, as has been stated from the outset. In this context, rape has been used not
only as an attack on the individual victim, but is used to humiliate, shame, degrade
and terrify the entire ethnic group. There are reliable reports of public rapes, for exam-
ple, in front of a whole village, designed to terrorize the population and force ethnic
groups to flee.51
Bosnia alleged that, pursuant to state policy, Serb forces encircled civilians to cut off
supplies and starve the population. Additionally, Serb forces committed ‘‘cultural
genocide’’ by destroying historical, religious, and cultural property.52 By the end of
1995, approximately 2.7 million refugees had been displaced in Bosnia and Herze-
govina.53 International organizations estimate that more than 100,000 people died
from the conflict between 1992 and 1995, and two-thirds were Bosnian Muslims.54
One particularly horrific incident was the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at
Srebrenica in July 1995, when Serb forces overtook 370 lightly armed Dutch peace-
keepers and killed almost 8,000 men and boys. The UN had declared this area a safe
haven and had pledged to protect it.55 Following a Serbian motor attack on the city
market in Sarajevo in August 1995, NATO forces initiated air strikes against various
Serbian military targets.56 The NATO campaign resulted in negotiations that culmi-
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nated in the Dayton Accords, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, officially ending
the war.57
During the Court’s early proceedings, two provisional orders were issued, both in
1993, demanding that Serbia and Montenegro ‘‘immediately . . . take all measures
within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide.’’58 These interim
injunctions had little influence, as evidenced by Srebrenica. Meanwhile, concurrent
with Bosnia’s petition to the ICJ, the UN passed a resolution in May 1993 that
created the ICTY to prosecute claims of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.59 The ICTY’s work is expected to
conclude in 2013.60
The two international courts had parallel, but distinct roles. The ICJ was limited
to determining the state’s (Serbia’s) responsibility for alleged genocide.61 It did not
have jurisdiction over related but separate allegations of war crimes and crimes
against humanity; nor did the Court have jurisdiction over individuals.62 As noted,
the ICJ only considers disputes between nation-states, and jurisdiction under the
UNCG does not incorporate other humanitarian crimes. In contrast, the ICTY was
charged with examining the alleged conduct of individuals, such as Serbian Presi-
dent Slobodan Milosevic, in committing any war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide.63
Prior to the Bosnia case, genocide had not been substantially defined beyond the
contours of the UNCG, and no international tribunal had ever previously considered
such claims under the UNCG.64 The Nuremberg Trials, while influential, commenced
prior to the UNCG and dealt primarily with charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity.65 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was subse-
quently created in 1994, and the Rome Statute establishing the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) was not effectuated until 2002, following the ratification by sixty
countries.66 Consequently, there was little precedential guidance available for the
ICJ on how to proceed.
The Meaning of a Crime
Responding to the atrocities of the Holocaust, the UN General Assembly passed a
resolution in 1946 defining genocide as ‘‘a denial of the right of existence of entire
human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human
beings.’’67 Two years later the UNCG was adopted and established genocide as
a crime in violation of international law. Article 2 of the convention’s definition
contains three primary elements: (1) prohibited acts that qualify as genocide (i.e.,
killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm; inflicting conditions of life calculated
to physically destroy; measures imposed to prevent births; forcibly transferring chil-
dren); (2) protected groups that must be targeted; and (3) the mens rea special intent
to ‘‘destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . .’’68 It
wasn’t until the 1990s that this document became the subject of substantial judicial
interpretation defining these elements, particularly that of genocidal intent.
The word ‘‘genocide,’’ the crime of crimes, was first coined in the 1940s by
Raphael Lemkin, a polish attorney and advisor to the US War Ministry.69 Following
the 1939 German invasion of Poland, Lemkin fled and eventually relocated to the
United States. In 1944, Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe was published, which
contained a thorough account of German crimes committed in Europe. This book,
coupled with Lemkin’s tireless advocacy, played a key role in the drafting and pas-
sage of the UNCG.70
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Lemkin’s conception of genocide was broad, encompassing not just killings but
also economic, political, intellectual, and cultural destruction. As outlined in Axis
Rule, the Nazi genocide occurred
through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of the captive peoples: in the
political field (by destroying institutions of self-government and imposing a German
pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); in the social field
(by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or removing ele-
ments such as the intelligentsia . . .); in the cultural field (by promoting or destroying
cultural institutions and cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for
education in the liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic thinking); in the eco-
nomic field (by shifting wealth to Germans and by prohibiting the exercise of trades
and occupations by people who do not promote Germanism ‘‘without reservations’’);
in the biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by promoting procreation by
Germans in the occupied countries); and in the field of physical existence (by introduc-
ing a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by mass killings, mainly of
Jews, Poles, Slovenes and Russians); in the religious field (by interfering with the
activities of the Church, which in many countries provides not just spiritual but also
national leadership); in the field of morality (by attempts to create an atmosphere of
moral debasement through promoting pornographic publications and motion pictures,
and the excessive consumption of alcohol).71
According to the sociologist Martin Shaw, ‘‘This full explanation [of genocide] is im-
portant. It shows that genocide, for the term’s inventor, was a comprehensive process
in which a power ‘attacked’ and ‘destroyed’ the way of life and institutions of
peoples.’’72 Notwithstanding, such a broad-based definition, including a category of
‘‘cultural genocide,’’ was rejected in the final UNCG draft.73 Shaw argues that,
subsequently, the meaning of genocide has lost the broad sociological understand-
ing articulated by Lemkins.74 This tendency is exemplified by the ‘‘conceptual pro-
liferation’’ of terms connoting only some functional aspect of genocide’s original
notion.75
Perhaps the most well known ‘‘conceptual proliferation’’ is the phrase ‘‘ethnic
cleansing.’’ This term entered common parlance during the wars in Bosnia and
Croatia. Providing an early description, Andrew Bell-Fialkoff wrote in 1993 that
this usage
defies easy definition. At one end it is virtually indistinguishable from forced emigra-
tion and population exchange while at the other it merges with deportation and geno-
cide. At the most general level, however, ethnic cleansing can be understood as
the expulsion of an ‘‘undesirable’’ population from a given territory due to religious
or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combi-
nation of these.76
In contrast, genocide has been described as ‘‘a form of one-sided mass killing in
which a state or authority intends to destroy a group.’’77 In other words, the term
genocide is meant to convey ‘‘mass killing,’’ whereas ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ signifies the
forced removal from a particular territory. The Rome Statute of the ICC recognizes
the ‘‘deportation or forcible transfer of population’’ as a crime against humanity.78
The word ‘‘genocide’’ carries compelling political and legal implications; perhaps
contributing to a reluctance of the world community to invoke it. Critics argue that
substituting the term ‘‘genocide’’ with ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ communicates a lower level
of alarm and responsibility to act.79 The term itself is suspect:
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Genocide has been the leading cause of preventable violent death in the 20th–21st
century, taking even more lives than war. The term ethnic cleansing is used as a
euphemism for genocide despite it having no legal status. Like Judenrein in Nazi
Medicine, it expropriates pseudo-medical terminology to justify massacre. Use of
the term dehumanizes the victims as a source of filth and disease, propagates the
reversed social ethics of the perpetrators.80
Shaw agrees: ‘‘‘Ethnic cleansing’ comes without genocide’s definite legal prohibition,
but it also offers less of a theoretical challenge: it is a minimal, euphemistic term,
often adopted for reasons of intellectual as well as political avoidance.’’81
During the early 1990s, the term ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ was frequently used inter-
changeably with genocide. The World Conference on Human Rights adopted a resolu-
tion in 1993 on Bosnia, which stated that ‘‘the practice of ethnic cleansing resulting
from Serbian aggression against the Muslim and Croat population in the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes genocide in violation of the Convention . . .’’82
The Commission of Experts appointed by the Security Council suggested that ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ could violate the UNCG:
Based on the many reports describing the policy and practices conducted in the former
Yugoslavia, ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbi-
trary arrest and detention, extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual assault, con-
finement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and
deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on
civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Those practices con-
stitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Fur-
thermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.83
Similarly, a UN General Assembly resolution passed on 18 December 1992 denounced
the ‘‘abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ which is a form of genocide.’’84 When it
was equating ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ with genocide, the UN was clearly referring to
intensified aggressive acts by the Serbian and Montenegrin forces to acquire more ter-
ritories by force, characterized by a consistent pattern of gross and systemic violations
of human rights, a burgeoning refugee population resulting from mass expulsions of
defenseless civilians from their homes and the existence in Serbian and Montenegrin
controlled areas of concentration camps and detention centres . . .85
This view is by no means universal. The eminent genocide scholar William Schabas
opines that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ is not genocide because the intent is to remove a
population, not physically destroy it.86 He further concludes that ‘‘the drafters of
the Convention quite deliberately resisted attempts to encompass the phenomenon
of ethnic cleansing within the punishable acts.’’87 Interestingly, Schabas notes
that Syria proposed an amendment incorporating a definition of genocide similar
to the contemporary notion of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’: ‘‘Imposing measures intended to
oblige members of a group to abandon their homes in order to escape the threat of
subsequent ill-treatment.’’88 Yugoslavia supported the amendment, citing the Nazis’
removal of Slav populations from parts of Yugoslavia: ‘‘That action was tantamount
to the deliberate destruction of a group . . . Genocide could be committed by forcing
members of a group to abandon their homes . . .’’89
The Syrian amendment was defeated, incurring opposition from the United
States. The US delegate argued that the Syrian concept ‘‘deviated too much from
the original concept of genocide.’’90 In Prosecutor v. Stakic, the rejection of the Syrian
proposal was cited by the ICTY Trial Chamber as evidence that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’
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was deliberately excluded from the UNCG,91 although comments accompanying the
Secretariat draft of the convention acknowledge that ‘‘[m]ass deportation of popula-
tions from one region to another also does not constitute genocide. It would, however,
become genocide if the occupation were also attended by such circumstances as to
lead to the death of the whole or part of the displaced population . . .’’92 As Schabas
pointedly cautions: ‘‘Ethnic cleansing is also a warning of genocide to come . . . Geno-
cide is the last resort of the frustrated ethnic cleanser.’’93
Although he holds that genocide and ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ are two different activi-
ties, the historian Norman Naimark concedes:
Further complicating the distinctions between ethnic cleansing and genocide is the
fact that forced deportation seldom takes place without violence, often murderous vio-
lence. People do not leave their homes on their own . . . They resist . . . The result is
that forced deportation often becomes genocidal, as people are violently ripped from
their native towns and villages and killed when they try to stay. Even when forced
deportation is not genocidal in its intent, it is often genocidal in its effect.94
This raises the following questions: Can true ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ really be achieved
without resorting to mass violence and murder? Doesn’t ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ by its
very nature, at least imply some component of genocide; such as the mens rea ‘‘intent
to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . .’’ ? Is
there really a meaningful distinction between intent to ‘‘destroy’’ versus the intent
to ‘‘cleanse’’ a territory of a particular group? As Shaw concludes: ‘‘It is not just that
‘cleansing’ is sometimes genocidal, or that genocide is ‘extreme’ cleansing. Cleansing
language invariably oozes genocidal intent, resonating with the idea of destroying, if
not murdering, the groups to whom it is applied.’’95
Shaw suggests that ‘‘expulsion of populations’’ is a central feature of genocide.96
He offers a definition of genocidal conduct as ‘‘action in which armed power organiza-
tions treat civilian social groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative
social power, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom
they regard as members of the groups.’’97 Shaw’s emphasis isn’t narrowly focused
on the murder of individual members but on destroying a group’s economic, political,
and cultural power. ‘‘Destroying’’ is understood as inevitably violent, incorporat-
ing several power modalities, that is, killing, violence, and coercion.98 Accordingly,
Shaw’s illustration is reminiscent of Lemkin’s broader generic concept of genocide.
Of course, adopting too broad a definition of genocide creates the risk of trivializ-
ing the term. But ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ can hardly be considered trivial, especially when
accompanied by violence and murder. As Schabas admits, ‘‘[B]oth genocide and
ethnic cleansing may share the same goal, which is to eliminate the persecuted
group from a given area . . .’’99 Notwithstanding debate over if and when ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ is genocide, both terms contain similar characteristics that need to be
more thoroughly identified and established in the adjudication of genocide.
Adjudicating Genocide
For genocide to be proved, it must be demonstrated that the perpetrator had
the ‘‘intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group. . .’’100 The specific intent to destroy a protected group has been characterized
as the distinguishing feature of genocide: ‘‘Thus, for an individual to be guilty of
committing genocide, he or she must have an aggravated criminal intent in addition
to having the criminal intent accompanying the underlying offense such as killing or
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the protected group.’’101 In
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the ICTY Trial Chamber explained that ‘‘genocide is distinct
from other crimes inasmuch as it embodies a special intent or dolus specialis. Special
intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of
the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act
charged.’’102 The Trial Chamber further stressed in Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic
that it is ‘‘not sufficient that the perpetrator simply knew that the underlying crime
would inevitably or likely result in destruction of the group. The destruction, in
whole or in part, must be the aim of the underlying crime(s).’’103
Dermot Groome, an ICTY senior prosecutor, contends that this mens rea require-
ment makes proving genocidal intent particularly difficult: ‘‘In many cases the actus
reus of genocide may be virtually indistinguishable from the actus reus of other
serious international crimes, such as some forms of persecution as a crime against
humanity . . . Of special note in this context is the determination whether a discrimi-
natory crime was perpetrated against victims because of their membership in a
group or was also intended as part of an effort to destroy the group itself.’’104
This dilemma is further compounded by the collective nature of the crime,
involving numerous individuals each with potentially differing motivations and
intentions. ‘‘It may be that the direct perpetrators harbor genocidal intent, whereas
state officials do not. Conversely, the state’s senior leaders may be the architects of
a carefully calculated genocidal plan that employs a multitude of others as instru-
mentalities who themselves do not possess genocidal intent,’’ adds Groome.105
Accordingly, to determine state culpability, the ICJ had to examine the conduct and
motives of individual Serbian actors, and distinguish between genocide and other
grievous violations, such as crimes against humanity. In other words, the ICJ had
to make similar determinations that were congruently being made by the ICTY, but
without the ICTY’s rules of procedure and evidence purposefully designed for such
inquiry.
Similar to domestic criminal courts, the ICTY is uniquely structured to probe
alleged criminal actions and intents of individuals. For example, one prominent fea-
ture of the ICTY Statute is the creation of an independent prosecutor’s office to fully
investigate claims made by all parties.106 In contrast, the ICJ has no independent
fact finding entity and has to depend primarily upon party submissions. While the
ICJ does have some authority to independently request production of evidence,107
without the enforcement mechanisms of domestic courts, these provisions are rarely
used. This deficiency proved especially daunting when evaluating individual acts of
alleged genocide. For instance, the ICJ relied on witness testimony conducted during
ICTY proceedings without the benefit of being able to pose questions directly at the
deponent.108 In short, although designed as a civil forum, the ICJ had to assess the
alleged criminal conduct of multiple individuals and entities.
Consequently, this necessitated a dependence on the findings of individual crim-
inal responsibility issued from the ICTY. The ICJ acknowledged this ‘‘unusual fea-
ture’’ whereby ‘‘[M]any of the allegations before it have already been the subject of
the processes and decisions of the ICTY.’’109 The Court accepted the ‘‘fact-finding
process of the ICTY’’ as ‘‘ ‘evidence obtained by examination of persons directly
involved,’ tested by cross-examination, the credibility of which has not been chal-
lenged subsequently.’’110 Indeed, Groome warns that having two international
courts, with one resolving allegations of State culpability and the other ‘‘designed
for adjudication of individual crimes,’’ creates separate judicial forums evaluating
similar claims with potentially inconsistent results.111 This could prove problematic
within an international legal system that is horizontally structured. The upshot is
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that the ICJ adopted nearly all factual and legal conclusions of the ICTY, even while
applying different legal standards on particular findings.
The second issue is the standard of proof espoused by the Court. Rejecting
Bosnia’s request that acts of alleged genocide should be proven on the ‘‘balance of
the probabilities,’’ the Court pronounced that ‘‘claims against a State involving
charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive.’’112
The ICJ has been critiqued for applying a standard of proof akin to those used in
criminal proceedings to a suit that was civil in nature. The Court does not have
criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, the ICJ’s own opinion concedes that ‘‘international law
does not recognize the criminal responsibility of the State, and the Genocide Conven-
tion does not provide a vehicle for the imposition of such criminal responsibility.’’113
Although, to assess claims of genocide, the Court did have to make findings that
were criminal in nature. Further, the provisions of the UNCG are predominantly
criminal, as opposed to the Geneva Conventions that are ‘‘mixed.’’ However, while
adopting a standard of proof equivalent to that of a criminal trial under these circum-
stances is arguably defensible, it raises a new set of difficulties. As Groome posits,
‘‘Given a standard of proof equivalent to that of a criminal trial for an inquiry that
obliges the ICJ to examine the states of minds of individuals not before it, one
wonders how an applicant could ever meet that burden.’’114 Stated differently, the
ICJ had to ascertain the criminal intent of individuals over whom the Court had no
jurisdiction while adhering to a high standard of proof.
Even more disconcerting, however, was that the ICJ did not evaluate all avail-
able evidence at its disposal. One oft-cited example was the Court’s refusal to
consider ‘‘redacted’’ sections of documents from the Supreme Defense Council of
Serbia. During the ICTY trial of Slobodan Milosevic, hundreds of documents were
produced marked ‘‘Defense. State Secret. Strictly Confidential.’’115 Described as
‘‘incriminating,’’ these documents contained meeting minutes of Yugoslavia’s political
and military leaders promising ‘‘the best inside view of Serbia’s role in the Bosnian
war . . .’’116 However, citing national security concerns, Serbia obtained permission to
keep parts of these documents confidential.117
The New York Times reported that attorneys who reviewed these documents
attested that they demonstrated how Belgrade financed the war.118 They reportedly
contained evidence that the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), though officially separate
after 1992, remained a de facto extension of the Yugoslav Army, and that ‘‘the
archives showed in verbatim records and summaries of meetings that Serbian forces,
including secret police, played a role in the takeover of Srebrenica and in prepara-
tion of the massacre there.’’119 Notwithstanding, the ICJ declined to investigate
these documents, reasoning that Bosnia already had ‘‘extensive documentation and
other evidence available to it . . .’’120 This failure to examine what might have been
the most available dispositive evidence of state culpability raises doubts about the
Court’s conclusion that Serbia did not commit genocide.
Concerns also stem from the criteria used in evaluating the admissible evidence
of state complicity. Bosnia alleges that Serbia supplied the VRS with aid and assis-
tance at a time when Serbian authorities were ‘‘clearly aware that genocide was
about to take place or was underway.’’121 In order to hold Serbia liable for the
actions of certain non-de jure organs, including the VRS and several paramilitary en-
tities, some form of state control had to be demonstrated. The ICJ used the ‘‘effective
control test’’ instead of the ‘‘overall control test’’ proposed by Bosnia and exercised by
the ICTY. ‘‘Effective control’’ requires either that there be ‘‘complete dependence’’ on
the controlling authority or that specific ‘‘instructions’’ be given for each operation
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in which violations occur, as opposed to ‘‘generally in respect of the overall actions
taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations.’’122 The
ICJ’s justification for this higher standard, enunciated in Nicaragua v. United States
of America,123 was that ‘‘this is the state of customary international law’’ as reflected
in article 8 of the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility.124
However, as Brunell University law professor Ademola Abass points out, custom-
ary international law does not ‘‘cast the particular form of that control in stone . . .
The jurisprudence of other international tribunals treats the required control with
some degree of flexibility.’’125 For example, the ICTY has found that ‘‘the ‘overall
control’ test could thus be fulfilled even if the armed forces acting on behalf of the
‘controlling state’ had autonomous choices and tactics although participating in a
common strategy along with the controlling State.’’126
In Tadic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber endorsed the ‘‘overall control’’ test by
explaining,
The requirement of international law for the attribution to States of acts performed
by private individuals is that the State exercise control over the individual. The
degree of control may, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each
case. The Appeals Chamber fails to see why in each and every circumstance interna-
tional law should require a high threshold for the test of control.127
While allowing that ‘‘overall control’’ may be the appropriate standard when examin-
ing international humanitarian law, the Court’s application of the more demanding
‘‘effective control’’ test used to apply a state’s responsibility colors the perception of
how conclusions were drawn regarding Serbia’s role.
For instance, evidence documented from previous tribunal cases illustrate that in
late 1993, over 1,800 officers and noncommissioned Yugoslav Army men were also
serving in the Bosnian Serb Army while being deployed, paid, or promoted by
Belgrade. Top military brass were given dual identities and Belgrade created the
30th Personnel Center described as ‘‘a secret office for dealing with officers listed in
both armies.’’128 The Court even acknowledges that Serbia was ‘‘making its consi-
derable military and financial support available to the Republika Srpska, and had it
withdrawn that support, this would have greatly constrained the options that were
available . . .’’129 Notwithstanding, the ICJ was only willing to find state liability if
Belgrade gave direct ‘‘instructions’’ for specific actions or whenever Bosnian Serbs
were ‘‘completely dependent’’ upon Belgrade.130
As Ruth Wedgwood, an international law professor at Johns Hopkins University,
exclaims, ‘‘This will be a surprise to scholars of ordinary tort law, who are accus-
tomed to supposing that responsibility can be shared.’’131 Wedgwood also notes that
this requirement conflicts with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,
passed in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, confirming that no
state can provide intelligence, logistics, or financing to terrorist activities.132 In a dis-
senting opinion, ICJ vice-president Al-Khasawneh concludes: ‘‘The inherent danger
in such an approach is that it gives States the opportunity to carry out criminal
policies through non-state actors or surrogates without incurring direct responsibility
therefore.’’133
Further, the Court’s finding that Serbia did not ‘‘control’’ the relevant forces yet
failed to prevent the Srebrenica genocide seems incongruent (implying that Serbia
could have prevented the genocide despite not having sufficient control over perti-
nent actors). With a crime as vast and complex as genocide, it is unlikely that any
one participant is going to have ‘‘effective control’’ over certain events. The crime of
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genocide is compounded, requiring coordination and support from multiple sources.
Accordingly, article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute recognizes the perpetration of a crime
through four possible methods of control: direct perpetration; perpetration through
another person or indirect perpetration; co-perpetration based on joint control; or
indirect co-perpetration.134
Indirect control is ‘‘applicable when some or all the co-perpetrators carry out
their respective essential contributions to the common plan through another per-
son.’’135 During the confirmation of charges in the Lubanga and Katanga and
Ngudjolo cases, the ICC described complicity based on joint control:
The concept of co-perpetration based on joint control over the crime is rooted in the
principle of division of essential tasks for the purpose of committing a crime between
two or more persons acting in a concerted manner. Hence, although none of the par-
ticipants has overall control over the offence because they all depend on one another
for its commission, they all share control because each of them could frustrate the
commission of the crime by not carrying out his or her task.136
The more flexible ‘‘control’’ standards enumerated by both the ICC and the ICTY
are in contrast to the ICJ’s rigid requirement of direct ‘‘instructions’’ or complete
dependence on the controlling authority. Accordingly, the ICJ needs to recognize
that ‘‘control’’ can be exercised within varying levels, degrees, and methods.
‘‘Ethnic Cleansing’’ and Systemic Patterns of Abuse
Another shortcoming was the ICJ’s approach in appraising evidence of a ‘‘genocidal
pattern.’’ Bosnia sought to demonstrate a consistent pattern of genocidal conduct
adduced over a period of years. To do so, the intentions and actions of Serbian
political and military leaders had to be assessed. The Court considered a document
derived under the auspices of the Bosnian Serb Assembly entitled Decision on the
Strategic Goals of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia contended
that this document indicated that both Radovan Karadzic (president of Republika
Srpska from 1992 to 1996) and Milosevic supported the goal of separating Serbia
from the ‘‘other two ethnic communities.’’137
The ICJ’s reason for rejecting this argument is twofold: first, the Court main-
tained that ethnic cleansing alone does not constitute genocide and Bosnia’s applica-
tion failed to ‘‘come to terms with the fact that an essential motive of much of the
Bosnian Serb leadership—to create a larger Serb State, by a war of conquest if
necessary—did not necessarily require the destruction of the Bosnian Muslims and
other communities, but their expulsion.’’138 The ICJ cited with approval the ICTY
Trial Chamber’s holding that ‘‘a clear distinction must be drawn between physical
destruction and mere dissolution of a group. The expulsion of a group or part of
a group does not in itself suffice for genocide.’’139 While proposing a theoretical
hypothesis, this explanation fails to explain what actually did transpire. As Abass
inquired: ‘‘If the simple goal of Serbia was to simply establish a State of Serbia,
as the Court claimed, how then does one account for all the killings that took
place?’’140
In a separate opinion to the second 1993 provisional order, ad hoc Judge Elihu
Lauterpacht reasonably asked, ‘‘Has genocide been committed?’’ He noted that
. . . the forced migration of civilians, more commonly known as ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ is,
in truth, part of a deliberate campaign by the Serbs to eliminate Muslim control of,
and presence in, substantial parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . it is difficult to regard
the Serbian acts as other than acts of genocide . . . they are clearly directed against
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an ethnical or religious group as such, and they are intended to destroy that group,
if not in whole certainly in part, to the extent necessary to ensure that the group no
longer occupied the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina coveted by the Serbs.141
However, this view was not embraced by the majority of the Court.
Citing a report from the UN Commission of Experts, which concluded that the
blockage of humanitarian aid was used to assist the takeover of Sarajevo, the ICJ
found that ‘‘civilian members of the protected group were deliberately targeted by
Serb forces in Sarajevo and other cities . . . UNHCR food and fuel convoys had been
‘obstructed or attacked by Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces and sometimes
also by governmental forces’ ’’142 Moreover, the ICJ highlighted other instances, for
example,
. . . with regard to Gorazde, the Special Rapporteur found that the enclave was being
shelled and had been denied convoys of humanitarian aid for two months. Although
food was being air-dropped, it was insufficient . . . In a later report, the Special
Rapporteur noted that, as of Spring 1994, the town had been subject to a military
offensive by Bosnian Serb forces, during which civilian objects including the hospital
had been targeted and the water supply had been cut off . . . Humanitarian convoys
were harassed including by detention of UNPROFOR personnel and the theft of
equipment . . . Similar patterns occurred in Bihac, Tuzla, Cerska, and Maglaj.143
Despite such evidence, the ICJ concluded that the perpetrators did not act with the
specific intent to destroy the protected group. The Court placed particular emphasis
on the fact that ‘‘[t]he Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights was of the view that the siege, including the shelling of population
centres and the cutting off of supplies of food and other essential goods, is another
tactic used to force Muslims and ethnic Croatians to flee.’’144 In other words, accord-
ing to the ICJ, forcing a particular group to flee did not reflect the intent to destroy.
The Court’s reasoning was recently cited by the ICC when the Pre-Trial Chamber
found insufficient evidence to prosecute al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for geno-
cide in connection with Darfur.145
Second, the ICJ noted that the ICTY made a similar ruling on the same claim,
stating that Bosnia’s contention ‘‘is not consistent with the findings of the ICTY re-
lating to genocide or with the actions of the Prosecutor, including decisions not to
charge genocide offences in possibly relevant indictments, and to enter into plea
agreements . . .’’146 The problem with this rationale, however, is that the ICTY was
not just settling claims of genocide, it was also resolving allegations of crimes against
humanity and war crimes. A prosecutor may exercise discretion, based on various
factors, to plea bargain and/or not charge a particular crime. In other words, unlike
the ICJ, the ICTY had the option of convicting not just for genocide but also for over-
lapping violations. Prosecutors have a predilection for charges that will stick, and it
is likely easier to obtain a conviction for war crimes or crimes against humanity than
for genocide.
Notwithstanding, during the Rule 61 hearing147 in Karadzic and Mladic, the
ICTY prosecutor offered a description of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ that sounds eerily similar
to genocide:
Well, ethnic cleansing is a practice which means that you act in such a way that in a
given territory the members of a given ethnic group are eliminated. It means a prac-
tice that aims at such and such a territory be, as they meant, ethnically pure. So, in
other words, the members of the other group are eliminated by different ways, by dif-
ferent methods. You have massacres. Everybody is not massacred, but I mean in
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terms of numbers, you have massacres in order to scare these populations. Sometimes
these massacres are selective, but they aim at eliminating the elite of a given popula-
tion, but they are massacres. I mean, that is the point. So whenever you have mas-
sacres, naturally the other people are driven away. They are afraid. They try to run
away and you find yourself with a high number of a given people that have been
massacred, persecuted and, of course, in the end these people simply want to leave.
They are also submitted to such pressures that they go away. They are driven away
either on their own initiative or they are deported. But the basic point is for them to
be out of that territory and some of them are sometimes locked up in camps. Some
women are raped and, furthermore, often times what you have is destruction of the
monuments which marked the presence of a given population in a given territory, for
instance, religious places, Catholic churches or mosques are destroyed. So basically,
this is how ethnic cleansing is practiced in the course of this war.148
The prosecutor’s summary of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ brings to mind Lemkin’s broad-
based concept of synchronized attacks ‘‘on different aspects of the life of the captive
peoples . . .’’149
While the prosecutor was hesitant to pursue charges of genocide, the ICTY recog-
nized that ‘‘cleansing’’ could amount to genocide in certain cases:
The policy of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ . . . presents, in its ultimate manifestation, genocidal
characteristics. Furthermore, in this case, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, which is specific to genocide, may be
inferred from the gravity of the ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ practiced in Srebrenica and its sur-
rounding areas, i.e., principally the mass killings of Muslims which occurred after the
fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, which were committed in circumstances manifesting
an almost unparalleled cruelty.150
The Brdanin Trial Chamber also acknowledged that ‘‘ethnic cleansing may under
certain circumstances ultimately reach the level of genocide . . .’’151 However, the
ICJ refused to find that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ reached the level of genocide in instances
other than in Srebrenica.
Similarly, criticism has been directed at the Court’s apparent neglect to properly
weigh genocidal proofs in a cumulative manner. Judge Al-Khasawneh had observed
that ‘‘genocide is definitionally a complex crime in the sense that unlike homicide it
takes time to achieve, requires repetitiveness, and is committed by many persons
and organs acting in concert. As such, it cannot be appreciated in a disconnected
manner. Unfortunately, there are instances in the (Court’s) judgment where this
happens . . .’’152 In determining genocidal intent, the ICJ should have more collec-
tively considered its own findings of ethnic cleansing coupled with ‘‘evidence of kill-
ings of members of the protected group in principal areas of Bosnia [Sarajevo, Drina
River Valley, Prijedor, Banja Luka and Brcko] and in various detention camps.’’153
In addition to Srebrenica, the Court acknowledged ‘‘fully conclusive evidence that
members of the protected group were systematically victims of massive mistreat-
ment, beatings, rape and torture causing serious bodily and mental harm, during
the conflict and, in particular, in the detention camps.’’154 This includes the 1992
killing of civilians in Brcko and the torture and execution of Muslims in Foca.155
The Court appears to treat these as separate, isolated episodes rather than as
systemic patterns of abuse. While granting that these acts may constitute war
crimes and crimes against humanity, the ICJ failed to identify any specific intent to
‘‘destroy, in whole or in part, the (protected) group as such.’’156 This narrow reading
of the evidence conflicts with ICTY jurisprudence that suggests that proof of geno-
cidal intent ‘‘may, in the absence of direct explicit evidence, be inferred from a
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number of facts and circumstances, such as the general context, the scale of atroci-
ties committed, the systematically targeting of victims on account of their member-
ship of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory
acts.’’157 Accordingly, a more holistic analysis might conclude that acts of genocide
occurred in areas outside Srebrenica.
In the end, despite finding ‘‘overwhelming evidence that massive killings in spe-
cific areas and detention camps throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina
were perpetrated during the conflict’’158 and that ‘‘evidence presented shows that the
victims were in large majority members of the protected group, which suggests that
they may have been systematically targeted by the killings,’’159 the only cognizable
claim of genocide recognized by the Court was the Srebrenica slaughter. Further,
this verdict was limited by the finding that Serbia only failed to prevent genocide,
as opposed to it being an accomplice. Furthermore, the ICJ opinion failed to ade-
quately expound upon why the Srebrenica carnage amounted to genocide while other
documented instances of inhumanity and mass murder did not. Unfortunately, these
defects overshadow an otherwise substantial holding that a nation-state can be held
liable under the UNCG and that a state has a duty to prevent genocide.
‘‘Ethnic Cleansing’’ Revisited
Croatia’s allegations against Serbia were remarkably similar to those of Bosnia.
Docketed in 1999, Croatia is suing Serbia for ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ described as ‘‘a
form of genocide . . .’’160 Croatia alleged that Belgrade supported a Croatian Serb
insurgency following Croatia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991,
resulting in killings and displacement of Croatians from the Krajina (an area cover-
ing roughly a third of Croatia).161 Specifically, Croatia charges stated:
By directly controlling the activity of its armed forces, intelligence agents and various
paramilitary detachments, on territory of the Republic of Croatia, in the Knin region,
eastern and western Slavonia, and Dalmatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
liable for the ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ of Croatian citizens from these areas—a form of geno-
cide which resulted in large numbers of Croatian citizens being displaced, killed, tor-
tured or illegally detained, as well as extensive property destruction—and is required
to provide reparation for the resulting damages. In addition, by directing, encourag-
ing, and urging Croatian citizens of Serb ethnicity in the Knin region to evacuate the
area in 1995, as the Republic of Croatia reasserted its legitimate governmental au-
thority (and in the face of clear reassurance emanating from the highest level of the
Croatian government, including the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo
Tudjman, that the local Serbs had nothing to fear and should stay), the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia engaged in conduct amounting to a second round of ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ in violation of the Genocide Convention.162
As a result of Yugoslavia aggression, Croatia alleged,
In Croatia, there were 20,000 dead and 55,000 wounded . . . In 1992, the humani-
tarian crisis in Croatia was at its peak, with approximately 800,000 displaced persons
and refugees . . . Several thousand Croat civilians were taken prisoner and forcibly
transferred to Serbia and other areas . . . Of the 7,000 people later released, 60 per-
cent had spent time in prisons or detention facilities . . . 1,821 cultural monuments
were destroyed or damaged . . . 171,000 housing units . . . were destroyed . . . about 25
per cent of Croatia’s total economic capacity . . . was damaged or destroyed during
1991–1992 . . .163
Serbia initially threatened to countersue, primarily in connection with the Croatian
offensive Operation Storm, launched in August 1995 to recapture the Krajina. Ac-
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cording to Serbia, this resulted in over 200,000 refugees and the murder of civilians
left behind.164 The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia estimated that
there were 680 civilian victims. Veritas, a Serbian documentation center, put the
figure at nearly 1,200.165 According to the ICTY, 350 elderly or ill people were killed
by Croat forces.166 In February 2004, former Croatian generals Ivan Cermak and
Mladen Markac were indicted for crimes against humanity and violations of the
laws or customs of war committed in connection with Operation Storm.167 They,
along with former Croatian general Ante Gotovina, are currently being tried at the
ICTY.168 At the time of this writing, Serbia has been given until 22 March 2010 to
file a response to Croatia’s allegations.169
A particularly revealing set of developments were the events that lead to the
ICTY plea agreement reached with Milan Babic, former president of the self-
proclaimed Serb Republic of Krajina (RSK) from 1991 to 1992. The RSK was founded
in response to the Croatian declaration of independence. Babic believed that the
Serbs in Krajina would become a minority and advocated for the creation of an inde-
pendent Serbian state.170 According to Babic’s indictment, between August 1991
through at least June 1992:
Serb forces, comprised of JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army], Local Serb TO units from
Serbia and Montenegro, Local and Serbian MUP police units, including ‘‘Martic’s
Police,’’ and paramilitary units, attacked and took control of towns, villages and
settlements in the SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina/RSK. After the take-
over, Serb forces, in co-operation with the local Serb authorities, established a regime
of persecutions designed to drive the Croat and other non-Serb civilian populations
from these territories . . . According to the 1991 census the total population of the
SAO Krajina/RSK was 286,716. Croats amounted to 78,611 (27, 42%) of the total
population. Only 1,932 (0, 67%) Muslims were registered at that time. Virtually the
whole Croat, Muslim and non-Serb population of the SOA Krajina/RSK was forcibly
removed, deported or killed.171
Babic and Slobodan Milosevic were originally allies, but had a falling out over a dis-
agreement of the 1992 cease-fire between Croatia and the insurgency. As a result,
Babic was ‘‘unceremoniously removed from office at the beginning of 1992 by Serbia’s
President.’’172 In September 2001, Babic was named as a co-perpetrator in the initial
ICTY indictment issued against Milosevic.173 The following year, Babic voluntarily
testified during Milosevic’s trial that the former Serbian president exercised political,
financial, and military influence over the Serb minority in Croatia.174 Whether out of
vengeance or remorse, Babic was willing to provide self-incriminating testimony that
was ‘‘of major significance to the Prosecution’s case and substantially reduced its
need for further in-depth investigations and presentation of evidence.’’175
According to Babic, the Krajina area was underdeveloped and the RSK could not
have been sustained without Serbia’s financial support.176 This testimony was corro-
borated by former US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, who asserted that
Krajina was ‘‘a completely impoverished region that could not exist even at the very
low level that it existed without financial support from Serbia.’’177 Babic further
explained,
most of the commanding cadre, commanding staff [in the Croatian Serb Army] were
active officers of the JNA who were on the JNA payroll. They were paid by the
General Staff of the Yugoslav Army and appointed to those positions by the personnel
department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People’s Army. The commanders of
the army were appointed by . . . Slobodan Milosevic-and it was financed, logistics sup-
port was given by Yugoslavia.178
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Babic’s indictment, issued in November 2003, contained charges of murder, forced
deportation, prolonged and routine imprisonment, and destruction of localities,
homes, and cultural institutions.179 Pursuant to an agreed upon plea, Babic con-
fessed to acting as a co-perpetrator. The prosecutor recommended a sentence of no
more than eleven years, taking into consideration Babic’s cooperation in testifying
against Milosevic.180 Babic was subsequently sentenced to thirteen years, which
was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber.181 On 5 March 2006 (six days before
Milosevic’s death), Babic reportedly committed suicide in a prison cell.
Milosevic was ultimately charged on three separate ICTY indictments related
to Kosovo,182 Bosnia and Herzegovina,183 and Croatia.184 The Croatia indictment
contained thirty-two counts, including criminal responsibility for crimes against
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws
and customs of war. (Unlike the Bosnian indictment,185 the Croatian indictment did
not contain specific charges of genocide.)186 These acts consisted of a ‘‘joint criminal
enterprise’’ calculated to bring about the ‘‘forcible removal of the Croat and other
non-Serb population . . .’’187 The reference to a ‘‘joint criminal enterprise’’ indicates
that the crimes alleged weren’t perpetrated by Milosevic alone but in concert with
other entities and individuals.
Methods included murder, prolonged imprisonment, creating inhumane living
conditions for Croat and other non-Serb civilians in detention centers, torture, the
destruction of homes and cultural institutions, and the deportation of ‘‘at least
170,000 Croat and other non-Serb civilians . . .’’188 Although Milosevic died prior to
the trial reaching a conclusion, the evidence against the defendant, buttressed by
Babic’s testimony, will likely be offered to support Croatia’s claims against Serbia.
Certainly, as president of Serbia during the period in question, Milosevic’s actions
and motives were relevant to Croatia’s allegations.
Notably, pursuant to a Rule 98 hearing, the ICTY found there was sufficient evi-
dence substantiating most counts challenged in the Croatian indictment so that the
Trial Chamber could convict Milosevic.189 These included charges of persecution,
extermination, murder, and killing.190 Similar to a summary judgement motion in
domestic civil proceedings, a Rule 98bis requires the Court to determine if there is
adequate evidence upon which the Trial Chamber could enter a conviction. While
the ICJ has held that it doesn’t give weight to Rule 98 decisions since they don’t con-
stitute a final judgement,191 the Court should be willing to independently examine
the evidence relied upon by the ICTY.
Consequently, the ICTY also found sufficient evidence to convict Milosevic of geno-
cide in relation to Bosnia’s claims.192 According to the Trial Chamber, the proofs
indicated that the ‘‘[a]ccused was the dominant political figure in Serbia and he had
profound influence over the Bosnia Serb political and military authorities.’’193 This
includes evidence that ‘‘there was a basic level of support from Serbia to the Bosnian
Serbs and in particular to the Bosnian Serb Military. The Bosnian Serb Military
emphasized that the chain of command really ran to Belgrade.’’194 The Court cited
testimony from key fact witnesses such as Babic and Galbraith.195 The later asserted
that Milosevic was ‘‘the architect of a policy of creating Greater Serbia and that little
happened without his knowledge and involvement.’’196 Despite such potentially con-
clusive documentation, the ICJ neglected to independently evaluate evidence gleaned
from the Milosevic trial.197 As Groome concludes:
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. . . the ICJ should have conducted its own examination of this evidence. Such a review
was all the more compulsory in view of the Milosevic trial chamber’s finding that the
evidence could establish not only that Milosevic, by himself, could be convicted of the
crime of genocide, but that he was a member of a joint criminal enterprise comprised
of other senior members of the FRY government similarly engaged in genocidal
crimes . . .198
On the surface, it’s difficult to fathom the ICJ’s arriving at a substantially different
conclusion (from the holding reached in Bosnia) with the current Croatian litigation
considering the similarities and overlaps between the Croatian and Bosnian claims
(i.e., that Serbia committed genocide). At the risk of appearing inconsistent, the
Court would need to examine previously overlooked evidence in a more connected
fashion and conclude that it rises to the level of genocide. But Milosevic’s actions as
head of state and his relationship with Babic and other Serbian leaders and entities
could be dispositive issues the ICJ will need to resolve in assessing Croatia’s alle-
gations. If and how the Court reviews evidence from the Milosevic trial may well
influence the outcome.
The Intent to ‘‘Destroy’’
Regardless of how the ICJ ultimately rules, the Court should use this opportunity
to illuminate when and if evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ can satisfy the mens rea
intent to ‘‘destroy in whole or in part . . .’’ a protected group. What seems paramount
to the Bosnia holding is the insistence that the horrific acts described, both alleged
and acknowledged, were not accompanied with the specific intent to destroy the pro-
tected group. The ICTY reached similar conclusions, writing that
the dolus specialis has not been proved in relation to ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part.’’ The Trial Chamber recalls in this context that deporting a group or part of a
group is insufficient if it is not accompanied by methods seeking the physical destruc-
tion of the group.199
But must the ‘‘intent’’ element be required to correlate directly to the prohibited acts
contained in article 2 of the UNCG, or should intent be interpreted more broadly to
include motivation to destroy the protected group as a social unit?
As noted, the ICTY also did not find genocidal intent despite evidence of ‘‘ethnic
cleansing.’’200 However, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kristic instruc-
tively cited the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which stated that
the statutory definition of genocide defends a supra-individual object of legal protec-
tion, i.e., the social existence of the group . . . the intent to destroy the group . . .
extends beyond physical and biological extermination . . . The text of the law does not
therefore compel the interpretation that the culprit’s intent must be to exterminate
physically at least a substantial number of the members of the group . . .201
While the Trial Chamber declined to fully endorse this approach, the Court acknowl-
edged that ‘‘where there is physical or biological destruction there are often simulta-
neous attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted
group as well, attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent
to physically destroy the group.’’202
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The Appeals Chamber in Krstic allowed that
[t]he fact that the forcible transfer does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act
does not preclude a Trail Chamber from relying on it as evidence of the intentions of
members of the VRS Main Staff. The genocidal intent may be inferred, among other
facts, from evidence of ‘‘other culpable acts systematically directed against the same
group.’’203
These dicta hint at a coherent method in evaluating genocidal intent: the perpetrator
does not have to intend to commit genocide per se. Intention is satisfied when the
goal is to ‘‘destroy’’ a protected group, broadly understood. While the complete de-
finition of ‘‘genocide’’ may require physical or biological destruction (i.e., killing),
methods aimed at ‘‘destroying’’ a protected group should not be so narrowly con-
strued. There are multiple ways that a protected group can be destroyed as a social
unit (i.e., ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’). If, in the process, a prohibited act under the UNCG is
carried out, then evidence of genocide is demonstrated.
A more expansive approach at analyzing intent was embraced by the European
Court of Human Rights in Jorgic v. Germany.204 The Higher Regional Court at
Dusseldorf convicted Nicolai Jorgic, a Bosnian Serb, of eleven counts of genocide,
which included the murder of thirty people. The Court held that the ‘‘intent to de-
stroy’’ did not ‘‘necessitate an intent to destroy that group in a physical or biological
sense. It was sufficient that the perpetrator aimed at destroying the group in ques-
tion as a social unit.’’205 After the conviction was upheld on appeal, Jorgic pleaded
to the European Court of Human Rights that the exercise of universal jurisdiction
violated article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In rejecting the defendant’s application, the European Court examined the mean-
ing of the phrase ‘‘intent to destroy’’ as contained in article 220a of Germany’s
Criminal Code dealing with genocide. The Court noted that the wording of article 2
of the UNCG corresponds to article 220a of the Criminal Code, which interprets ‘‘the
Genocide Convention so as to comprise the protection of a group as a social unit.’’206
Accordingly, the Court concluded that
the domestic courts’ interpretation of ‘‘intent to destroy a group’’ as not necessitating
a physical destruction of the group, which has also been adopted by a number of
scholars . . . , is therefore covered by the wording, read in its context, of the crime of
genocide in the Criminal Code and does not appear unreasonable.207
In contrast to the European Court, the ICJ postulated that
the intent that characterizes genocide is ‘‘to destroy, in whole or in part’’ a particular
group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by
force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is destruction
an automatic consequence of displacement. This is not to say that acts described as
‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ may never constitute genocide, if they are such as to be charac-
terized as, for example, ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,’’ contrary to Article
II, paragraph c, of the Convention, provided such action is carried out with the neces-
sary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with a view to the destruction of
the group, as distinct from its removal from the region.208
The Court’s interpretation is problematic. First, it appears to define ‘‘destruction of
the group’’ as limited to physical destruction. Second, when ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ gives
rise to murder, the resultant killing is not happenstance. The ‘‘intent to destroy’’
(a ‘‘substantial’’ portion of )209 a protected group is only one component of genocide.
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Committing a prohibited act, such as murder, completes the criminal definition.
There are many ways a protected group can be ‘‘destroyed.’’ Interpretation of the
UNCG should not require the intent to carry out ‘‘genocide’’ per se, but rather the
intent to ‘‘destroy’’ the social unit of a protected group. If, in the process, a prohibited
act such as murder is contemporaneously performed, then genocide can be inferred.
As noted, the judicial inquiry raised is whether the required ‘‘intent to destroy’’
should be interpreted to strictly refer to the prohibited acts defined by the UNCG. As
Schabas explains, ‘‘an important problem of interpretation arises as to whether the
destruction that is part of the intent, in the first part of article II, must correspond
to the physical or biological destruction defined in the second part of article II.’’210
Schabas points out that the International Law Commission considered this issue
during the drafting of the Code of Crimes and concluded:
As clearly shown by the preparatory work for the Convention, the destruction in ques-
tion is the material destruction of a group either by physical or biological means, not
the destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a
particular group. The national or religious element and racial or ethnic element are
to be taken into consideration in the definition of the word ‘‘destruction,’’ which must
be taken only in its material sense, its physical or biological sense. It is true that the
1947 draft Convention prepared by the Secretary-General and the 1948 draft pre-
pared by the ad hoc Committee on Genocide contained provisions on ‘‘cultural geno-
cide’’ covering any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language,
religion or cultural of a group, such as prohibiting the use of language of a group in
daily intercourse or in schools or the printing and circulation of publications in the
language of the group or destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums,
schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and
objects of the group. However, the text of the Convention, as prepared by the Sixth
Committee and adopted by the General Assembly, did not include the concept of
‘cultural genocide’ contained in the two drafts and simply listed acts which come
within the category of ‘‘physical’’ or ‘‘biological’’ genocide.211
However, when physical or biological destruction is perpetrated in the context of
‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ or some type of ‘‘cultural genocide,’’ are courts to presume such
destruction to be incidental? Does this interpretation make sense in the face of wide-
spread violence, murder, and abuse? If so, can evidence of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ be used
to actually refute genocide claims? (For example, the ICJ relying on the Special
Rapporteur’s conclusion that cutting off food supplies was motivation enough to
cause Muslims and Croatians to flee.)212 These results certainly do not mirror the
letter and spirit of the UNCG. As Schabas succinctly considers:
A court seeking to adopt the broader and more liberal view [of intent] could, however,
rely on the text itself, the objectives of the Convention, the need for dynamic interpre-
tation of legal instruments that protect human rights, and the principle established in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which authorizes resort to a conven-
tion’s preparatory work only when the ordinary meaning of the provision, taken in
its context and in light of its object and purpose, leaves a provision ‘‘ambiguous or
obscure.’’213
Absent careless negligence, the broader interpretation suggested in Jorgic, is the
only logical application when the ‘‘intent to destroy’’ culminates in genocidal conduct.
Instructively, this is underscored in Blagojevic, where the ICTY Trial Chamber
recognized the ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ objective behind the Srebrenica massacre:
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Immediately before and during these massacres, the remainder of the Bosnian Muslim
population of Srebrenica was forcibly transferred to Bosnian Muslim-held territory.
The forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly is a manifestation of the
specific intent to rid the Srebrenica enclave of its Bosnian Muslim population. The
manner in which the transfer was carried out—through force and coercion, by not
registering those who were transferred, by burning the houses of some of the people,
sending the clear message that they had nothing to return to, and significantly,
through its targeting of literally the entire Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica,
including the elderly and children—clearly indicates that it was a means to eradicate
the Bosnian Muslim population from the territory where they had lived.214
Further, it is unlikely that the architects of the UNCG could have anticipated all the
subsequent conditions which have produced genocidal violence. Provocatively, Shaw
questions whether changes in historical trends affect the very nature and perception
of genocide: ‘‘Is the problem posed differently today compared with the period when
the concept [of genocide] was developed? . . . Are the forms of genocide changing?
Are there significant patterns in these changes at the beginning of our new century?
And has the conceptual proliferation [i.e., the term ‘ethnic cleansing’] represented
attempts, confused perhaps, to register historical transformation?’’215
Shaw’s point is that the nature of genocide is not fixed or static. It is multi-
faceted, comprehensive, and variable. While it is unlikely that international courts
will adopt a broader definition of genocide beyond the parameters of the UNCG,
they need to articulate an understanding of genocidal intent that accounts for chang-
ing circumstances and methods. The ‘‘intent to destroy’’ can manifest in many ways.
‘‘Ethnic cleansing’’ might demonstrate such intent, and when accompanied by a pro-
hibited act such as killing, a finding of genocide should be judicially permitted.
Conclusion
The Bosnian genocide case is arguably the most complex matter the ICJ has ever
presided over. To determine state culpability, the ICJ had to assess individual crimi-
nal actions, a task for which it was ill-suited, ensuring a relationship of dependency
with findings of the ICTY. Difficulties were further exacerbated by questionable
methods over what and how to evaluate evidence. Furthermore, the context of ongo-
ing civil strife presented explicit compliance problems that rendered provisional
edicts ineffective. Since the ICJ is the only Court with jurisdiction over nation-states
(the ICC and ICTY have jurisdiction over individuals), it is likely that state respon-
sibility will continue to be contested in this forum when allegations of genocide arise.
Accordingly, reform measures could bolster the Courts ability to analyze complex
facts and better ascertain evidential findings.
Since the ICJ is a court of both first and last impression, it must make dual
findings of fact and law. The Court would benefit from a separate fact-finding com-
mission to evaluate evidential proofs ‘‘when the facts and their elucidation are para-
mount.’’216 If designed as a hybrid entity, this body can incorporate characteristics
similar to both a domestic trial court and prosecutor’s office, with powers of subpoena
and the ability to evaluate witness/expert testimony. The ICJ can then more appro-
priately concern itself with rendering legal opinions based on the facts presented
by the commission. Susan Sa´Couto, director of the War Crimes Research Office at
American University, suggests that such a commission might be useful in providing
preliminary analysis of the best available evidence.217
Similarly, an alternative proposal is to modify the Court’s rules to provide for a
special master to assist with making factual findings.218 The US Supreme Court has
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a comparable modus operandi in matters of original jurisdiction. This might aid the
Court with analyzing pertinent evidence in a more precise fashion. Such reforms
could assist with identifying systemic patterns of abuse, adduced over a period of
time, suggestive of genocidal intent. In addition, it might result in less dependency
on the corresponding work of other courts.
Meanwhile, the significance of the ICJ’s bold ruling establishing an affirmative
duty for nation-states to prevent genocide, to the extent possible, must not be over-
looked. Historically, genocide is virtually always carried out with implicit knowledge
and/or assistance from state authority.219 Providing a cause of action against these
states could both discourage state complicity with genocidal acts and encourage mea-
sures to pro-actively prevent such acts from developing. This prospect is particularly
noteworthy considering the apparent ineffectiveness of the ICJ’s interim measures.
The duty to prevent is an important legal principle that will continue to evolve in
international law.220
As originally proposed, the term genocide conveyed not just mass killings but
also methods designed to dilute a group’s economic, political, and cultural power.
The meaning of genocide has subsequently been more narrowly construed to denote
only conduct calculated to bring about biological or physical destruction, as defined
by the prohibited acts contained in article 2 of the UNCG. Given the many ways an
unwanted group can be targeted, justice would be better served if courts considered
the broader sociological concept advocated by Lemkin. This could be achieved, not by
expanding the list of specific prohibited acts, but through interpreting the ‘‘intent to
destroy’’ so that it includes measures aimed at disrupting the protected group as a
social unit.
While conceived in the aftermath of the Nazi-driven Holocaust, the UNCG has
been interpreted against the backdrop of changing international conditions and
diverse methods of repression. Techniques and circumstances may vary, but the in-
tent to ‘‘destroy’’ a particular group, broadly understood, remains the distinguishing
feature of both genocide and related humanitarian crimes such as ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’
The role that this plays in adjudicating claims of genocide needs to be further estab-
lished. In Croatia, the ICJ has another opportunity to elaborate on the nexus
between ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and genocidal intent. Such a contribution will better
reflect the realities of how genocide can unfold in the twenty-first century.
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Genocidal Intentions: Social Death and
the Ex-Gay Movement
Sue E. Spivey and Christine M. Robinson
James Madison University
In this article, the authors contribute to the literature on predicting and prevent-
ing genocide in an international context, focusing on social death practices elabo-
rated in articles II(b)–(e) of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG). Analyzing ex-gay movement
texts, the authors apply James Waller’s theoretical framework, which explains
how ordinary people commit extraordinary acts of brutality, to the rhetoric and
public policy advocacy of prominent ex-gay movement organizations and entre-
preneurs. Further, they examine the extent to which this new religious movement
promotes public policies in the United States and globally, and argue that these
policies constitute social death as genocide of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and trans-
gender peoples based on the UNCG definition. The authors conclude that empha-
sizing mass murder at the expense of social death constricts our view of genocide
at an enormous human cost, including predicting and preventing mass murder,
and accentuating the aftermath of genocide, leaving articles II(b)–(e) diminished,
understudied, and, therefore, discounted in comparison. They suggest that revitaliz-
ing scholarship on social death will broadly enrich the field of genocide studies and
enhance collective efforts to forecast and avert genocide in all of its manifestations.
Key words: genocide, religion, homosexuality, politics, social movements
Genocidal Intentions: The Ex-Gay Movement and Social Death
Rapidly proliferating since the 1990s, the cross-disciplinary study of genocide has
been conceptualized and approached in vastly different ways. Since 1948, interna-
tional law has defined the characteristics and forms of genocide. However, genocide
scholars have identified a number of conceptual shortcomings in the United Nations’
criteria. Four of the most prominent are that: (1) the definition of genocide lacks
clarity, (2) the definition fails to include political and social groups, (3) the meaning
of ‘‘intent’’ (as in ‘‘intent to destroy’’) is unclear, and (4) the scope of destruction (‘‘in
whole or in part’’) is not clearly defined.1 Given these concerns, scholars have
invested considerable attention toward proposing alternative conceptualizations of
genocide. In the end, however, international law recognizes only the official definition
from the United Nations Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG).
Article II of the UNCG defines genocide as ‘‘any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or men-
tal harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Im-
posing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and/or (e) Forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.’’2
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In addition to these conceptual issues, scholars from different disciplines largely
focus on separate sections of the UNCG. Researchers in political science, interna-
tional relations, international law, history, and (some in) sociology typically con-
ceptualize and examine genocide as mass murder, distinguishing it categorically
from other human atrocities that constitute genocide.3 These researchers argue that
mass murder, Article II(a), is a tangible, measurable entity compared to the forms of
genocide listed in articles II(b) through II(e), the muddled social and cultural dimen-
sions. Here scholars contend that limiting the definition to mass murder enhances its
moral status. Further, they argue that expanding the definition reduces the moral
opprobrium attached to the atrocity. While this emphasis has proven fruitful, it has
also constricted our view, accentuating the aftermath of mass murder while neglect-
ing other forms of genocide. Debates among these scholars have been limited to legal
matters after the fact; including the role of diplomacy, sovereignty, failed states,
intervention strategies, and punishment procedures. This emphasis on genocide
as mass murder, postmortem, has left UNCG articles II(b) through II(e) diminished,
understudied, and, as a result, discounted.
In contrast, anthropologists, social philosophers, social psychologists, and (prior
to the early 1990s) sociologists predominantly emphasize the social and cultural pro-
cesses which precede and accompany physical death, including those forms of geno-
cide elaborated in UNCG articles II(b)–(e).4 These scholars conceptualize genocide as
part of a continuum of oppression, violence, and inequality, locating mass murder at
one end and social death and symbolic violence at the other. Building from Orlando
Patterson’s5 concept of social death, philosopher Claudia Card asserts that genocide
is not, in its essence, physical death, since genocide involves physical and psycholog-
ical torture, humiliation, and other forms of degradation.6 Rather, she argues, geno-
cide is fundamentally about the destruction of a culture—the annihilation of cultural
identity, heritage and intergenerational bonds, associations, and relations: ‘‘The very
idea of selecting victims by social group identity suggests that it is not just the phy-
sical life of victims that is targeted but the social vitality behind that identity.’’7 This
is why the UNCG definition of genocide includes physical and psychological torture,
the seizing of a group’s children, or denying a group’s capacity to reproduce. Thus,
these scholars focus on these means of eradicating the cultural identity of a group
for the next generation, or social death, as a primary issue in genocide research.
Yet in comparison, the literature on mass murder is considerably more substantial.
Regardless of the emphasis, scholars agree that genocide is a planned, coordinated,
long-term process, not simply a spontaneous event. Further, scholars agree that the
purpose of studying genocide is prediction and prevention.8 In this article, we seek to
contribute to this objective by identifying the ideology and practices that constitute
social death forms of genocide against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) peoples, perpetrated by the ex-gay movement.
Prior to the development of genocide as a type of crime under international law,
male and female homosexuals in European Christian nations were routinely put to
death or tortured for the crime of sodomy from the fourteenth through the twentieth
century.9 Significantly, genocidal acts committed by the Nazis against homosexuals10
were not recognized as such, because, as genocide scholar Jack Porter notes, ‘‘under
the Nuremberg Laws in which genocide was defined after the war, the killing of
homosexuals was not considered a crime against humanity or a war crime.’’11 Porter
also notes that the anti-gay bias of major genocide scholars themselves has led them,
at best, to dismiss considering whether gays and lesbians were victims of the Nazi
genocide, and, at worst, to categorize them as ‘‘criminals, perverts, and deviants.’’12
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Today, five nations (Iran, Mauritania, Saudia Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, and parts of
Nigeria and Somalia) punish homosexual acts with death, and another eighty coun-
tries criminalize homosexuality.13
Although the original UNCG classification of genocide did not include social (or
political) groups, the recent International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda established
such a precedent by defining possible victims as a group sharing a common culture.14
Further, Mohammed Abed identifies the features that make social groups vulnerable
to genocide, and articulates a compelling case for including gays and lesbians in
genocide research.15 The United Nations has also begun to formally recognize human
rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In 2008, sixty-
six countries (including the United States) signed the United Nations’ statement
‘‘Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity’’ that condemns human
rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Citing this UN
statement, on 4 June 2009, the Organization of American States’ General Assembly
adopted Resolution 2504, which went much further than condemning such acts.16
Noting ‘‘with concern acts of violence and related human rights violations perpe-
trated against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity,’’
the OAS resolution urged states to ensure that such acts ‘‘are investigated and their
perpetrators brought to justice.’’ Finally, the Resolution called for the Committee on
Juridical and Political Affairs to include this issue on its next agenda and for the
Permanent Council to report to the General Assembly at its next session on its
implementation.
Given these developments, an analysis of ex-gay movement ideology, discourse,
and political strategy will lend clarity to our research questions: To what extent
does ex-gay ideology constitute part of the genocidal continuum against LGBT peo-
ples? To what extent does the ex-gay movement advocate genocide based on the
1948 UNCG definition? Analyzing movement texts, we use James Waller’s17 social
psychological theory to assess the extent to which this movement promotes public
policies that constitute genocide and the social death of LGBT peoples.
The Ex-Gay Movement: Origin and Global Emergence
Social scientists have long established that social movements are powerful agents
of social change. During the past forty years, conservative Christian political organi-
zations in the United States have mobilized to counter social changes advanced by
feminist and gay and lesbian liberation movements. During this same period, the
ex-gay movement, a lesser-known phenomenon, has grown steadily from a handful
of evangelical Christian ministries in the early 1970s into a global movement in the
twenty-first century, seeking to advance an ambitious public policy agenda.18
The ex-gay movement is predominantly an evangelical Christian Right social
movement which aims to purge society of homosexuality and transgenderism. It
was formed in the early 1970s to counter the American Psychiatric Association’s
declassification of homosexuality as a mental disorder in 1973. The movement pro-
motes the belief that same-sex attraction (SSA) is a developmental gender identity
disorder; that homosexual identity and behavior are inherently sinful and destruc-
tive to society; and that ‘‘people with SSA’’ can be re-oriented to heterosexuality
through religious and/or psychological interventions. In response, prominent medical
and mental health associations in the United States have issued statements oppos-
ing ‘‘reparative’’ and ‘‘conversion’’ therapies, and have discouraged professionals
from attempts to change sexual orientation.19 Today, the movement has grown into
an international network of religious, scientific, and political organizations using the
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existence of ‘‘ex-gays’’ to claim that homosexuals can change. This notion is funda-
mental to their political argument that unlike legal protections based on immutable
traits such as race or sex those based on sexual orientation are not legitimate.20
As we will show, in the public policy arena, and pertinent to the UNCG articles
II(b)–(e), ex-gay organizations and advocates have sought to legitimize potentially
harmful therapies; uphold the criminalization of private homosexual sexual relations
between consenting adults; prevent legal family recognition of same-sex couples; and
advocate legislation that would prevent gays and lesbians from adopting children,
serving as foster parents, or having access to medical technologies that would enable
them to become parents. In addition, they oppose including sexual orientation or
gender identity in hate crime statutes and anti-discrimination policies.
For decades, the Christian Right has amassed recruits and resources in the
United States through anti-gay politics.21 In the twenty-first century, it is using
gender and sexuality as prime vehicles to consolidate power on a global scale. The
ex-gay movement is a vital component of its domestic public policy strategy and its
evangelical strategy abroad. The movement is rapidly globalizing, and has been
imported to some of the most dangerous environments in the world for sexual and
gender minorities.22 Recent scholarship illustrates that American Christianity is
increasingly influencing policies and programs worldwide through the growth of
support for missionaries and churches in other countries and in short-term volunteer
efforts abroad.23 Few are noticing this movement’s global proliferation, their use of
‘‘hate group’’ propaganda, their misuse of science, or the movement’s social impact.
Theoretical Framework
James Waller24 synthesizes a large body of social and psychological scholarship,
organized as a general model, to explain how ordinary people commit extraordinary
acts of brutality. His model presents a wealth of empirical support for the proposi-
tion that perpetrators of cruelty are not exceptional, and that committing acts
of genocide, like other atrocities, does not require evil personalities. Rather, the
evidence demonstrates that a host of social forces and environmental factors
influence such behavior. In Waller’s scheme, there are three major social processes
that explain how individuals become capable of perpetrating brutality toward others:
the cultural construction of a worldview, the psychological construction of the other,
and the social construction of cruelty, each of which are further subdivided into addi-
tional social processes.
The ‘‘cultural construction of worldview’’ refers to the socially constructed frame-
work that shapes individual perceptions of reality and subsequently influences be-
havior. The three components of worldview are: (1) collectivistic values based on
a group identity (these include obedience, conformity, tradition, and order); (2) an
‘‘authority orientation’’ that promotes rigid, hierarchical relations of power; and (3)
social dominance, which establishes the group’s belief in its own supremacy and its
desired control over other groups.
In the second part of the model, ‘‘psychological construction of the other,’’ Waller
outlines the social death processes that explain how perpetrators of brutality become
capable of harming their victims, while distancing themselves from moral culpability
for their actions. ‘‘It is the moral exclusions . . . that help us understand how victims
move from person to nonperson and how perpetrators move from . . . coming to
believe that it is not only right to harm their victims, but it would be wrong not to
do so.’’25 Three social processes are involved: (1) us-them thinking, (2) moral disen-
gagement, and (3) blaming the victim. Us-them thinking explains how perpetrators
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engage in social distancing from their target. Here perpetrators use ethnocentrism
and xenophobia to redefine victims from persons to nonpersons. Moral disengage-
ment occurs when perpetrators distance themselves from the moral implications
of their actions by behavioral justification, the dehumanization of the victims, and
euphemistic labeling of their actions toward the target group. Blaming the victim
involves attaching culpability to victims for their plight. Perpetrators avoid feelings
of guilt since victims are presumed responsible for their own troubles.
The final component of Waller’s model, ‘‘social construction of cruelty,’’ explains
how perpetrators are enveloped by a social context that encourages and rewards
cruelty. There are three processes involved: (1) professional socialization, (2) ritual
conduct, and (3) the binding factors of the group. Professional socialization refers to
the process by which perpetrators assume social roles that encourage them to engage
in outwardly small, escalating commitments which induce later obligations for fur-
ther conformity. Ritual conduct aids in socializing perpetrators for their role and
coping with their cruel behavior. The role begins to shape the individual and his/her
behaviors toward others. Once the self merges with the role, perpetrators solidify
their identities as group members. One’s group identification enables an individual
to repress his/her own conscience and diffuse individual responsibility. The final pro-
cess explains how the desire for acceptance and group pressure to conform further
binds the individual to group demands.
Methods
We use extensive content analysis of ex-gay movement organizational ‘‘texts,’’ includ-
ing the vast literature of printed, online, and audio materials created and promoted
by ex-gay organizations. Overwhelmingly, these ‘‘texts’’ represent the views of move-
ment entrepreneurs, and the official positions of four prominent ex-gay organiza-
tions are included in this analysis: Exodus International (hereafter referred to as
EXODUS), the largest network of evangelical Christian ex-gay ministries, founded
in 1976; its global counterpart, Exodus Global Alliance (hereafter referred to as
EGA); the National Association of Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (here-
after referred to as NARTH), founded in 1992, which views homosexuality as a
developmental disorder; and Focus on the Family (hereafter referred to as FOCUS),
co-founded in 1977 by James Dobson, which seeks to impact public policy from an
evangelical Christian perspective and sponsored (until 2009) the ex-gay ‘‘Love Won
Out’’ (LWO) conferences.
The Ex-Gay Worldview: Collectivist Values, Authority Orientation,
and Social Dominance
Our analysis will illustrate how ex-gay movement entrepreneurs and organizations
fulfill the criteria of Waller’s model. In the sections that follow, we explain how
the movement constructs its collectivist worldview, psychologically constructs homo-
sexuality and homosexuals, and encourages and rewards adherents to perpetrate
cruelty against gays and lesbians.
The worldview promoted by the ex-gay movement is based primarily on one’s
identity as a Christian and the oft-repeated ‘‘values’’ that ostensibly distinguish
Christians from non-Christians. The movement defines ‘‘Christian’’ as mutually ex-
clusive from ‘‘gay.’’ Further, anyone who embraces a LGBT identity is considered
‘‘non-Christian,’’ regardless of that person’s own religious identity, and such non-
Christians are accused of embracing entirely different values and worldviews. Randy
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Thomas, vice president of EXODUS, calls these two perspectives ‘‘warring world-
views.’’26 From this perspective, Christians are defined by their belief in and
obedience to the will of God, for which the Christian Bible is held to be the sole
authority. This authority orientation requires believers to submit absolutely to what
they believe to be the inerrant word of God, and to accept scriptural authority as
supreme. Patricia Lawrence, former executive director of EGA, illustrates this point:
‘‘Listen, scripture is the authority of Christians, it is the way that God speaks to
us, and we must stand firm next to the word of God, because if we don’t, then why
are we Christians, because we have nothing . . . This tells us how to live.’’27 Alan
Chambers, President of EXODUS, also establishes this view as supreme to any
potentially competing authority:
[S]cience can never and should never trump the word of God . . . [which] is the final
authority on this issue. The Bible . . . calls homosexuality . . . a sinful condition . . . our
Christian worldview has to be separate from that of the world, from that of science . . .
God wants us to live lives that are submitted to Him.28
Waller explains that collectivist values define an in-group and an out-group, make
extreme categorical judgments between groups, and police that boundary. Ex-gay
leaders construct acute differences between Christians and gays, including holy/
unholy; healthy/diseased; victim/predator; obedient/disobedient; penitent/unrepentant;
and saved/condemned. From this worldview, being a ‘‘Christian’’ is the only divinely
sanctioned identity and being ‘‘gay’’ is a selfish, corrupt, and a contemptuous affront
to the will of God.
Finally, the ex-gay worldview promotes Christian supremacy and social domi-
nance. Believers proclaim theirs is the one true God, and their biblical mandate is
to manifest God’s Kingdom throughout the world, what they often refer to as the
‘‘Great Commission.’’ Michael Brown, author of Revolution: The Call to Holy War, a
speaker for EXODUS and FOCUS, wrote:
We often conceal ours [Christian views and aims], trying to convince worldly people
that our views are not really extreme, that our faith is completely reasonable, that
our aims are not radical at all. Nonsense! As Christians, we believe that everyone
who rejects our message will be sentenced to eternal punishment by God. That’s ex-
treme! We believe that anyone who does not know the Lord, is a child of Satan. That’s
extreme! . . . We believe it is our mission in life to reach the entire world with the
gospel of Jesus, calling all people to believe in Him. That’s extreme! And we believe
that God’s Word is the standard by which everyone will be judged, in which case, all
who have not been born again are ungodly sinners. That’s extreme!29
Constructing Gays: Us–Them Thinking, Moral Disengagement, and
Blaming the Victim
In this section we apply the social psychological processes that explain how ex-gay
movement leaders construct gays and lesbians as non-persons and thus become
capable of harming them, while distancing themselves from moral culpability for
their actions.
Us–Them Thinking
The ex-gay movement divides ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ into two basic groups: Christians and
non-Christians, yet claims it is God who makes these distinctions and treats each
accordingly. In addition, the movement claims, people choose sides; therefore, each
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individual is responsible for his or her eternal fate. Patricia Lawrence, former execu-
tive director of EGA, illustrated this when she declared, ‘‘There are two identities in
this world. We are either children of Satan, or children of God.’’30 Lawrence subse-
quently spelled out the consequences for those who choose to be ‘‘children of Satan’’:
‘‘. . . let those homosexuals enjoy their life here on Earth, because they are going
to spend an eternity in Hell.’’31 Movement leaders see themselves as ‘‘God’s people’’
doing His will, which enables them to justify their conduct as righteous.
The primary way that ex-gay leaders socially distance themselves from their
victims, as well as their own actions, is by denying that there are homosexual people,
and thus denying the reality of a victim at all. They do this by defining homo-
sexuality as sin, sickness, or a social threat. Homosexuality is variously described
as behaviors, attractions, identities, or more insidiously, as a sinful ‘‘ lifestyle,’’ a
mental illness, or a menacing social ‘‘agenda,’’ thus denying the personhood, indeed
the existence—and the victimization of gay and lesbian people. Constructing homo-
sexuality as a disorder, Joseph Nicolosi, a NARTH co-founder, emphasizes:
There is no such thing as a homosexual. There is no such thing as a homosexual . . .
[A] father called me up a little while back. He said ‘‘Our 15 year old son just
announced to us that he is homosexual and we are trying to find a psychologist that
we can trust who can tell us is he homosexual or not.’’ I said ‘‘He is not.’’ They said
‘‘How do you know? You haven’t seen him yet.’’ I said ‘‘He is designed for a woman . . .
He is heterosexual but he may have a homosexual problem.’’32
In constructing homosexuality as a sinful condition and offering redemption, the ex-
gay movement appears to encourage Christians to be compassionate toward homo-
sexuals. Julie Harren Hamilton, current NARTH president, describes this process at
an EXODUS conference:
It puts it in a different light instead of just seeing it as awful and ugly sin . . . [I]t
takes the focus off of the sin and puts it onto the person who is hurting and lets you
see them in a new light. Instead of just ‘‘sinner’’ you now see ‘‘hurting person who
needs God’s love.’’33
In these ways, ex-gay leaders deny there are any victims of their actions. If homo-
sexuality is a condition, ‘‘treating’’ people with same-sex attractions is reconstructed
euphemistically as compassionate and humane, not dehumanizing. However, once
homosexuality is redefined as something non-human, it can be called anything or
acted upon without recrimination. And it is.
Moral Disengagement. Once homosexuality is redefined as an object—a behavior,
a condition, or an ‘‘agenda,’’ it is demonized and blamed for a variety of social evils.
Alan Chambers, EXODUS president, along with others, repeats this catchphrase fre-
quently at ex-gay conferences: ‘‘The opposite of homosexuality is not heterosexuality,
it’s holiness.’’34 This is a euphemistic way to say homosexuality is evil. The Southern
Poverty Law Center, which tracks ‘‘hate groups’’ in the United States, quoted Cham-
bers thus: ‘‘We have to stand up against an evil agenda. It is an evil agenda and
it will take anyone captive that is willing, or that is standing idly by.’’35 Note
the rhetorical differences for distinct audiences. Chambers employs euphemism at
ex-gay conferences and more explicit demonizing language at political strategizing
meetings.
For Waller, there are three practices that enable people who commit brutality to
morally disengage from their victims, which function to ‘‘make their reprehen-
sible conduct acceptable and to distance them from the moral implications of their
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actions.’’36 These are moral justification, dehumanization, and euphemistic labeling
of evil actions. The ex-gay movement justifies its condemnation of homosexuality as
a directive from God, which for them is scripturally validated (tautology notwith-
standing). By claiming to follow God’s will rather than their own, they deny respon-
sibility for their beliefs and actions. Additionally, the movement has developed
a secular ideology that blames homosexuality for an assortment of social evils.
Throughout the process of moral disengagement, movement leaders frequently rely
on the propaganda of organizations designated as hate groups by the Southern
Poverty Law Center to justify their secular claims.
Ex-gay proponents portray homosexuality and homosexuals as a contagious
threat that spreads and unleashes all kinds of social ills in its wake. They repeatedly
refer to homosexuality or its advocacy movement as a ‘‘threat to the family,’’ a
‘‘threat to traditional values,’’ a ‘‘threat to religious freedom,’’ and a threat to human
civilization itself. They also claim that homosexuals themselves are a threat. James
Dobson, FOCUS co-founder, condemns homosexuals as the ultimate social threat:
‘‘Homosexuals are not monogamous. They want to destroy the institution of mar-
riage. It will destroy marriage. It will destroy the Earth.’’37 To counter such a grave
danger, exterminating homosexuality is not only morally justified, it is a societal
imperative.
Ex-gay leaders attempt to justify their genocidal intentions by portraying their
actions as morally and socially necessary against the enormous threat posed by
homosexuality, the ‘‘homosexual agenda,’’ and homosexuals themselves. In doing
this, they both minimize and deny the systematic oppression and victimization of
gays and lesbians and construct themselves as victims of a destructive and sinister
‘‘homosexual agenda.’’ In addition to ‘‘denying a victim’’ by constructing homosexual-
ity as behavior, they minimize and deny anti-gay persecution and oppression, allege
that homosexuals are privileged, and portray them as violent aggressors.
Denial of the Victim: The Myth of Gay Affluence. One way to diminish sympathy
toward a group and lessen public support for protecting members from discrimina-
tion is to minimize their victimization and portray them as privileged. This is pre-
cisely how ex-gay groups use the claims made by Anton Marco. The claim that gays
seek ‘‘special rights’’ is a well-worn rhetorical tactic of the Christian Right.38 The ex-
gay movement elevates this approach by promoting the belief that gays and lesbians
are wealthier than the rest of society. Marco alleges that ‘‘[h]omosexuals have an
average household income of $55,340 versus $32,144 for the general population and
$12,166 for disadvantaged African-American households.’’39 In 2008, EXODUS Vice-
President Randy Thomas declared, ‘‘The gay identified community is the most pros-
perous, median salary wise, community in the country.’’40 Citing Marco, NARTH
extensively treats this subject: ‘‘For decades homosexual activists have fostered the
impression that gays are economically, educationally, and culturally disadvantaged.
Yet recent marketing studies, done by gay-run marketing agencies . . . roundly refute
those claims.’’41 Economists disagree and refer to this rhetorical tactic as ‘‘The Myth
of Gay Affluence.’’42 Herman43 notes this discourse evokes a familiar strategy used to
demonize other groups.
While the ex-gay movement morally disengages from their victims by disavowing
anti-gay oppression (especially their own culpability), they simultaneously portray
themselves as victims of those they subjugate. Scholars44 have documented a perva-
sive rhetoric of victimhood adopted by anti-gay Christian conservatives, who recast
themselves as an oppressed minority. Stein notes that this enables them to feel
rage and mobilize their members to act on their behalf against those they define as
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the enemy. Ex-gay leaders brand ‘‘militant’’ gays as ‘‘anti-Christian’’ aggressors,
reversing the victim-victimizer role, a stock dehumanization tactic.45
Dehumanization and Demonization: How Victims Become Victimizers
By claiming to target homosexuality, and not people, as the object of annihilation—
and defining that as sin, illness, or a perilous political agenda—is one way ex-gay
movement leaders dissociate themselves from the harm they inflict on people.
Despite this, the movement does indeed dehumanize and demonize gays. Perhaps
the most malicious form in which this manifests is the stereotype that gays are
prone to sexual predation, and are likely to molest children. Waller notes that de-
humanization often involves ‘‘using categories of negatively evaluated unhuman
creatures (such as demons and monsters).’’46 Michael Brown, a speaker at EXODUS
and FOCUS ex-gay conferences, wrote about the ‘‘seductive’’ threat of homosexuality:
Satan certainly has his strategy, and it is multifaceted, multipronged, and bent on
multiplication: One Satan touched life quickly touches another! [The superscript leads
to this:] . . . [I]t has been noted that homosexuals cannot increase by reproduction but
only by seduction. Thus many gays are not merely content with having the right to
live the way they want to without ‘‘discrimination’’; rather, they want to encourage
others to join them in their lifestyle.47
James Dobson invokes the specter of the homosexual pedophile in his parenting
book: ‘‘Moms and Dads, are you listening? This movement is the greatest threat to
your children. It is a particular danger to your wide-eyed boys, who have no idea
what demoralization is planned for them.’’48 He cites the expertise of NARTH co-
founder Joseph Nicolosi to substantiate claims about homosexuality and pedophilia.
At a FOCUS 2007 LWO conference, Nicolosi told the audience:
Sexual abuse, man/boy sexual contact and homosexual outcome—one third of our
clients were sexually abused by older boys or men. And in the personal histories of
gay men we often see same-sex abuse. This is in the literature. And we know that
those who abuse become abusers. Gay activists get very, very angry when we make
these connections but the scientific evidence is there. In addition gay activists are
more likely to lobby for lowering the age of sexual consent.49
Finally, EXODUS board member Don Schmierer claims in his book on the preven-
tion of homosexuality: ‘‘Sexual abuse, including molestation and/or rape, is a key fac-
tor in homosexuality. We will return to this repeatedly because it is so significant.’’50
Prominent movement figures, including Schmierer and Nicolosi, in EXODUS, EGA,
NARTH, and FOCUS frequently cite the discredited research of Paul Cameron to
demonize gays. Cameron was expelled from the American Psychological Association
in 1983 for refusing to cooperate with an ethics investigation of his work. He was
rebuked by the American Sociological Association in 1985 and 1986 for consistently
misrepresenting sociological research on homosexuality, and for substantiating his
anti-gay political advocacy with his distortions.51 The Southern Poverty Law Center
designates his organization, the Family Research Institute, as an anti-gay ‘‘hate
group.’’ Despite all this, Cameron’s publications, and those who reference them,52
continue to be cited by ex-gay representatives to support genocidal practices in court
decisions and public policy.53
Gays Are Violent
Another dehumanizing theme in the rhetoric and propaganda promoted by ex-gay
organizations is that gays are violent. Paul Cameron’s essays are a chief source
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for the claim that gays are more likely to sexually violate children. In addition,
Cameron alleges that gays are more likely than heterosexuals to be mass murders,
serial killers, and abusive domestic partners.54 Cameron is not the only anti-gay pro-
pagandist promoted and utilized by ex-gay organizations. In 2009, EXODUS was
criticized because board member Don Schmierer was one of three American speakers
to participate in an anti-gay conference in Kampala, Uganda. At the conference, the
main organizer and anti-gay propagandist, US citizen Scott Lively, allegedly blamed
the Rwandan genocide on gay men.55 Lively co-authored The Pink Swastika: Homo-
sexuality and the Nazi Party,56 excerpts of which were linked to EXODUS’ and
NARTH’s websites until 2009. The book’s primary objective is to deny that homo-
sexuals were ‘‘targeted for extinction by the Nazis’’ and to depict them instead as
aggressors.57 From the preface:
The Pink Swastika is a response to the ‘‘gay political agenda’’ and its strategy of por-
traying homosexuals as victims of societal and Nazi persecution . . . there was far
more brutality, rape, torture and murder committed against innocent people by Nazi
deviants and homosexuals than there ever was against homosexuals . . . The Pink
Swastika will show clearly how the world the Nazis attempted to create is a world
not of the past, but of the possible future . . . given its present course and left un-
challenged, America could easily become the Nazi Germany of 50 years ago.58
The Southern Poverty Law Center regards Lively’s organizations, Abiding Truth
Ministries and Watchmen on the Walls, as anti-gay hate groups.59 (Another Watch-
men co-founder, Ken Hutcherson, was a keynote speaker at EXODUS’ 2007 con-
ference and at a 2008 FOCUS conference.) The Uganda People News reported that
Uganda’s Minister of Ethics and Integrity James Nsaba Buturo told conference
attendees that he would submit a bill to parliament because the penal code criminal-
izing homosexuality is too weak. The article noted: ‘‘Scott Lively says it is good for
the government of Uganda to criminalize homosexuality but the government should
subject . . . criminals . . . to a therapy rather than imprisoning them.’’60 Uganda’s law
allows for life imprisonment as a maximum sentence for homosexual sex, and a
seven-year sentence for attempting to commit ‘‘unnatural offences.’’61 In 2007, Lively
called homosexuality a ‘‘a very fast-growing social cancer’’ and urged Russia to
‘‘criminalize the public advocacy of homosexuality.62
Blaming the Victim. The ex-gay movement morally disengages from its victims
by minimizing and denying anti-gay oppression, and by stereotyping, demonizing,
dehumanizing, and blaming ‘‘people living in homosexuality.’’ When movement en-
trepreneurs acknowledge that gays and lesbians confront adversity, they attribute
such hardships to ‘‘the homosexual lifestyle’’—that is, to the people themselves.
Blaming the victim is key to promoting moral disengagement. According to Waller,
If victims are to blame for their fate, then there is no reason for the perpetrators to
feel guilty. The moral foundation of much evil doing rests on the principle that
because of their damaging behaviors, certain individuals or target groups forfeit their
rights to humane treatment and can be harmed without guilt or remorse.63
If homosexuality is a sinful choice or a mental disorder, then anything that happens
to those who choose this behavior or refuse the ‘‘change’’ that is offered by ex-gay
organizations is their fault. The ex-gay movement uses this logic to blame gays for
AIDS, along with mental health problems such as depression, suicide, and the hate
violence targeting them, rather than anti-gay oppression.
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Spokespersons of the ex-gay movement acknowledge that the advent of AIDS
was a boon to them. Former EXODUS President Sy Rogers called its influence
‘‘profound.’’64 The movement capitalized on and continues to exploit AIDS as proof
of the destructive nature of the ‘‘homosexual lifestyle.’’ Portraying homosexuality as
a ‘‘culture of death’’ is the same victim-blaming tactic that was so effectively used by
the phrase ‘‘culture of poverty’’ to blame the poor for their own indigence. Ex-gay
leaders cite the ‘‘research’’ of Paul Cameron to allege that homosexuals have drasti-
cally shortened life spans. Cameron proposed tattooing and quarantining ‘‘sexually
active homosexuals’’65 and AIDS patients,66 and, at the 1985 Conservative Political
Action Conference, political scientist Mark Pietrzyk quoted Cameron when he told
the audience, ‘‘Unless we get medically lucky, in three or four years, one of the
options discussed will be the extermination of homosexuals.’’67 According to an inter-
view with former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, ‘‘Cameron was recommending
the extermination option as early as 1983.’’68 Movement entrepreneurs, such as
NARTH board member Christopher Rosik,69 blame the ‘‘homosexual lifestyle,’’ not
oppression, for higher rates of stress-related psychiatric disorders and substance
abuse, despite evidence that links these directly to ‘‘minority stress.’’70 According to
the APA,
the evidence clearly supports the position that the social stigma, prejudice, discrimi-
nation, and violence . . . and the hostile and stressful social environment created
thereby adversely affects the psychological, physical, social and economic well-being
lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals.71
Even hate-motivated violence has been denied or blamed on gays themselves.
Anthony Falzarano, founder of Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays and Gays (an EXODUS
member organization until 2009), implied that gay men are attacked for preying
on heterosexual men. He blamed Matthew Shepard, the gay college student from
Wyoming, for his own murder: ‘‘. . . that poor unfortunate boy in, where was it? South
Dakota? That man was a predator to heterosexual men.’’72 In 2009 the Matthew
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act became law, adding sexual
orientation and gender identity to federal hate crime statutes. Ex-gay leaders vigo-
rously opposed this bill, alleging that it would be used to ‘‘silence Christians’’ and
destroy religious freedoms.73 In addition to blaming Shepard for his own death,
some ex-gay advocates deny that sexual orientation bias played any role. At a LWO
conference, Dick Carpenter attempted to reframe Shepard’s murder as a drug-
related robbery:
Gay activists have been and continue to exploit the unfortunate death of this young
man . . . And we often hear that Matthew Shepard was killed because of his sexual
orientation. Well some months ago a well-known news program revisited the story of
Matthew Shepard and what they discovered was a different story . . . that Matthew
Shepard was not necessarily killed because of his sexual orientation but because of
drugs and money. But that’s not what we hear now.74
Portraying Shepard as a predator and/or drug user, and not a victim of an anti-gay
hate crime, at best, fosters indifference and minimizes the reality of hate crimes
based on sexual orientation; at worst, it reinforces horrific stereotypes of gays and
suggests that Shepard got what he deserved.
‘‘God’s Solution’’: The Social Construction of Cruelty
In 2007, FOCUS board member Albert Mohler created a national controversy after
stating,
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The scientific evidence is mounting that human sexual orientation may be fixed by
genetic and biological factors. Th[is] discovery . . . would not change the Bible’s moral
verdict on homosexual behavior. Rather than excusing homosexual behavior, such a
genetic discovery could lead to pre-natal ways to eliminate homosexual orientation
and Christians should support such a development . . . we should unapologetically
support the use of any appropriate means to avoid sexual temptation and the inevita-
ble effects of sin.75
The final part of Waller’s model, the social construction of cruelty, explains how per-
petrators of genocide become enveloped by a context that encourages and rewards
cruelty. We apply three processes: (1) professional socialization, (2) ritual conduct,
and (3) binding factors of the group.
The Ex-Gay Role: Christian Missionaries on the Battlefield
The ex-gay movement socializes and trains disciples to internalize its religious, psy-
chological, and political ideology of homosexuality, transforming them into Christian
missionaries and warriors whose role is to convert non-believers, obliterate homosex-
uality, and usher in the Kingdom of God as they understand it. EGA board member
Darryl Foster instructed: ‘‘All of us are ministers. You don’t have to go to . . . semi-
nary.’’76 Leaders train disciples to effectively evangelize, strategically using a rheto-
ric of love, which also helps them distance themselves from the perception that they
are hateful.77 Ex-gay conferences and publications also seek to equip followers to en-
gage in the culture war. War rhetoric is a prominent feature of movement discourse,
which is frequently cited as biblical.78 Leaders are careful to disavow violence,
although Michael Brown writes about the need for ‘‘holy hatred’’ as a motivating
force.79 In socializing believers to fulfill their roles as missionary-warriors, leaders
emphasize biblical authority and obedience to God’s will, which mandates imparting
their beliefs. Brown encouraged his audience to imagine themselves as revolution-
aries, as ‘‘God’s solution’’ to the problem of homosexuality. He plainly asserted that
the ‘‘cost’’ of following Jesus demands a readiness to die fighting for the cause and
the risk of literal death:
The church needs to stand up . . . If we don’t become salt and light what happens
next? We need to develop a revolutionary mentality . . . This is how a revolutionary
thinks . . . Life as it is is not worth living but the cause is worth dying for . . . This is
not just an option. A revolutionary realizes that he is part of something bigger than
himself. Revolutions don’t happen . . . at a tea party . . . [they] come when people get
to a breaking point, when they say ‘‘It’s too late.’’ ‘‘It’s too far gone.’’ ‘‘Life as it is is
not worth living and I’d rather die fighting for what I believe in.’’80
To bind followers to the demands of the group, leaders emphasize one’s obligation to
follow God’s will, rather than their own, which absolves them of responsibility or
guilt for their actions. Darryl Foster emphasizes absolute obedience, telling his audi-
ence: ‘‘We didn’t write the Bible, but we are required to follow it.’’81 To induce com-
pliance, leaders appeal to the fear and/or self interest of believers by using threats of
hell and promises of heaven, and other forms of social power.82 In addition, leaders
make emotional appeals to compassion, ritually reminding disciples that not only
their own, but the eternal destiny of others is at stake in carrying out God’s will.83
Mobilizing believers is amplified by claims of the urgency of the situation, as Brown
displays, and as Foster implores, claiming that Jesus will soon return: ‘‘This is the
message we need to carry to the whole wide world . . . [these are] perilous times . . .
these are the last days.’’84 Since 1973, the ex-gay movement has developed a mas-
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sive corporate infrastructure of religious, scientific, and political organizations in the
United States and internationally. In addition to a global network of ex-gay minis-
tries, the movement collaborates with most major Christian Right organizations, co-
ordinates a network of churches and mental health counselors, manages an industry
of ex-gay conferences and bookstores, and directs a variety of multimedia outlets to
evangelize the ex-gay message and to advance genocidal policies at home and
abroad.
Genocidal Intentions
We argue that the ex-gay movement organizations analyzed in this study advocate
a genocidal ideology and public policy agenda targeting LGBT peoples on a global
scale. Article II of the UNCG delineates several forms of conduct that constitute
genocide. The ex-gay movement is actively pursuing public policies that would, if
implemented, constitute state-sponsored genocidal practices in the United States
and globally. The organizations analyzed in this study undeniably intend to purge
society of homosexuality (whether by ‘‘prevention’’ or ‘‘treatment’’) and are actively
working to destroy LGBT cultures worldwide. In 1990, Poland’s president Lech
Walesa promised in a televised speech that he would ‘‘eliminate from the country
‘moral undesirables’ including homosexuals.’’85 In 2004, ex-gay psychotherapist
Richard Cohen (expelled in 2003 from the American Counseling Association on
several ethical violations) was invited to speak to Poland’s parliament on ‘‘repara-
tive’’ therapy, in response to a bill legalizing same-sex marriage. Cohen asked for
$10 million in funding to eradicate homosexuality in Poland and called for a bill to
criminalize gay activism.86
Ex-gay organizations are actively pursuing policy positions that would, if imple-
mented, constitute genocide under each of the UNCG articles under discussion here.
Article II(b) recognizes genocide as acts that cause ‘‘serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group.’’ Several prominent American medical and mental health
associations have issued statements opposing therapies and treatments that are
based on the assumption that homosexuality is a mental disorder, and discourage
their members from attempting interventions aimed at changing sexual orientation,
which they consider unethical and potentially harmful.87 In 2005, a Memphis-based
EXODUS residential ministry, Love in Action, came under investigation by the
Tennessee Department of Health for allegedly dispersing psychotropic medication
and treating minors without a license in their ‘‘Refuge’’ program for youths between
the ages of thirteen and eighteen. National news coverage revealed that some chil-
dren were being forced by their parents to undergo ‘‘treatment’’ at Love in Action.
Both FOCUS and NARTH encourage parents to subject their children to ‘‘treatment’’
regardless of the consent of their children.88 In 1997 the American Psychological
Association issued a statement opposing attempts to change sexual orientation on
several grounds, stating that ‘‘. . . children and youth often lack adequate legal pro-
tection from coercive treatment.’’89 In 2009, an APA task force published the most
comprehensive analysis of attempts to change sexual orientation to date. Regarding
children and adolescents, the report concluded that such attempts ‘‘can pose harm
through increasing sexual stigma and providing inaccurate information. We further
concluded that . . . involuntary or coercive residential or inpatient programs . . . may
pose serious risk of harm.’’90 Forced therapy is also a concern where ex-gay organi-
zations operate outside of the United States, as illustrated by the 2009 Uganda
conference featuring hate group propagandist Scott Lively and EXODUS board mem-
ber Don Schmierer. Although EXODUS claims to not condone forced treatment,
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Schmierer allegedly never voiced opposition during the conference to ‘‘treating’’
homosexual prisoners or criminalizing homosexuality.91 Schmierer’s book, An Ounce
of Prevention: Preventing the Homosexual Condition in Today’s Youth, flaunts this
quote from gay activist Frank Kameny among the book’s endorsements: ‘‘We view
your encouragement of prevention as tantamount to genocide . . .’’92
Article II(c) of the UNCG defines genocide as ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part.’’ In addition to the explicit intention to eradicate homosexuality via treatment
or prevention, several of the ex-gay organizations analyzed in this study advocated
criminalizing consensual, adult homosexual relations, and some movement leaders
urge criminalizing gay advocacy. Sixteen states had such ‘‘sodomy’’ laws prior to the
2003 Lawrence v. Texas Supreme Court decision. FOCUS and the Alliance Defense
Fund jointly submitted an amicus curiae brief defending the legality of these
statutes. James Dobson (co-founder of ADF and FOCUS) called the Lawrence ruling
an ‘‘outrageous decision.’’93 Phil Burress, a 2005 EXODUS board member, wrote a
letter in 2000 to the Republican National Convention Chair Jim Nicholson concern-
ing the first speech ever given at the RNC by an openly gay man, Arizona legislator
Jim Kolbe:
Mr. Kolbe as a self described homosexual means nothing except to say he engages in
sodomy. Did you know that in Arizona, sodomy is against the law? Mr. Kolbe should
be arrested when he returns to his home state for violating state law. Would you
agree that all lawmakers should insist that all laws be enforced?94
Paul Cameron and colleagues proposed: ‘‘State sodomy laws should be written . . .
and enforced across the nation . . . Legal acceptance/toleration of sodomy is a symp-
tom of a decadent society.’’95 EXODUS leaders also supported criminalizing homo-
sexual conduct.96 EGA sponsored a conference in Barbados, where homosexual sex
is illegal. The flyer read: ‘‘Some say decriminalize homosexuality . . . we say let’s offer
solutions.’’97
Articles II(d) and II(e) of the UNCG define genocide as ‘‘imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births within the group’’ and ‘‘forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group’’ respectively. Ex-gay organizations seek to deny reproductive
technologies and adoption rights for homosexuals, and support policies and court
decisions that have forcibly removed children from the custody of their parents solely
based on their homosexuality. EXODUS’ official policy states:
Exodus International believes that the biblical design for the family and the best
environment for raising a biological or adoptive child is one in which the child’s
mother and father are married to one another and are present in the home. While
legitimate and difficult circumstances often prevent this, the intentional deprivation
of a mother or father through same-sex parenting and adoption, is not in the best
interest of children . . . [S]ocial policy and adoption law should be governed by a desire
to ensure the health and well being of future generations.98
All the ex-gay organizations analyzed here are currently exhibiting the personal
testimony of Canadian Dawn Stefanowicz, the daughter of a now-deceased gay man,
who, citing Paul Cameron’s distortions, claims that her tormented childhood sub-
stantiates that gay people are unfit to raise children.99 Stefanowicz, an accountant,
appeals to her individual experiences and cites Cameron’s statistics in testimony
before legislatures in both Canada and the United States to deny parenting rights
and reproductive technologies to gays and lesbians.100 Cameron and his colleagues
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recommended: ‘‘States should prohibit homosexuals, prostitutes, and drug addicts
from adopting children, being foster-care parents, and having custody of children.’’101
Cameron’s allegations, and those who cite him, such as Lynn Wardle, continue to be
cited as credible research in amicus briefs, court decisions, and policy hearings in the
United States.102 ‘‘Judges have cited Wardle’s article to justify transferring child
custody from lesbian to heterosexual parents.’’103
Using the courts to deny parents custody of their own children is the primary
means through which children are forcibly removed from one group and transferred
to another. In 1995, the Virginia Supreme Court used the state’s sodomy statute to
justify forcibly transferring custody of Sharon Bottoms’ two-year-old son to her
mother. Ex-gay organizations today work with Christian Right legal firms, such as
the Alliance Defense Fund and Liberty Counsel, which routinely submit court briefs
and litigate to prevent or deny gay people from conceiving, adopting, fostering, and
rearing children, even their own offspring. Since 2004, Liberty Counsel founder
Mat Staver, dean of Liberty University’s Law School, has represented Lisa Miller,
an ex-gay woman who seeks to deny her co-parent’s visitation rights. Miller claims
her former partner’s ‘‘ lesbian lifestyle’’ results in a harmful environment for their
daughter Isabella. Liberty Counsel and PFOX, an EXODUS ministry until 2009, co-
sponsor the ‘‘Protect Isabella Coalition’’ to provide legal support for this case.
NARTH, which portrays itself as a secular mental health organization, featured
Staver at its 2009 conference. In 2002, Alabama Supreme Court Justice Roy Moore
wrote a post-divorce custody opinion, which denied guardianship to a lesbian mother:
To disfavor practicing homosexuals in custody matters is not invidious discrimination,
nor is it legislating personal morality. [It] . . . promotes the general welfare of the peo-
ple of our State in accordance with our law, which is the duty of its public servants . . .
the protection of the family is a responsibility of the State. Custody disputes involve
. . . the State, within the limits of its sphere of authority, in a way that preserves
the fundamental family structure. The State carries the power of the sword, that is,
the power to prohibit conduct with physical penalties, such as confinement and even
execution. It must use that power to prevent the subversion of children toward this
lifestyle, to not encourage a criminal lifestyle.104
Moore is running for governor of Alabama in 2010. James Dobson is quoted on
Moore’s Web site: ‘‘Judge Moore is a man of courage and strong Christian character,
and I have long admired him. Should he win the party primary, I will be pleased to
endorse him for governor . . .’’105
Conclusion
If implemented, would the policies advocated by ex-gay movement organizations and
representatives analyzed here constitute genocide? We have attempted to illustrate
how the ideology, rhetoric, and practices of the ex-gay movement are congruent
with Waller’s explanatory model of how ordinary people commit extraordinary acts
of brutality, and to reveal how this movement promotes public policies that, we
argue, would constitute social death forms of genocide according to UNCG articles
II(b)–(e).106 The ex-gay movement consciously desires the destruction of LGBT cul-
ture, and movement leaders have advocated upholding laws that would criminalize
private consensual homosexual relations, allow potentially seriously harmful thera-
pies, and deny parenthood to LGBT peoples. It promotes public policy, at home
and abroad, designed to destroy the social vitality of LGBT peoples. According to
Card, ‘‘Social vitality is destroyed when the social relations—organizations, practices,
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institutions—of the members of a group are irreparably damaged or demolished.’’107
It is purposeful and sustained action with full knowledge of the consequences of and
expectation of extermination.
The genocidal agents in this case do not involve constitutional rulers of a state,
but emissaries of a religious movement vested with a belief in divine sanction for
their cause, and divine absolution for their brutality. The ex-gay worldview is con-
structed on what its entrepreneurs imagine to be a moral universe. Constructing
homosexuality as a dangerous social threat further legitimates its destruction, and
justifies the movement’s foray into the public sphere. Its ideology leads to no other
solution than annihilation. Denying that people are harmed by their actions is a
form of ideological annihilation, a necessary short-term objective to establish credi-
bility for their genocidal intentions and, ultimately, to summon state and medical in-
tervention. By waging a culture war using hate propaganda and misusing scientific
research to gain public legitimacy, the movement seeks to deploy state powers and
the medical profession to perpetrate genocidal acts on its behalf. In the context of
persistent stigmatization and increasing rates of hate crimes against sexual and gen-
der minorities in the United States, escalating human rights violations against
LGBT peoples worldwide, and the global proliferation of American evangelical Chris-
tianity, the ex-gay movement may potentially enable and facilitate the commission of
genocide.
As an example of this movement’s potential to influence nation-states, the situa-
tion in Uganda has worsened significantly since the March 2009 conference featuring
Scott Lively, Caleb Brundidge, and EXODUS board member Don Schmierer. In Octo-
ber of 2009, a draft of the ‘‘Anti-Homosexuality Bill’’108 was introduced to Uganda’s
parliament. If passed, this law would mandate the death penalty for a range of
different homosexual acts under the category ‘‘aggravated homosexuality,’’ including
repeated consensual homosexual sexual activity or engaging in homosexual activity
if HIV positive. Further, it would mandate life imprisonment for a person who ‘‘pur-
ports to contract a marriage’’ to a person of the same sex. Finally, it allows for life
imprisonment for a single consensual homosexual act, a maximum penalty of seven
years in prison for the ‘‘promotion of homosexuality,’’ and a maximum sentence of
three years for anyone who does not report, within twenty-four hours, their know-
ledge of any offense committed under this act.
In response, government officials in the United States, France, and England have
all issued public statements denouncing this bill, and have urged Uganda’s parlia-
ment to withdraw its consideration. The Organization of American States and the
sixty-six signatories of the United Nations’ statement ‘‘Human Rights, Sexual Orien-
tation, and Gender Identity’’ should use their individual and collective leverage to
discourage support for this bill, which would send a message to the governments of
other nations which might consider similar measures. In October of 2009, the United
States offered $246 million in new aid to Uganda.109 To evince their commitment to
human rights as expressed by the 2008 UN statement and the 2009 OAS resolution,
the Obama administration and Congress should tether this offer to the vote by
Uganda’s parliament on this proposed legislation.
Our research aims to contribute to the literature on predicting and preventing
genocide, focusing on social death forms of genocide elaborated in the UNCG, articles
II(b)–(e). We suggest that prioritizing research on genocide as mass murder may
indeed enhance its moral opprobrium, but at an enormous human cost, including
predicting and preventing mass murder. Further, given that international responses
to genocide have been based primarily on political, and not moral, considerations, we
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advocate a fuller consideration of the UNCG definition. Revitalizing scholarship on
social death will broadly enrich the field of genocide studies and enhance our collec-
tive efforts to forecast and avert genocide in all of its manifestations.
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From Real Friend to Imagined Foe:
The Medieval Roots of Anti-Semitism
as a Precondition for the Holocaust
Christopher Tuckwood
Sentinel Project for Genocide Prevention, Toronto, ON
This study examines the medieval roots of European anti-Semitism as a precondi-
tion for the Holocaust. The twelfth century saw an important transition from Jews
being viewed as the adherents of a competing religion to dangerous, inhuman
threats to the broader Christian society for the first time. Northern France is
used as a case study, examining several Jewish, Christian, and secular primary
sources to understand the factors leading to gradual Jewish dehumanization.
Growing Church influence and resulting restrictions forced some Jews into what
would become their stereotypical occupation of moneylending. Lacking awareness
of this broader process and as a result of Church propaganda, the Christian
majority came to see Jews as a threat associated with foreign and supernatural
enemies. Ultimately, both the people and rulers found the victimization of Jews
desirable, culminating in the burning of the Jews of Blois and their expulsion
from the French Royal Domains. These results help to explain the beginning of a
centuries-long process which had already dehumanized Jews by the time that the
Nazis redefined and racialized anti-Semitism in the early twentieth century.
Key words: anti-Semitism, Holocaust, medieval, Europe, preconditions
Introduction
It is often taken for granted in Holocaust studies that general European anti-Semi-
tism was a convenient, and probably necessary, precondition for the Nazi assault
upon European Jewry. Without this existing atmosphere of, at best, indifference
and, at worst, violent hostility toward Jews throughout Europe, the Nazis would not
have found such apathetic bystanders and enthusiastic collaborators during their
campaign of extermination. This anti-Semitism did not always exist in Europe but
its roots are rarely discussed, even though they extend back a millennium into the
early medieval period when fundamental popular attitudes toward Jews underwent
a major shift due to the interaction of social, economic, and religious factors. This
very important change meant that Christian Europeans no longer saw Jews only as
the misguided adherents of an outdated religion, but rather as innately threatening
beings who could be subjugated, abused, and even eliminated en masse.
The purpose of this article is to shed some light upon these roots within the
context of the larger genocidal process. This is not to say that the development of
medieval anti-Semitism was intentional or part of a deliberate dehumanization pro-
cess, or even that it was responsible in any way for the Holocaust. Rather, it is to say
that this type of Jew-hatred did not always exist and that its origins must be con-
sidered in order to understand how the stage was set for successive pogroms and
expulsions over the centuries and ultimately contributed as an enabling factor in
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the Holocaust of the twentieth century. Understanding the medieval origins of anti-
Semitism will ultimately contribute to a greater understanding of the preconditions
for the Holocaust. These origins are complex and involve various religious, economic,
political, and social factors that could each inspire much larger studies. However, as
much detail as possible will be given in the space available, as well as a small case
study focusing on northern France. While this study is in no way intended to provide
a simple monocausal explanation of anti-Semitism, particular attention will be paid
to the changing Jewish socioeconomic role and its interaction with Church teachings
about Jews during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, which appear as the most
salient factors of that period, and gave rise to the most enduring anti-Semitic myths.
Anti-Jewish hostility is a constantly evolving force which has taken various
forms both today and in the past, even though its most commonly used label, anti-
Semitism, has only existed in modern times1 and only refers to a phenomenon about
nine centuries old. Just as the emergence of racially based anti-Semitism during the
early twentieth century was a major development in Jew-hatred, so too was the
initial emergence of anti-Semitism during the eleventh century. Prior to that period,
anti-Jewish hostility was religiously motivated and almost exclusively clerical, with-
out any known associated violence. Because of its almost exclusively religious
nature, scholars call this form anti-Judaism. However, between the ninth and
twelfth centuries there was a gradual shift to often violent, popular, and political
hostility: essentially, anti-Semitism. Medieval anti-Semitism was a precursor to the
modern phenomenon of the same name and was characterized by an irrational fear
and hatred of Jews as threatening subhumans that Gavin Langmuir has defined as
‘‘the hostility aroused by irrational thinking about ‘Jews’ ’’2 as the ‘‘Other.’’ By the
late twelfth century, Jews were no longer protected subjects and social equals with
whom one might disagree theologically, but a violently persecuted and marginalized
minority. Although medieval Jews generally carried on peaceful lives and avoided
the constant victimization that is sometimes associated with them, their history
from the twelfth century on was punctuated and characterized by increasingly vio-
lent attacks.
To clarify, anti-Judaism is a semi-rational opposition to Judaism as a religion
and Jews as its adherents based on theological judgments. This form found itself
quite popular in clerical circles at all levels of the Roman Catholic Church, but failed
to gain many, if any, adherents among the laity. It is perhaps characterized best as
a ‘‘normal, albeit lamentable interreligious rivalry’’3 caused by a perceived Jewish
threat to Christianity. Differing from anti-Judaism is anti-Semitism, the irrational
fear and hatred of Jews because they are perceived to be innately harmful and dan-
gerous beings, both spiritually and physically.4 Anti-Semitism developed out of anti-
Judaism but far surpassed the intent or control of the clergy and became popular
among laypeople and rulers who developed quasi-religious, counterfactual beliefs
about Jews.
Most scholars explain the transition from anti-Judaism to anti-Semitism exclu-
sively in religious, economic, or social terms, with little effort to harmonize the three.
In actual fact, the inter-relationship of these three areas cannot be ignored, because
people do not operate in each of these roles separately but rather live a unified life.
Essentially, religiously inspired economic and legal changes throughout the ninth,
tenth, and eleventh centuries marginalized Jews in society and created an atmo-
sphere in which existing religious ideas about them were popularly received and
gradually became exaggerated to the point of occasional and extreme violence by
the end of the twelfth century. During this period, an important political transition
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also took place when the Carolingian Empire dissolved and the Capetian monarchs
rose to power and began to shape what would become the kingdom of France. The
experiences of Jews across Europe, though certainly sharing many common ele-
ments, were diverse at this time, and so it will be necessary to concentrate on a spe-
cific political region in order to coherently track the development of anti-Semitism.
The northern area of modern France surrounding Paris will be ideal for this, as
it was a prominent area in the landscape of the western Carolingian Empire,
and then the Royal Domains under the direct control of the Capetians. The events
that occurred there represented a pattern and process in the development of anti-
Semitism common to other areas, though regional nuances were significant. As a
result, the case examined is useful, but caution must be exercised not to over-
generalize the conclusions drawn from this evidence and their implications for
broader European anti-Semitism leading up to the Holocaust. Unfortunately, both
primary and academic sources on the Jewish experience in this place and time are
scant, so it will sometimes be necessary to deal with information of a more general
nature, from neighboring regions, or from different times in order to extrapolate
meaning for the places and events in question.
Jews in the Carolingian Empire: Tolerance and Integration
The Jews of early medieval Gaul living under the Frankish Merovingian dynasty
could hardly have been further from the wretched state that their descendants would
find themselves in five centuries later. They formed a secure and influential minor-
ity, with many friends and supporters at court and important economic, social, and
political roles to play themselves, which guaranteed that they enjoyed a comfortable
place in society.5 From the early seventh century onward, the Merovingian kings
began to decline in power until they were mere figureheads and their mayors of the
palace ruled instead. One such mayor, Charles ‘‘the Hammer’’ Martel, actually ruled
for several years without a king, but upon his death his sons Carloman and Pippin
attempted to stem rebellion by appointing the man who would be the last Merovingian,
Childeric III, in 743.6 Carloman withdrew from public life in 747, taking the tonsure
and retiring to a monastery near Rome.7 With all competition thus removed, Pippin
had himself elected King of the Franks in 751 and deposed Childeric III, thus ending
the Merovingian dynasty of ‘‘do-nothing kings,’’ replacing it with Carolingian rule.8
It is not clear what, if any, role that Jews played during the transition to Caro-
lingian rule, but they were by no means a community of singular mind or action, and
likely held varying positions depending upon their circumstances. Pippin made his
Jewish policy clear only after 768, when he conquered Aquitaine and affirmed the
personality of the law9 for Jews so that they could continue to live under their own
laws and still enjoy the privileges previously given to them.10 It is clear from the
sources that Carolingian Jews enjoyed a social status nearly, if not fully, equal to
that of their Christian neighbors. One has to remember that the Carolingian Empire
was an eclectic organization, and that Jews were just one of many small ethnic
groups. Aside from their unique religion in a predominantly Christian society, little
would have set the Jews apart, since they had the same occupations, wore the same
clothes, spoke the same language, and enjoyed much of the same culture as their
neighbors. Perhaps the greatest testament to the highly integrated social status of
the Jews at the time was the writings of clerics and the efforts of the Church in gen-
eral, urging segregation of Jews from Christians. In a letter to Louis the Pious about
826, Archbishop Agobard of Lyon urged for the separation of Jews and Christians,
citing a long list of accusations, among them that ‘‘[the Jews] lie to simple Christians
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and boast that they are dear to you [Louis] . . . most excellent people desire [the
Jews’] prayers and blessings . . .’’ and ‘‘naı¨ve Christians say that the Jews preach to
them better than our priests.’’11 Even leaving room for a preacher’s hyperbole, one
gets a real sense of fear from Agobard’s writings. Certainly the Church would not
have reacted so strongly to something that was not happening at all, and two of
its main goals were to prevent Jewish-Christian intermarriage and conversions to
Judaism. Other sources confirm that it was common at the time for Christians and
Jews to dine together on kosher food, discuss religious ideas, and for Christians to
adopt Jewish customs such as resting on Saturday and celebrating Jewish holidays
while neglecting their own. Such practices likely even extended to the imperial court,
and clerical alarm is thus not surprising.12
The Carolingians treated Jews as ‘‘Romans’’ and so they lived under Roman law
in public matters but also had the privilege of being subject to Jewish law and courts
in private matters internal to the Jewish community. The Byzantine Justinian’s
Code and the earlier Roman Theodosian Code were the two bodies of law used as a
foundation for Jewish legislation in Carolingian Europe. Although both documents
placed restrictions upon Jews, the Theodosian Code was by far the more lenient of
the two and so it was the one most often enforced. Even some popes, such as Gregory
I, seem to have preferred it. The laws of Theodosius were also more ambiguous in
their declarations and so secular rulers were able to bend the rules in favor of
Jews—whether the Church agreed to this practice or not—while still technically
adhering to the letter of the law. A ruler’s successors also often simply ignored
or even overturned secular laws passed against the Jews. Most notably, rulers, in
defiance of even the most permissive laws, often gave Jews high appointments in
government and allowed them to own Christian slaves despite their prohibition
from having authority over Christians.13
In addition to receiving near-equal treatment with their Christian neighbors,
Carolingian Jews often enjoyed privileges unique to them. Jewish merchants fre-
quently received exemptions from tolls and taxes, received official protection from
the office of the magister Iudeorum and, most gallingly to Agobard of Lyon, had mar-
ket days officially moved to Sunday so that the Jewish Sabbath would not be violated
by business.14 In fact, the privileges granted to private Jewish merchants were at
least as good as those given to non-Jewish traders in the service of the king.15 All of
these special concessions to Jewish merchants indicate, without a doubt, that their
economic importance must have been disproportionate to their small numbers.
Jews were, in fact, the primary traders of (largely Christian) slaves captured during
Charlemagne’s campaigns16 and their great mobility, higher education, and connec-
tions across Europe and to the East meant that Jews were very useful to the king
for foreign trade.17
Of course, as would be the case with moneylenders later on, merchants during
the Carolingian period did not make up a majority of Jews and were in no way re-
presentative of the greater Jewish population. The Carolingian Empire was a pri-
marily rural and forested place, with few towns in the west save for those built on
old Roman town sites.18 Most Jews lived off the land as farmers, just as they had
for most of their history. Some Jews, however, sought greater rewards for their gen-
erally higher level of education and literacy—as compared to most Christians—and
elected to move into towns and take specialized, skilled jobs. Many local rulers
realized the economic value of having a Jewish community and encouraged them to
settle in their towns. The economic theory of path dependence indicates that shocks
(stimuli) that influence changes in occupation will be permanent in the absence of
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countervailing shocks. In the Jewish case, the initial shock that moved them into
urban, skilled occupations was the increased education and literacy resulting from
the extra emphasis placed on personal Torah study by the rise of Rabbinic Judaism
in the first two centuries ce. The local rulers encouraging Jewish immigration used
their new subjects as merchants, craftsmen, tax collectors, court bankers, and later
moneylenders.19 With incentives drawing them to the towns and no countershock to
change their occupational path, it was practically inevitable that Jews would gradu-
ally urbanize, especially since many Jews were merchants and towns were important
stations along both local and international trade routes.
Money was not yet a major feature of the European economy in the ninth and
tenth centuries, so finance and moneylending had not yet become major occupations
for Jews, particularly since no other occupations had yet been completely closed to
them. However, a ‘‘Capitulary for the Jews’’ by Charlemagne in 814 indicates that
some did lend money to a degree, as it bans them from taking ‘‘in pledge or for any
debt any of the goods of the Church’’ or ‘‘to take any Christian in pledge.’’20 It was
common practice at the time for a borrower to offer his freedom as collateral and,
if he defaulted on a loan, to be taken into the custody of his creditor either as a
hostage or a slave. This law of Charlemagne was likely a Church-inspired attempt
to reduce Jewish control over Christians. Soon after, the Jewish right to own even
non-Christian slaves was limited, removing them from their earlier pre-eminence in
the slave trade and severely limiting their ability to participate in large-scale agri-
culture. The loss of this right alone had major ramifications and caused later long-
term implications for the economic lives of France’s Jews. Their decline had begun.
Religious Attitudes toward Carolingian Jews
Jews in the Carolingian Empire were not the social pariahs and financial specialists
that they would later become in France, but neither were they universally tolerated.
Hostility toward Jews at this time was anti-Judaism in the truest sense and appears
to have emanated solely from the Church and its clerics. Unlike later irrational anti-
Semitism, which had a veneer of religion about it but deeper social and economic
causes, the predominantly religious hostility of anti-Judaism grew out of the com-
petition between the two religions. The Church and clerics of the time seem to have
viewed Judaism as a genuine threat to Christianity, fearing and hating it as such.
This is all the more understandable when one remembers that the majority of Chris-
tians in Carolingian Europe at the time were relatively new, and presumably reluc-
tant, converts. Christianity had found dedicated adherents among the ruling class
but had yet to become a true mass religion among the general population. Evidence
of popular anti-Jewish feeling at this time is minimal, and any resentment seems to
have come predominantly from the bishops.21 The social affinity between many Jews
and Christians made the situation even more alarming for the Church. The clergy’s
serious concern indicates that the conversion of Christians to Judaism was not only a
danger but also a reality which had already taken place, though it is impossible to
know how many had converted. The Church’s constant and vehement reiteration
over several centuries of its strongly negative position on Christian-Jewish social
interaction also indicates that its efforts were largely unsuccessful.22
Nowhere was the sense of alarm at the loss of Christians or potential Christians
to Jewish proselytizers more evident than, once again, in the writings of Agobard of
Lyon. Agobard made it clear in a letter to a few sympathetic courtiers of Louis the
Pious around 823 that he was not satisfied that Jews had been rendered incapable
of owning Christian slaves. He also pleaded on behalf of the potentially Christian
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pagan slaves (no mention is made of Jewish ones) serving in Jewish households. His
cause for concern was that ownership by a Jew could be a major obstacle to a pagan
being baptized into the Christian faith, thereby giving Judaism another advantage in
the perceived competition with Christianity. Although pagans probably made up only
a small segment of the Carolingian slave population, Agobard tries to give the im-
pression of a captive and subjected people crying out for baptism because ‘‘they are
pricked by [Carolingian culture] towards the love of Christ . . . They flee to the
Church, asking for baptism . . .’’23 Agobard indicates that pagan slaves desiring to
be baptized legally needed the unlikely permission of their masters, and he cites
the forced conversions of conquered peoples by Christian emperors as justification
for doing so without permission. Of course, once a slave became a Christian, a
Jew could no longer own him, and so laws were put in place to prevent unapproved
baptisms. Although Agobard claims to support the compensation of Jews thus
relieved of their legally owned human property, it apparently either was not put
into practice or was not enough to satisfy the offended parties and prevent ‘‘human
offense and the grievous wounding of our house [the church of Lyon].’’24
Although the clerical hostility toward Jews during the anti-Judaic period was
mostly based on the fear of Judaism’s threat to Christianity as an organization, this
was not enough to arouse the average early medieval layperson. They were more
worried about the problems of day-to-day survival than the Church’s recruitment
and retention concerns. Instead, most of the public diatribes against Jews at this
time appealed to emotional issues, with the age-old accusations of past deicide based
on the trumped-up role of some Jews in Christ’s crucifixion.25 Most effective, though,
was the spread of rumors about continued secret Jewish hostility toward Christ and
Christians. Preachers called Jews every manner of insult for allegedly being in lea-
gue with Satan to attack Christ and his followers both spiritually and physically.26
Beliefs such as these were used as justifications for the restriction and subjugation
of Jews throughout Europe. However, even where such arguments found sym-
pathetic Christian ears, they were never translated into physical violence by the peo-
ple. It must be remembered that the Church’s official policy and the sermons of even
its most venomous clerics in the early medieval period advocated only the segrega-
tion and legal, systemic oppression of Jews, but never physical violence against
them. Nor was the banishment of Jews ever encouraged. The Church actively dis-
couraged harming Jews because of Augustine of Hippo’s fourth-century interpreta-
tion of the Cain and Abel story to mean that God had simultaneously cursed and
protected the Jews for their ‘‘crime’’ against Christ in order for them to serve as
exemplars of the consequences of perfidy. The continued misery of Jews was believed
to bear witness to the truth of Christ’s message and divinity as eternal punishment
for their crimes against God and disbelief in the Gospels.27
Fortunately for the Jews of the time, however, it seems that the common people
and their rulers in the Carolingian Empire were almost entirely unresponsive to the
Church’s and clerics’ demands, thanks to the great divide between official Church
teaching and what laypeople actually believed. Although the concept of separation
of church and state did not exist at the time, secular rulers often allowed temporal
rather than spiritual considerations to dictate policy. The common people were also
more likely to be concerned with the exigencies of daily life than abstract theological
accusations, especially when personal experience showed them that Jews were not
evil demons but normal people. Part of the reason for tolerance of Jews by the Caro-
lingian people was likely their relative newness to Christianity and the preservation
in their religious attitudes of Germanic polytheistic tolerance, which expected every
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people to have their own gods and rituals. Their warlike culture may also have iden-
tified better with the harshness of the Old Testament and the similarities between
Jews and Christians than they did with the New Testament with its message of
pacifism and Christian–Jewish antagonism.28 Although Carolingian Jewish policy
was inconsistent and varied across the reigns of many rulers, it remained relatively
friendly, despite religious pressure from individuals such as Agobard. Since the peo-
ple did not listen much to their preachers on this matter and formed no anti-Jewish
ideas of their own, pogroms were unheard of at this time.
Charlemagne was the dominant figure in Carolingian history, but Louis the
Pious and his other successors continued his pro-Jewish policies following his death.
Louis even lifted some restrictions while resisting Church pressures to enhance them
and actually enacted laws to protect Jews. Agobard of Lyon considered Louis’ Jewish
policies to be far too lenient and wrote many diatribes expressing his disapproval.
This conflict culminated when the king humiliatingly rejected Agobard as he tried
to raise his concerns at court after imperial officials denounced him for unlawfully
baptizing a Jewish-owned slave in 822.29 Even when the Carolingian Empire began
to break up, pro-Jewish policies continued in all regions. Clearly, anti-Judaism had
not found a popular following in any sector of lay society. Even the clerics who pas-
sionately professed it were a minority. Interestingly, some preachers who promoted
the official line and attacked Judaism and Jews as a group from the pulpit were
often on friendly terms with individual Jews on a personal level, even entering into
religious discussions with them.30
Carolingian Dissolution and the ‘‘Rise’’ of the Capetians
All things come to an end, and the Carolingian Empire was no exception when suc-
cession difficulties arose following the death of Louis the Pious in 840. In accordance
with Frankish custom and the practice of his father Charlemagne, Louis had in-
structed that the empire was to be partitioned between his three sons, Lothar, Louis,
and Charles. Although division of inheritance was an established Germanic princi-
ple, there was no way to ensure its implementation, so the three brothers fought
and negotiated for dominion once their father had died.31 After three years of strug-
gle, they signed the Treaty of Verdun in 843 and divided the empire into Francia
Occidentalis, where Charles would reign, Francia Orientalis, where Louis would
reign, and the Middle Kingdom, which Lothar would rule, keeping the imperial
title.32 Francia Occidentalis in the west comprised most of the lands that make up
modern France and will be the focus of this article from here on.
By the end of the tenth century, the descendants of Charles had suffered the
same fate as the Merovingians two and a half centuries earlier and became inactive
figurehead kings. They reigned, but did not rule. Instead, men who effectively held
the post of ‘‘prime minister’’ conducted the work of government. Louis V was the
last Carolingian king of France, and he reigned less than two years before dying,
after which his chief administrator Hugh Capet, Duke of the Franks, took the throne
in 987.33 In so doing, Hugh founded a new dynasty that would bear his name: the
Capetians.
The kingdom Hugh inherited had declined along with its kings and did not con-
stitute a cohesive political unit. The king could expect only nominal fealty from the
lords of the land, and his influence diminished significantly the further he was from
any particular area. The only real and direct power enjoyed by the Capetians was
limited to a small territory surrounding Paris known as the Royal Domains. Essen-
tially, the king ruled as a baron with a royal title. In fact, the first century of Cape-
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tian rule saw a decline in royal power throughout France, with a slow recovery
beginning only around the end of Phillip I’s reign (1060–1108).34 Royal domination
of France was nominal, with local barons exercising real power while the Capetians
put most of their effort into consolidating their authority in the Royal Domains and
expanding it outwards. Most attention will be paid to the experiences of Jews in the
Royal Domains when discussing the rise of political anti-Semitism, and a slightly
wider focus will be used when examining the growth of popular anti-Semitism.
For the first century of Capetian rule there is little, if anything, that is possible
to say about the role of Jews on the political scene, as they were not much involved
in the dynastic transition. As mentioned above, the first king to make any significant
gains for Capetian power was Phillip I in the early twelfth century, as he built up
relationships between minor lords and the crown.35 Coinciding with the growth in
Capetian power during the twelfth century was a change in the operation of the
economy that began early in the eleventh century. The old bartering system was
rapidly giving way to an increasingly commercial exchange economy. This explosion
in the use and importance of money36 was to have grave implications for Jews and
their relationship with the rest of society and the crown.
Moneylending: A Jewish Niche and Its Consequences
At the same time that the Carolingians gave way to the Capetians around the turn
of the first millennium, changes began which caused many Jews to shift into what
would become their stereotypical occupation—moneylending. A combination of push
and pull factors caused this shift. Jews had effectively been forced out of large-scale
agriculture when their rights to own Christian slaves were taken away and,
although they were still able to own land, it was legally insecure and useless to
them for anything beyond subsistence farming. The gradual barring of Jews from
the developing merchant and craft guilds on the grounds of their prohibition from
holding authority over Christians also forced them out of the higher skilled trades.37
At the same time, new financial opportunities arose due to the new monetary econ-
omy that required people to be able to borrow money on credit for growth and devel-
opment. The Church, however, prohibited Christians from lending money to other
Christians for the purpose of earning interest. This ban was based on an interpreta-
tion of a biblical passage, Deuteronomy 23:20: ‘‘You may charge a foreigner interest,
but not a brother Israelite . . .’’ Since the Christian Church saw itself as the new
Israel, this moneylending ban was extended to all members of Christendom. Jews,
however, were exempt from Christian restrictions.
The same Deuteronomic commandment, naturally, applied to Jews as well,
and rabbinic authorities frowned upon lending at first, whether to a fellow Jew
or a Christian. The great rabbi and commentator Rashi himself declared in the
late eleventh century, ‘‘He who loans money at interest to a foreigner will be de-
stroyed.’’38 Less than a century later, necessity had softened rabbinic consensus:
‘‘no loans at interest must be made to the gentiles, if a livelihood can be earned in
another manner,’’ but ‘‘when a Jew may possess neither fields nor vines permitting
him to live, the lending of money at interest to non-Jews is necessary and conse-
quently authorized.’’39 The potential to carve out a niche and gain a monopoly over
a growing trade must have appealed deeply to many Jews, especially since their
urbanization, historical experience as merchants, and higher standards of education
suited them for it. However, attraction alone is not enough to explain the Jewish
shift into moneylending. Most people will not opt to change occupation simply be-
cause they can. Instead, it was the external influence of occupational restrictions
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that gradually forced Jews off their farms and out of their workshops. The principle
that Jews must not control Christians was far more powerful in pushing them out
of agriculture and the guilds than the rise of a capital economy, and the Church’s
ban on Christians charging interest to each other were in drawing them to the
money table.
The majority of Jews still scratched out livings in low-level occupations, but the
minority who did move into moneylending was a highly visible one. These Jewish
financiers inadvertently formed the seed of the stereotype of the ‘‘money-loving
Jew,’’ which has found incredible longevity and fame. Medieval Christians found it
especially easy to associate all Jews with moneylending since, relative to the Chris-
tian majority, a greater proportion of the Jewish community were moneylenders
even when Christians made up the majority of lenders overall. This proportion
must have appeared even larger, since virtually all moneylenders lived in towns
and so comprised a sizeable percentage of urban Jews when their poorer co-religionists
remained in the countryside. In this way the Jewish economic role in medieval
France was disproportionate to Jewish numbers both in reality and even more so in
the Christian imagination. This powerful association between Jews and moneylend-
ing remained pre-eminent even when Christians (particularly Italians) disobeyed the
usury ban and began to make up a majority of the financial market overall.40
In spite of the unrealistic representation of Jews as chronic moneylenders and
the extremely negative stereotype that later grew out of it, Jewish lenders in the
late eleventh and twelfth centuries actually provided an important and appreciated
service in two ways. First, they helped to grow an increasingly money-based economy
that Church policy otherwise hindered.41 Second, Jewish lenders contributed to the
survival of many poor people who needed borrowed money in order to meet the
necessities of day-to-day life.42 It is perhaps only natural however, considering
human nature, that many Christians came to resent the Jews for their new role in
spite of its benefits, whether because of jealousy, suspicion, or personal insecurities.
The prejudice was all the more potent since Jews were already marked out as dif-
ferent from the rest of society. The Jewish writer Joseph Kimhi of Narbonne wrote
in the mid-twelfth century of the double standard applied to Jewish and Christian
lenders, despite the latter’s higher interest rates and less-reputable business prac-
tices.43 Jewish reactions to Christian hostility definitely indicate that envy was one
likely motive for attacks on their communities. Jewish communities (kehillot) in
northern France enacted laws placing self-imposed restrictions on the behavior of
their members. Limits were set on the kinds of clothing that could be worn, the
type and amount of jewelry, and the size and nature of banquets given. The leaders
of the kehillot acknowledged that ostentatious shows of wealth such as these by a
few Jews would arouse the jealousy and anger of Christian neighbors against the
entire community if left unchecked.44
The fact that only a minority of Jews were moneylenders and that fewer still had
any great wealth did not seem to allay the Christian hostility against their entire
community. The actions of the kehillot confirm that the economic status of a
few Jews engendered the hostility of the Christian majority against all their co-
religionists and initiated the formation of an enduring stereotype. Human beings
have a tendency to form mental schemas, assuming that all members of a particular
group share certain characteristics and may even be all the same. People usually
draw these conclusions from direct observations of only a few members of the group
in question or even from mere rumor and hearsay. These conclusions are then gen-
eralized to the entire group. In sociological terms, this phenomenon is called the out-
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group homogeneity effect and has been used to establish ‘‘Otherness’’ and dehuman-
ize victim groups many times throughout history.45 Furthermore, humans are prone
to the accentuation effect, which establishes a confirmation bias that remembers
negative characteristics of an ‘‘Other’’ individual or group while ignoring positive
qualities or characteristics that contradict presuppositions, even if those positive
qualities are more numerous.46 In medieval France, these two factors meant that
all Jews quickly came to be associated with the financial activities of a few of their
highly visible co-religionists.
Religious leaders of the time quickly realized that the new Jewish ‘‘offence’’ to
Christendom could be very useful. They soon changed their angle of attack from the
old, purely religious rhetoric to a new combined religious, economic, and social one
that the laity was much more prepared to accept. Preachers started portraying
moneylending as a weapon in the Jewish arsenal being used to attack and under-
mine Christendom either as part of a Jewish fifth column in alliance with the Mus-
lims, or in the service of the Devil himself to prepare the way for the Antichrist.47
Once the laity accepted this rhetoric, it was an easy progression to forming and
believing other erroneous accusations against Jews. Political leaders, while finding
Jews economically useful and protecting them for a time, also began to see the pro-
paganda value of their new status and did not hesitate to exploit it.
Transition: The Blois Massacre and the First Expulsion
When Jews began to move into moneylending in sufficiently large numbers during
the twelfth century, Christians began to see it as a ‘‘Jewish’’ occupation. At the
same time, another change took place in European society. The old clerical, religious
anti-Judaism that the laypeople and rulers of Europe had ignored for so long began
to give way to a popular, irrational hostility which can be called true anti-Semitism
for the first time. This change happened because the growing hostility and stereo-
types surrounding Jewish moneylending psychologically prepared common Chris-
tians to accept rumors about the other harmful activities that Jews supposedly
carried out in secret. In the minds of many Christians, Jews became financially para-
sitic ‘‘Others’’ who committed untold horrors in private. They had long been painted
by clerics like Adhemar of Chabannes as the Devil’s agents sent to earth to attack
Christ and Christians. Around the turn of the millennium, the preacher Ralph
Glaber articulated ‘‘the wickedness of the Jews’’ which he alleged had led to the
destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem48 by their supposedly
devilish Muslim allies under the Caliph al-Hakim. Common Christians never seem
to have believed such accusations, of which they could see no evidence and which
had such distant results. Now that the new ‘‘evil’’ of Jewish moneylending was
present in everyday life for all to see, when Christians heard it denounced in church
as an attack on their society, the association was easier to make.
Once the idea of the Jewish menace had been established and internalized, it
was not much of a leap for poorly understood Jewish rituals and customs to also be
accepted as part of an anti-Christian campaign. The average medieval Christian
peasant had only the barest understanding of his/her own religion, let alone the
alien practices of Jews that took place behind closed doors. Furthermore, the belief
that Jewish religious and economic activities were actually spiritual attacks carried
out in the name of the Devil naturally resulted in the acceptance of further accusa-
tions that Jews did actual physical harm to Christians in the course of their evil
spiritual services. Christians began to accept such rumors, if for no other reason
than that they had no concrete reason to disbelieve them.49 Unexplained deaths, for
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which the common people demanded answers and justice, could then be blamed on
the Jews by troublemakers. Such accusers usually had the tacit (and sometimes
enthusiastic) approval of the authorities, who knew the placement of guilt would be
accepted by the people. As a marginalized, defenseless, and demonized minority, the
Jews made very plausible scapegoats.
Violence, often on a large—though never truly exterminatory—scale, was the
natural outcome of accusations against a dehumanized and feared group such as
medieval French Jews, especially when there was not enough evidence for a legiti-
mate trial and mob justice took over. Local authorities often approved of, and some-
times encouraged, the lynching of Jews in this way whether because of apathy,
genuine hostility, or greed for confiscated Jewish wealth. This was certainly the
case at the first French ritual murder accusation: the ‘‘trial’’ and burning of Jews at
Blois in May 1171. Ephraim ben Jacob of Bonn, a German-Jewish Talmudist and
poet, gave an account of the incident at Blois in his work ‘‘A Book of Historical
Records.’’ No reason is known for the ritual murder accusation to have happened at
that place and time, but it may have been an echo of the similar William of Norwich
scandal in England in 1144. Ephraim recounts that about forty Jews lived in Blois at
the time that one of them was accused of disposing of a Christian corpse. The man
was watering his horse at the river when a soldier doing the same with his master’s
horse claimed that the animal spooked at the sight of the Jew. Somehow, the soldier
turned this episode into a story that he immediately told his master about a Jew
whom he saw ‘‘throw a little Christian child, whom the Jews have killed, into the
water.’’50 Remembering his hatred of ‘‘a certain Jewess influential in the city,’’
the master saw a chance for vengeance and immediately reported the ‘‘crime’’ to the
ruler of Blois, Count Theobald V.51 Theobald believed the story and imprisoned all
the Jews of Blois as a result. He had no evidence against them—not even a body—
but saw an opportunity to profit by ransoming the entire Jewish community to Jews
in the neighboring cities. Extremely outdated and misapplied methods of trial by
ordeal were used to prove the ‘‘truth’’ of the accusation against the Jews, while the
arrival of a hateful priest swayed Theobald’s mind from mercy and ransom to
punishment. On 26 May, more than thirty of the forty Jews of Blois were burned
alive.52 Their torment was the first episode of its kind in continental Europe and
set a dangerous precedent. Both Theobald and his subjects enthusiastically accepted
the ritual murder accusation and sought a gruesome vengeance at the urging of a
simple priest. The whole episode lacked even the veneer of a legitimate legal case
or sincere religious justification. Something had changed. These Christians hated
Jews not as human members of an alien religion, but irrationally, as something
they objectively were not: evil and secret murderers of the innocent. Anti-Semitism
had arrived, and it was both popular and political.
It must be noted that ritual murder pogroms differed greatly from the massacres
of Jews that took place during the First Crusade. The crusaders who slaughtered
Jews in the Rhineland and at Rouen in France (the only place where the French
king and bishops were unable to protect Jews) were not the aristocratic and officially
state-sponsored soldiers sent to recapture the Holy Land. The people who so
viciously attacked Jews during the crusade were almost universally commoners.
They were non-professional soldiers and hangers-on, urged to unrestrained violence
by grass-roots leaders on religious grounds.53 Moreover, these renegade crusaders
attacked Jews in a time of heightened religious sentiment when they had been
gathered for the purpose of killing non-Christians to begin with. To these low-level
crusaders an infidel was an infidel, and the distinction between Jew and Muslim
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was a moot point since all were the enemies of Christ and thus deserved to die.
Their behavior, however, was discouraged at the time by most rulers and by mem-
bers of the Church hierarchy.54
Much had changed seventy years after the First Crusade. The killings at Blois
did not occur in an atmosphere of increased religious feeling by a community facing
an external threat of any kind, but rather in a safe and peaceful town. Although, as
Ephraim of Bonn notes, the final decision to burn the Jews of Blois came at the
instigation of a priest, there was no religious motive in the initial acceptance of
the accusation or decision to persecute them. Also, it was a political figure, Count
Theobald, who provided the main impetus to attack the Jews, quite unlike his
Crusader counterparts who discouraged such behavior. Lastly, the common men
who carried out Theobald’s sentence on the Jews massacred their neighbors, who
clearly posed no threat to the community.
Interestingly, Louis VII was the king of France and Count Theobald’s brother-in-
law at the time of the Blois massacre. Louis strongly condemned the accusations
against the Jews of Blois and renewed assurances of his protection to the Jewish
community in his domains55 (Blois being just outside the king’s sphere of direct in-
fluence). Clearly, anti-Semitism had not yet become institutionalized at the highest
levels of society, although Louis’ words were probably motivated more by economic
considerations than humanitarianism. Jews had become mere pawns for rulers due
to their new economic role. The developing political anti-Semitism was more a phe-
nomenon of abuse of power and realpolitik than of hatred, fear, or religious belief.
Unlike the previous centuries when Jews were free and equal subjects who had a
special partnership with kings, by the late twelfth century their survival was based
entirely on their economic and political usefulness. The Jews were yet another point
of contention, along with minting rights and authority over serfs, over which the
Capetian monarchs battled their vassals during the long struggle to unite and domi-
nate France. They were pieces of property around whom kings built very strong legal
claims for the rights of the crown.56
The Jews were an important source of money for the king even more than they
were a source of legal leverage. Rulers always need money, especially those who are
trying to build up their power base. The majority of loans that medieval Jews made
were to such rulers, and the business relationship generally went smoothly. The
Jews had several methods to ensure that they were repaid on time. Pawnbroking
secured loans when enough physical collateral was available, as did royal grants of
tax rights to the Jews, and Jewish threats of collective boycott should one of them
be cheated.57 Theoretically, no king would default on a loan if it meant that he would
never get another one. Sometimes, though, rulers ignored the consequences and
sought profit from the Jews by attacking rather than protecting them. The collective
confiscation of property or repudiation of loans from all Jews could bring in a large
one-time gain, while simultaneously removing the threat of boycott and neutralizing
the Jewish community’s source of leverage.58 Kings found this option very attractive
when another non-Jewish source of credit was available.
The young king Philip II Augustus was intent on expanding royal power as much
as possible when he came to the French throne in 1179. Only fifteen years old, Philip
was nonetheless a shrewd ruler and knew right away that he needed vast quantities
of money in order to fight the feudal barons for power and win.59 The best medieval
source of information on Philip and France at this time comes from the book ‘‘Gesta
Philippi Augusti’’ by the monk Rigord of St. Denis. Apparently, Philip immediately
recognized that Jews were useful to his plans and he set to work persecuting them
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within months of ascending the throne. Four months into his reign, Philip im-
prisoned every single Jew in the Royal Domains. He released them in 1180, only
after receiving a large ransom. In 1181 Philip annulled all Jewish loans that had
been made to Christians and retained 20% for the crown. Finally, in 1182, Philip
issued the last blow to the Jews by confiscating their homes, buildings, and land,
banishing them from the Royal Domains effective the feast of St. John the Baptist
on 24 June.60
Rigord justifies Philip’s expulsion of the Jews of his lands in religious terms. He
claims that Philip knew full well how ‘‘the Jews who dwelt in Paris were wont every
year on Easter day. . . to go down secretly into underground vaults and kill a Chris-
tian as a sort of sacrifice in contempt of the Christian religion.’’61 Apparently, the
final offence came when the Jews ‘‘used so vilely’’ some church vessels given to
them as security on a loan.62 Whether or not Philip really believed such accusations
will never be known, but he likely did not care about the truth, instead only wanting
to use them as effective propaganda in his attacks. The confiscation and expulsion of
1182 did, however, serve several practical worldly purposes that Philip fully calcu-
lated and believed in. First, the financial revenues from taking over Jewish property
and the claims on their debts hugely enriched the crown. Under former circum-
stances, Philip would have ruined any chances at future loans by thus impoverishing
and alienating the Jewish community. However, Italian moneylenders had estab-
lished a growing presence in France and were ready to fill the gap. A ruler in such
a situation did not have to fear boycott, but did stand to make a substantial one-time
gain while enjoying continued credit from a new source.63 Second, the expulsion
itself ensured the support of the French Church and the goodwill of the clergy.
Official papal policy rejected the persecution and expulsion of Jews but, as has been
seen, many lower-level clerics ignored this and would have welcomed the Jews’ ex-
pulsion. Finally, even the most undemocratic tyrant still cares about public opinion
to some degree and wants the support of his subjects. It was important for Philip to
establish this popularity early in his reign, and the expulsion of what had become a
feared and hated minority was an excellent way to do so. Philip’s religious pretences
for the expulsion would have made this public relations coup all the more effective
because of his appearance to be cleansing Christian France of the Devil’s Jewish
servants.
The expulsion of 1182 was small in scope due to the limited geographical area to
which it applied. It was also a temporary measure, for the king would allow Jews
back into his lands by the end of the century. Philip Augustus’ expulsion of the
Jews, however, had significance beyond its scale. It was the first such expulsion any-
where in Europe, and signaled that the Jews had fully fallen from being protected
and favored royal subjects to political pawns at the mercy of their rulers. Jews could
now be used as tools to raise money, settle political disputes, or gain the support of
the masses. The events of 1182 had set a dangerous and much-followed precedent for
the rest of Europe, particularly the western half, which was entirely free of Jews
three centuries later. Although the Jews were eventually allowed back into the
French Royal Domains, they suffered repeated banishments until their last re-
mnants were forced out in 1394. English Jews were expelled in 1290 due to compli-
cations related to moneylending, and those in Germany, Spain, and parts of Italy
faced much harassment and violence before their own final expulsions in the
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.64 From a modern point of view, the most
significant aspect of the 1182 expulsion is clearly that Philip Augustus had ushered
in the age of political anti-Semitism at the highest levels of government and society.
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Conclusion
Over the four centuries from the rise of the Carolingians to their first expulsion
from France, the Jews under royal control occupied a steadily worsening position
in society. By the end of that period they had lost their original acceptance and
privileged place. Although intolerance of Jews was nothing new in Christendom, it
definitely grew and morphed as the earlier clerical anti-Judaism gave way to an
irrational popular and political anti-Semitism. The change in employment opportuni-
ties forced many Jews into taking on an economic role that was the main factor lead-
ing to their downfall. Without the restrictions which led to that change of occupation,
and which consequently influenced popular attitudes toward Jews and religious
accusations against them, the Jews of France would likely have continued living as
a protected minority condemned from the pulpit but accepted by their neighbors. The
growing hatred of Jews as a group was in no way inspired by their real behavior.
Rather, Jewish moneylending simply provided a catalyst for the spread of false pre-
conceived and generalized notions about Jews.65 Without the adoption of moneylend-
ing as a major Jewish occupation, the common people would never have seen any
‘‘evidence’’ of Jews as a dangerous minority feeding off of Christian society and plot-
ting its destruction. Instead, seeing Jewish ‘‘predators’’ financially ‘‘attacking’’ Chris-
tians through usury planted the idea in the average layperson’s mind that perhaps
they were dangerous after all. The way was paved for anti-Semitism: if Jews did
such terrible things publicly, many Christians likely reasoned, just imagine what
they did in secret. Suddenly, all of the long-proposed but unpopular religious propa-
ganda portraying Jews as demonic enemies seemed a little more realistic. Eventually
ready to believe anything, laypeople accepted these ideas and a mob mentality carried
them away into unthinking fear and hatred. The most baseless of accusations
suddenly became legitimate grounds for the bloodiest of massacres.
State protection that normally would have stopped anti-Jewish violence not only
disappeared but also turned into tacit approval and then active persecution as rulers
realized the value of exploiting Jews. Whether as a means to indirectly tax the peo-
ple, a source of wealth for confiscation, scapegoats for crimes and social problems, or
tools to raise popular and clerical support by periodic ‘‘religious’’ persecutions, few
things were more useful to a ruler than a helpless Jewish community. The period of
transition from anti-Judaism started in 1171 with the Blois massacre and concluded
with the expulsion of 1182. The former signaled the arrival of popular anti-Semitism
and the latter the arrival of its political counterpart. Both set dangerous precedents
that were repeated in France and all over Europe for centuries to come. Most im-
portantly, these events marked a sinister transition in the treatment of Jews by all
levels of society, often independently of religious cause. Anti-Semitism had arisen
and established Jews as dehumanized enemies of the common good, though the phe-
nomenon would continue to evolve for centuries.
Ultimately, when viewed in a much broader historical context, the events begin-
ning in the twelfth century clearly helped to create the atmosphere that enabled
another major reinvention of Jew-hatred with the Nazi racialization of anti-Semitism
in the early twentieth century. The Nazis exploited many ancient myths about Jews,
including the blood libel, demonological imagery, and especially the portrayal of
Jews as parasitic internal enemies preying upon their non-Jewish neighbors, largely
through economic means.66 The vast span of history and the lack of medieval geno-
cidal intent preclude a direct causal link between the rise of medieval anti-Semitism
and the Holocaust. However, the fires of Blois were, without a doubt, important first
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steps on the long road to the ultimate catastrophe of European Jewry almost eight
centuries later.
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Adopted in September 2005 by the UN General Assembly as part of the UN World
Summit’s Outcome Document, the ‘‘Responsibility to Protect’’ (R2P) principle has
gained demonstrable traction during the first decade of the new millennium. It was
first used and defined as the title for the 2001 report of the International Com-
mission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). R2P was also featured in
the report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change, entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004).
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also embraced R2P in his own report, In
Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human Rights for All (2005),
and in 2006 the UN Security Council reaffirmed R2P in Resolution 1674.
The international community’s widespread recognition of Responsibility to Protect
poses serious practical challenges to state makers holding the view that sovereignty
is, or at least ought to be, inviolable. At the same time, R2P also poses theoretical
and conceptual challenges to those practitioners of disciplinary international rela-
tions trying to analyze and make sense of the contemporary world affairs unfolding
around them. The source of these challenges lie in three interrelated presumptions
underpinning R2P: first, that the state bears primary responsibility for protecting
its own population from mass crime and conscience-shocking atrocity; second, that
the international community is responsible for assisting states to meet these duties;
and third, that UN member states are also responsible for protecting at-risk popula-
tions when the host state fails to provide the necessary protection. In addition to rec-
ognizing the international community’s responsibility to react to atrocity crimes—
which include, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against human-
ity—R2P recognizes the international community’s responsibility to help prevent
those atrocities from occurring in the first place as well as its responsibility to help
rebuild governments, economies, and societies in the aftermath of mass crime. The
Damien Rogers, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All,
by Gareth Evans; Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, by Alex J.
Bellamy; and The Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century,
edited by Richard H. Cooper and Juliette Voı¨nov Kohler. Genocide Studies and Prevention 5,
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logic of R2P therefore represents a radical departure from the highly controversial
muscular humanitarian interventions of the 1990s.
This review briefly examines three recent works, each of which responds to the
practical, conceptual, and theoretical challenges posed by the emergence of R2P.
While the authors of these works rely upon various approaches to deal with their
topic, a consensus emerges around the need to complete the transformation of R2P
from words into deeds, from concept into norm, from rhetoric into reality.
Gareth Evans’ The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once
and for All (2008) provides an insider’s account of the emergence of the R2P concept.
He is well known internationally for his former role as Australian foreign minister,
and for his current post as president and chief executive officer of the International
Crisis Group (ICG). Evans played an integral part in developing and articulating the
R2P concept, not only as co-chair of the International Convention on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and as a member of the UN High-Level Panel but
also, and more recently, as co-chair of the International Advisory Board for the
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, launched in early 2008. Indeed,
Evans was so central to the development of this concept that the phrase he
coined—the ‘‘Responsibility to Protect’’—provided the title for the ICISS report,
although the catchy acronym ‘‘R2P’’ was someone else’s suggestion. Building on his
personal involvement, the central purpose of Evans’ latest book is to introduce,
elaborate, and clarify the R2P concept for his readers, and to rectify some of the
prevalent misunderstandings that accompany this concept which misinform much of
the relevant discussion occurring within the academy, the media, and government
circles. Evans writes that his book ‘‘is about understanding the responsibility to pro-
tect, how the concept emerged, and what it does and does not embrace . . . [it] is
about what is necessary to operationalize the new norm, to make it work effectively
in practice’’ (3). By educating his readership to that end, the book thereby seeks to
mobilize a broad range of actors who are present on the international stage and
who can help transform R2P from rhetoric into reality, enabling those actors to
successfully navigate their way past key obstacles and overcome resistance to R2P’s
development and entrenchment.
Foregrounding both his own travels through Cambodia in the late 1960s, before
Pol Pot’s regime unleashed its genocidal nightmare on the Cambodian people, and
his efforts to confront the aftermath of that atrocity during the late 1980s and early
1990s as Australian foreign minister, Evans reveals his own personal motivations for
advocating R2P. This personal background provides a useful context in which to
situate the urgent need for the world’s policy makers to respond effectively to atrocity
crimes irrespective of the locations in which they occur. While this highly personalized
approach may well appeal to, and resonate strongly with, a wide readership—through
either their own personal encounters with such atrocities or their reflection on, and
repugnance for, conscience-shocking mass crime that occurs within an international
culture of impunity—it tends to preclude the book’s potential status as an authorita-
tive account of the topic at hand. Put simply, the narrator is too close to the events
he depicts. Yet even though Evans has first-hand insights into key personalities
involved in developing R2P, such as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and
Mohamed Sahnoun, co-chair of the ICISS, the book does not dwell on them. Nor
does the book read as the self-congratulatory vehicle I half expected it to be. To be
sure, Evans does highlight, with some degree of regularity, his own role in recent
and contemporary politico-historical trends and events. But the book is more than
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part memoir and, if anything, his self-emphasis might prove useful as the basis for
assessing Evan’s potential role as a norm entrepreneur.
Writing from a unique and well-informed perspective, Evans organizes his argu-
ment into two main parts. Part one contains three chapters, the first of which pro-
vides useful legal and political definitions of mass atrocities before offering what is
essentially a statement of the problem for which R2P is designed as a remedy. To
do this, Evans traces the problem of atrocity crimes from the earliest moments of
human history right up to the 1990s, ending with examples drawn from Somalia,
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo, each of which ought to be familiar to his readership.
The second chapter treats the reader to some very good background material cover-
ing the emergence of R2P, its first articulation in 2001, its subsequent evolution, as
well as pointing out some major obstacles to its full development. The contention
surrounding the precise status of R2P as a norm in international affairs, the lack of
institutional preparedness, and the lack of political will to fully implement R2P are
obstacles that, if left unchecked, could erode the consensus forming around R2P,
perhaps foreshadowing the degree to which R2P’s transformation from rhetoric to
reality is resisted. Particularly useful here is Evans’ treatment of humanitarian
intervention within the broader, ongoing debate between muscular intervention and
respect for the sovereign state’s prerogative of non-interference. The final chapter of
part one seeks to rectify several key misunderstandings of R2P—foremost of which is
a misconception that R2P is another means justifying the coercive use of military
force—and to clarify the situations to which R2P does and does not apply. Taken
together, the chapters of part one will prove valuable to readers wanting to
strengthen a basic appreciation of R2P or looking for a first-hand account of the
kinds of thinking which influenced the emergence of this important concept.
Part two contains a total of seven chapters, the first four of which give focus to
three major aspects of R2P: namely, the responsibility to prevent atrocity crimes
from occurring; the responsibility to react to atrocity crimes when they occur; and
the responsibility to rebuild in the aftermath of atrocity crimes. Using two chapters
to examine the responsibility to react—one focusing on non-coercive means, the
other on the circumstances necessary for the use of military force—demonstrates
that the coercive use of force lies at the extreme end of a broad range of policy
options available to the international community. Evans analyses each of the major
aspects of R2P in terms of policy makers’ conceptual toolboxes, which include various
political/diplomatic measures, economic/social measures, constitutional/legal mea-
sures, and security sector measures. The analysis here is generally wide-ranging
but, by corollary, somewhat cursory, though Evans emphasizes ‘‘that each situation
has its own characteristics and that one-size spanners don’t fit all, but that each situa-
tion is likely to require a complex combination of measures, with the balance between
them bound to change, and to have to change, over time as circumstances evolve’’ (85).
Building upon the analysis mentioned above, the remaining three chapters of
part two examine the extent to which existing organizations can play a role in trans-
forming R2P from rhetoric into reality, what is required to build the diplomatic,
military, and civilian capabilities needed to assist this transformation, and how the
prerequisite political will might be mustered and sustained. Evans favors a survey
approach to these chapters instead of a formal analytic framework, focusing his
argument on a range of pragmatic concerns. In his chapter on promoting and mobi-
lizing political will, for instance, Evans writes that it ‘‘is not a missing ingredient,
waiting in each case to be found if we only had the key to the right cupboard or lifted
the right stone. It has to be painfully and laboriously constructed, case by case, con-
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text by context’’ (224). The elements required for constructing sufficient political
will—namely, disseminating knowledge of mass atrocity, building compelling argu-
ments, generating a strong desire for action, demonstrating that taking action can
make a significant difference, highlighting those processes which can help manage
that action, and searching for, or supporting, leadership appropriate to this chal-
lenge—are each in turn explored in this final chapter. He continues to express this
pragmatic approach to the book’s very end when he remarks, ‘‘You don’t get to
change the world simply by observing it’’ (241). The last third of the book, then, is a
call to action to operationalize R2P’s concepts and to further strengthen its status as
an emerging norm. To that end, Evans’ book includes a couple of additional features
that warrant brief mention here: appendices containing apt excerpts of instruments
of international law that define genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes;
references for a selection of works that will interest the general reader; and various
Web site addresses of advocacy groups sufficiently concerned by the R2P issue to
take action in some way.
Inspiring as this call to action might be, the book is not without fault. The most
immediate deficiencies concern the organization of the argument and its uncritical
approach to the topic. Given that part two contains seven of the book’s ten chapters,
and that the subject matter of the first four chapters of part two are closely interre-
lated, the reader would be forgiven for thinking that these four chapters would have
been better placed in their own part. This would have almost certainly given the
argument greater analytic clarity. More problematic than the book’s structure,
however, is Evan’s uncritical approach, which characterizes R2P as part of a prob-
lem-solving paradigm. Evans writes, for instance, that for ‘‘all its problems, the UN
system—with the Security Council at its heart on issues of war and peace and civil-
ian protection—is the only credible international institution we have, or are ever
likely to have, with the necessary combination of legitimacy and authority. The task
is not to replace or bypass what we have but to make it work better’’ (180). Passages
such as these left me wondering if the argument would have been stronger had it
seriously considered systemic reform. However, it is likely such reform would be
unattractive to Evans due to its potential to undermine not only his own role in help-
ing implement R2P but also ICG’s future role and status. Evans draws heavily upon
ICG reports for evidence to support his general narrative and arguments. However,
by the time the reader reaches the end of this book, the heavy reliance on ICG
reporting is unimportant since the ICG reports, generally speaking, contain informa-
tion, analysis, and conclusion of a high standard.
Overall, this is a unique, well-informed, and fairly comprehensive account of the
R2P concept. The book demonstrates an excellent understanding of its topic and con-
veys that to its reader in an easy-to-comprehend manner. Despite the minor issues
mentioned above, the reader is provided with solid information about R2P and the
history surrounding its evolution, as well as some of the critical strengths and weak-
nesses of the concept. Given the moral power of his argument and the passionate
prose of the text, it will be difficult for the uncritical reader to not share Evan’s
‘‘fairly unquenchable sense of optimism; a belief that even the most horrible and
intractable problems are soluble; that rational solutions for which there are good,
principled arguments will prevail’’ (7).
Based at the University of Queensland, Australia, Alex J. Bellamy is a professor
of Peace and Conflict Studies and has an impressive breadth and depth of expertise
in international security matters. His recent book, entitled Responsibility to Protect:
The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (2009), is well researched and well organ-
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ized, and presents a compelling argument. Unlike Evans, who draws heavily on his
personal experiences as ICISS co-chair and member of the UN High-Level Panel,
Bellamy writes from a perspective one step removed from the emergence of R2P at
the international level although he acknowledges that he enjoyed close contact with
those who were ‘‘actively involved in creating, selling, and operationalizing the R2P’’
(viii). The fact that Bellamy writes from a distance about R2P provides him with the
opportunity to critically approach the topic, which he does well. This is not to say
that Bellamy is unconcerned with transforming R2P from rhetoric into reality; in
addition to this book and scholarly articles on the topic, he is also editor of the new
journal Global Responsibility to Protect and executive director of the Asia-Pacific Cen-
tre for the Responsibility to Protect. Rather, Bellamy’s book does not exhibit the same
level of optimism and enthusiasm as Evans’ does. It is, first and foremost, a scholarly
contribution to the existing pool of knowledge on what he describes as the ‘‘single
most important recent development’’ (2) in the world’s response to atrocity crimes.
Bellamy’s book begins by introducing a useful analytic framework that illustrates
how R2P first took shape as a concept before evolving into a principle that can guide
collective action. This distinction matters, as ‘‘it determines whether the R2P is sub-
ordinate to traditional principles of sovereignty and non-intervention or whether—as
a principle in its own right—it has the effect of altering the meaning of sovereignty
itself ’’ (6). At the same time, but not as part of this continuum, R2P also develops as
an emerging norm.
The book is divided into six main chapters, the first of which provides a sophisti-
cated discussion of sovereignty and intervention. Bellamy suggests that sovereignty
was never absolute and has never acted as a forceful barrier to intervention, but
instead has always included a right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other
states and was grounded in, and sustained by, human rights, particularly the right
for people to determine their preferred form of government. He dismisses the dichot-
omy of sovereignty and human rights, which is commonly understood as the rights to
non-intervention, territorial integrity, and political independence enjoyed by modern
states. The latter, human rights, are described as ‘‘the idea that individuals ought
to enjoy certain fundamental freedoms by virtue of their humanity’’ (8), Bellamy
demonstrates the ‘‘need to move beyond thinking in terms of a struggle between
sovereignty and human rights’’ (14). The opening chapter also surveys the ongoing
public policy debate that set the scene for the Canadian government to establish
the ICISS, recasting the debate so that ‘‘the whole concept of the R2P rests on the
idea that sovereignty and human rights are two sides of the same coin, and not
opposing principles locked in interminable struggle, as is often portrayed’’ (33).
The second chapter provides an excellent account of the emergence of R2P as a
concept within the work of the ICISS, including insightful passages dealing with
the commission’s abandonment of humanitarian intervention rhetoric, its adoption
of the victim’s perspective, its broadening of intervention beyond the scope of the
coercive use of force, and its emulation of the Brundtland Commission report of
1987, which conceived the notion of sustainable utilization as a way of resolving the
tension between the seemingly irreconcilable impulse for commercial exploitation and
conservationists’ concern for natural resources. Significantly, Bellamy notes that:
The commission’s adoption of language focusing on the rights of endangered civilians
rather than on the rights of potential interveners help to illuminate a broad con-
stituency of states and civil society actors prepared to acknowledge that sovereignty
entailed responsibilities and the legitimacy of the international involvement in pro-
tecting people from genocide and mass atrocities. (65)
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The chapter also introduces and explains the key aspects of the ICISS concept of
R2P, and engages the main contemporary responses to that report.
The third chapter focuses at length on the 2005 World Summit, and to the vari-
ous efforts to generate a consensus on R2P among the international community.
Bellamy notes that, at certain times, the R2P concept looked like it might never
reach the international security agenda. He also points out that, despite its common
name, the principle of R2P adopted by the UN General Assembly differed in some
key respects from the concept advanced by the ICISS. For example, ‘‘tying non-
consensual force under the banner of the R2P exclusively with Security Council
authorization—rather than primarily, as proposed by the ICISS—became a key
part of the R2P [principle] and was an essential component of the 2005 consensus’’
(73; emphasis in original). This difference reasserted the Security Council’s claim to
be the only legitimate body authorizing the use of force in international affairs, dis-
tanced R2P from the stigma attached to the unlawful US interventions in Kosovo
and Iraq (both of which were without Security Council authorization), and probably
helped ease some of the concerns surrounding R2P’s potential to justify or disguise
neocolonial interference in the developing world. Also provided is an intriguing
description of the tactics deployed by US Permanent Representative to the UN John
Bolton in an attempt to disrupt and derail the negotiation process leading up to the
World Summit—an attempt that was ultimately unsuccessful. As with the previous
chapter which focused on the ICISS report, Bellamy considers the major responses to
the Outcome Document. Taken together, chapters two and three present a well-
researched and thoughtful narrative conveying this very recent history, giving focus
to the evolution of R2P from concept to principle and to important dimensions that
have changed as a result of that evolution. It will be of interest to those readers con-
cerned with the diplomatic processes and structures used for developing norms or
advancing a novel concept on the international community’s security agenda.
A close reading of chapters two and three reveals that one of the book’s key
strengths lies in its critical approach. As Bellamy traces the development of R2P
from concept to principle, he points to where the evolution of R2P has resulted in
important weaknesses. For example, he argues that
the [ICISS] report is conceptually confused about the nature, scope and place of pre-
vention and adds little new to the way we think about the practice of prevention.
Much the same can be said of the commission’s finding on rebuilding. There is a vast
gulf between the commission’s sophisticated and nuanced treatment of intervention
and its brief, confused and unoriginal take on prevention and rebuilding. (52–53)
He also notes that, despite claims that prevention is the key aspect of R2P, the re-
port devotes only nine of its eighty-five pages to it. In fact, ‘‘the responsibilities to
prevent and rebuild received only sixteen pages, compared with thirty-two pages on
the question of intervention’’ (64). So while Bellamy’s book covers much the same
ground as Evans’, it offers wide-ranging insight of R2P’s emergence, and the reader
is left with a more analytically sophisticated, critical understanding of the principle.
This important difference will appeal to advanced undergraduate and postgraduate
students as well as to scholars and researchers wishing to keep abreast of important
recent developments within the field of international security.
In turn, the three remaining chapters examine the main aspects of R2P. Focus is
given, first, to identifying the circumstances in which the responsibility to prevent
ought to apply, and the practical steps, measures, and initiatives that will need to
be considered if that responsibility is to be fulfilled by the international community.
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Next, a range of measures short of the coercive use of force are discussed in the
context of the responsibility to react before the coercive use of force is discussed,
including the conditions that ought to exist and the practical steps, measures, and
initiatives required to offer immediate protection to those at risk on the ground.
Bellamy frequently stresses, correctly, the importance of having a broad range of
options, extending from total inaction to dispatching armed forces. Finally, Bellamy
examines different approaches to post-conflict rebuilding, focusing on the Peacebuild-
ing Commission as a key initiative in this respect. Throughout his detailed treat-
ment of these major aspects of R2P, Bellamy is mindful of the conceptual and prac-
tical difficulties of implementation. Too many passages, however, left me wondering
if the discussion, which was very interesting, had entered a level of detail that could
be considered ‘‘off topic,’’ particularly during the discussions of sanction regimes and
of peacekeeping operations. The space used here might have been better used on pro-
viding a statement of the problem to which R2P is a response, which struck me as a
significant omission in this book. Nevertheless, Bellamy’s was my pick of the three
books subject to review here. It is well researched and informative, written in lucid
prose, and compellingly argued, and its bibliography will prove a useful guide to the
key literature concerning R2P.
Edited by Richard H. Cooper and Juliette Voı¨nov Kohler, Responsibility to Pro-
tect: The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century (2009) is a volume of fourteen
essays that will appeal to advanced undergraduate and graduate students as well
as university-level teachers, although the inclusion of a consolidated bibliography
would have further enhanced its scholarly appeal and value as a teaching aid. The
foreword by Samantha Power sets an appropriately sober tone for the essays that
follow by warning that ‘‘[s]upporters of R2P should expect more, not less, pushback
in the international system as they try to mobilize support for diplomatic, economic,
or military intervention’’ (xi). The essays are divided into three sections, the first
explaining the roots and rationale of R2P, the second exploring conflict situations in
Iraq, Northern Uganda, Darfur, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in light of
R2P, while the final section examines some of the experiences of, and practical con-
cerns confronting, members of the international community seeking to implement
R2P.
However, this collection of essays offers a mixed bag, some stronger and better
written than others. The best among them are David Scheffer’s essay, which gives
greater clarity to defining ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ by examining various sources of inter-
national law, a broad-ranging essay on philanthropy by Adele Simmons and April
Donnellan, and the editors’ own contribution describing the urgent need for an
International Marshals Service to support the international justice system. The case
studies are worthwhile reads in and of themselves, particularly Herbert F. Weiss
and Mary Page on the DRC and Northern Uganda, respectively. The more dis-
appointing contributions include Evans’ essay, which covers much the same ground
as his 2008 book, while Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch,
could have focused his essay more closely on the topic at hand, rather than arguing
that ‘‘the invasion of Iraq fails the test for a humanitarian intervention’’ (110).
Despite offering various perspectives and approaches, the inclusion of more
voices of those directly impacted by mass atrocity or of more marginalized perspec-
tives on the R2P topic would have significantly improved the entire collection. Page’s
essay, for example, does capture children’s perspectives on the Lord’s Resistance
Army to disturbing effect, but more of this kind of writing would have made the col-
lection’s arguments even more engaging in human terms. While the essay by Aaron
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Dorfman and Ruth Messinger, which gives focus to R2P in light of the Jewish tra-
dition, produces some interesting insights, it also begs the question of how other
important sacral vantage points and analytic frameworks, such as those belonging
to Islam, Buddhism, or Hinduism, might complement the more mainstream commen-
taries and analysis provided in this volume. However, this collection of essays does
give sharp focus to powerful states and their pursuit of self-serving interests.
Each of the books reviewed here recognize that powerful states are prone to
intervening in the domestic affairs of less powerful states when it is in their vital
interests to do so: Kosovo and Iraq are common, recurring examples. Each of the
books, moreover, describes various ways in which powerful states have impeded mul-
tilateral discussions seeking to further develop the rhetoric of R2P. John Bolton’s
attempts to frustrate the UN’s machinery receives treatment, as do Russian and
Chinese diplomatic maneuverings. The collected essays, however, go further by giving
sustained analytic treatment to the practical means of curtailing the options avail-
able to powerful state makers wishing to prevent R2P’s realization. In particular, a
very good essay by Lee Feinstein and Erica De Briun traces recent US foreign policy
in this respect before providing a range of practical recommendations that will
enable the US government to act in accordance with, rather than merely agree to,
the R2P principle. The lack of sustained analysis of the realpolik dimension among
these texts is not so much a limitation as it is an opportunity for future scholarly
research.
Notwithstanding the significant differences among the three works reviewed
above, each demonstrates an emerging consensus around R2P as a key policy re-
sponse for the international community to confront the ugly existence of atrocity
crimes. They all highlight the important, though in some cases nascent, links among
sanction regimes, peacekeeping operations, and the international criminal court. An
even stronger consensus emerges in these books over the need to build on the trac-
tion achieved over the past decade in order to traverse the difficult terrain of trans-
forming R2P from rhetoric into reality. As Evans points out in The Responsibility to
Protect,
The immediate objective must be to get to the point where, when the next conscience-
shocking case of large-scale killing, or ethnic cleansing, or other war crimes, or crimes
against humanity comes along—as is all too unhappily likely—the immediate reflex
response of the whole international community will be not to ask whether action is
necessary but rather what action is required, by whom, when, and where. (53)
It will be highly regrettable and a condemning indictment of humanity if the world’s
policy makers need to bear witness to yet another mass atrocity in order to enable
this much-needed transformation.
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Book Review
Grigoris Balakian, Armenian Golgotha. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2009. Pp. 509, cloth. $35.00 US.
Reviewed by Robert Melson, Professor Emeritus, Purdue University, and Cohen-Lasry
Distinguished Professor, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies,
Clark University
The twenty-fourth of April 1915 is the date that marks the commencement of the
Armenian Genocide. On that day, Grigoris Balakian, a high-ranking Armenian
priest, was among the 250 Armenian religious, political, and cultural leaders who
were arrested in Constantinople and sent 200 miles east to Chankiri to await their
fate. While most of his companions were killed or died during the genocide, Balakian
survived both the genocide and World War I. When the war ended in 1918, he
started to write Armenian Golgotha. This is an astonishing memoir and meditation
on his survival and on the course of the mass murder that destroyed more than half
of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. It is first-hand testimony from a
terrible time by a knowledgeable and historically informed witness who was intent
not only on recalling his experiences but also on leaving a documented record
behind. The book was translated by the gifted poet and historian Peter Balakian—
Grigoris Balakian was Peter’s great-uncle—with the able assistance of Aris Sevag.
Peter Balakian supplies an important and illuminating introductory essay that helps
the reader navigate the text.
Grigoris Balakian had studied at German universities and spoke fluent German
by the time he returned to Constantinople in September 1914, on the eve of World
War I, when he was thirty-eight years old. His command of German saved his life
when later he went into hiding, and it gave him a perspective on the role of Germans
and Germany—Turkey’s ally—during the genocide. He was also well-connected to
the establishment of the Armenian Apostolic Church and a well-known figure in
Armenian affairs. He arrived in Constantinople two months before Turkey joined
Germany and the Central Powers against the Entente, and left it in 1919 as part of
the Armenian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In those five years he expe-
rienced the Armenian Genocide first hand.
When he lived in Berlin, he had been alarmed by the ferocity of German national-
ism and the millenarian expectations aroused by the coming of the war. He discovered
similar emotions raging among Turks as well as Armenians when he returned to Con-
stantinople. He believed that a rabid form of Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkism
motivated the Committee of Union and Progress, which seized the opportunity of
the war to destroy the Armenians and to transform Turkey into a homogenous
Muslim and Turkic state. He was critical of the role of the German military and
foreign office as well, which he accused of collaborating in the destruction of the
Armenians. During his escape, when he posed as a German soldier, he was shocked
to overhear ordinary Germans refer to Armenians as ‘‘Christian Jews and as blood-
sucking usurers,’’ accusing Armenians of economically exploiting Turkey (281).
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Balakian was a fervent Armenian patriot, but he was also quite critical of his
own people’s attitudes on the eve of the war. Thus, upon returning from Germany,
he found Armenian enthusiasm for the coming war and what it might mean for an
independent Armenia both alarming and naı¨ve. He feared that it would play into
the xenophobia of the Turks. Referring to the massacres of 1894–1896, he noted
that ‘‘the bloody experiences of the last thirty years had not made the Armenians
any more prudent’’ (28). In a later passage he said, ‘‘In this way we provoked the
Turks, who had for a long time been looking for an excuse . . . [to annihilate] the
entire Armenian population of Turkey’’ (32). Balakian could not be aware in 1918
that those who would deny the Armenian genocide decades later would argue that
it was the Armenians who had provoked the Turks into committing mass murder.
After spending ten months in prisonlike conditions in Chankiri, in February
1916, Balakian was made to join a forced march toward Chroum and Yozgat, sta-
tions on the way to the killing fields in Der-Zor in Syria. It was during this deporta-
tion that he documented his extraordinary conversation—amounting to a prolonged
interview over many days—with Captain Shukri, the sixty-five-year-old commander
in charge of the police soldiers, the unit guarding Balakian and the other deportees.
Because of his high status and a well-placed bribe, Balakian was allowed to ride on
horseback next to Shukri, who was quite open and unapologetic—even proud—about
his participation in the deportation and mass murder. This conversation–interview
between a victim and a perpetrator must be unique in the annals of the Armenian
Genocide and clarifies the process of destruction as well as the attitudes of the
‘‘ordinary men’’ who both killed and supervised the killing.
In this connection he retells Captain Shukri’s account of the destruction of the
Armenian women of Yozgat (141–50). Not knowing that their husbands and other
male relatives had already been killed, the women were told to bring their children
and their valuables, because they would be deported to Aleppo to join their relatives.
Captain Shukri headed the detachment of police soldiers that guarded the caravan of
deportees, but the women and their children were not destined for Aleppo. On orders
from his superiors in Yozgat, the Captain led the women and their children to an iso-
lated valley, where they were first stripped of their possessions and then massacred
by villagers from the surrounding hills. Their valuables were then shipped to the
authorities in town, with Captain Shukri getting his cut (144).
On hearing this account, Balakian could not contain himself and asked the good
Captain how he, a believing Muslim, could participate in the massacre of innocent
women and children. Shukri explained his motivations in religious and political
terms:
The Sheikh-ul-Islam [the highest Suni religious authority in Turkey] had issued a
fatwa to annihilate the Armenians as traitors to our state, and the caliph, in turn . . .
had ordered its execution . . . And I, as a military officer, carried out the order of my
king . . . killing people during war is not considered a crime, now is it? (146)
Balakian reports, ‘‘I fell silent because there was nothing I could say in reply to an
executioner who had likened the merciless massacre of unarmed, defenseless women
and infants to killing people in war. In total he was responsible for the murder of
42,000 innocent people’’ (146). Balakian suggests that the leaders of the Committee
of Union and Progress, like Talaat and Enver, might have been impelled by Turkish
nationalism and Pan-Turkism, but the ordinary men and women who were the
followers and executioners of the genocide were just as likely to respond to religious
exhortation and legitimation. Balakian could not know in 1916 that following orders
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in wartime would be a recurring rationalization by the perpetrators of genocides,
including the Holocaust during World War II and the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.
When he realized that deportation meant certain death, Balakian joined two
other Armenian men and escaped on 2 April 1916. He shaved his beard, changed
his clothes, and began his life as a fugitive from Turkish authorities. His success-
ful flight lasted until the end of the war. During his extraordinary odyssey, he
demonstrated exceptional courage, and ingenuity, at various times impersonating
a German railroad worker; a German Jew(!), Herr Bernstein; a German engineer;
a railway administrator; a German soldier; and a Greek vineyard worker.
His comment on his transformation tells us much about his boldness and his zest
for life:
My transformation . . . had made me a new man, bold and fearless; clothing can
change one’s disposition and spiritual power in ways I had not realized. A peace-
loving and meek servant of the church had abruptly been transformed into a young
adventurer ready to employ all of his physical, intellectual, and moral energies to
save his life. But any misjudgment would result in death. (263)
Although the memoir records a dark and brutal period, which brought Balakian
to moments of despair, he did not shut his eyes to human kindness and courage.
His story is punctuated by episodes of Turks rescuing Armenians, of endangered
Armenians risking their lives to save him and other victims, and decent Germans,
appalled by their country’s policies, willing to extend him a hand. During the most
wrenching moments of his flight, he was sustained by his faith in a compassionate
Christian God and in the patriotic hope that, after the ordeal, Armenia would rise
as a free and independent state. He was also sustained by personal optimism, self-
confidence, and zest for adventure that cannot easily be taught or duplicated.
Grigoris Balakian speaks up for the Armenian survivors who had much to
say about the course of the genocide and about their own experiences during that
horrifying period. Armenian Golgotha promises to become an important primary
document about the Armenian Genocide. Moreover, because of its freshness and
immediacy—in parts it reads like daily reports from the front lines of mass
murder—it is likely to become a major addition to the literature of witness and tes-
timony describing the violent upheavals and crimes of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries.
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Book Review
Nicholas A. Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of
Law in Rwanda and Arusha. New York: Routledge, 2010. Pp. 229,
cloth. $130.00 US.
Reviewed by Gerald Caplan, Independent Scholar, Toronto, ON
Countries emerging from the dark night of conflict and oppression into the light of a
new dawn face an almost limitless number of seemingly intractable problems. Think
of Cambodia after the Khmer, South Africa after apartheid, Rwanda after the geno-
cide. The economy, unemployment, infrastructure, governance, public service, school-
ing, health care, reconciliation, justice, trauma—all need to be dealt with, and all
simultaneously. Yet over the last two decades, of all these daunting challenges it
has been issues related to post-conflict justice and reconciliation that have received
most public attention. An entire industry of professionals and institutions who claim
to be expert in guiding such societies in transition to new levels of justice and har-
monious living has grown up in response to this. In tandem, a related academic dis-
cipline of scholars studying these experiments and evaluating them has sprung up.
We need to hope these specialists can deliver on their promises, for issues
related to justice are extraordinarily complex, far more than is often assumed. The
subject includes its own multitude of sub-concepts, many of them entirely contradic-
tory of and conflicting with others. For some time after South Africa escaped from
apartheid, its Truth and Reconciliation Commission was the best-known example of
a dramatic attempt to deal with the issue. The very title implied that the truth
about apartheid would lead to reconciliation between white and black South Afri-
cans. This reflected the idealistic notion of restorative as opposed to retributive
justice, a concept embraced by Bishop Tutu but not the mothers of Africans who dis-
covered how the apartheid intelligence services had tortured and murdered their
children. The truth can make you bitter.
In recent years, among those who pursue the elusive goal of transitional justice,
South Africa has been replaced as the center of attention by Rwanda. This has
reflected both the number of Rwandan institutions involved in the apparent search
for post-genocide justice and their inherent fascination—the regular Rwandan justice
system, which had been almost entirely destroyed during the genocide; the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) set up in Arusha, Tanzania, by a
guilt-ridden Security Council; and the gacaca courts, a unique institution developed
in Rwanda by Rwandans to deal with the vast number of accused who could not be
accommodated at either of the other two judicial levels.
Naturally, scholars have been racing to observe and study this remarkable phe-
nomenon for several years already, and now that gacaca is over and the ICTR is
winding down, we can expect the number of books and articles to explode as a result.
Some of these contributions have been welcome and enlightening; for example, Timothy
Longman’s essay in the latest Peace Review and Clark and Kaufman’s recent collec-
tion of edited essays, After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruc-
tion and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond. (See my review in Pambazuka
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News.) That Longman, Clark, and Kaufman reach substantially different conclusions
about the gacaca process merely underlines the complexity of the issues involved and
the need for rigorous scholarship at all times.
Nicholas Jones’s book, which is the subject of this review, has a daunting title,
The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda and Arusha, and is
yet another contribution to the subject. But it is not, I fear, up to the standards the
subject demands.
There are several problems. First, Jones is a very awkward writer, apparently
unaware at times of common syntax, grammar, and word meaning. For example, he
writes of ‘‘a part of Rwanda history that people do not contend,’’ by which he means
that experts don’t dispute this aspect of Rwandan history. He states that the ‘‘racist
underpinnings of the Hutu social revolution became the moniker for the future
ethnic divide,’’ although ‘moniker’ is simply an informal word for ‘name’. He quotes
another author, making the statement ‘‘justice becomes the causality of a political
calculation,’’ when it is clear that the original author had written ‘‘casualty.’’ Plus
we are told, ‘‘The capacity for achieving reconciliation will be argued to be associated
with the type of justice . . .’’ There’s really no excuse for such clumsiness and so many
errors of literacy.
There are also too many errors of fact, some of them perhaps of only minor
consequence. Even so, can we not expect that the names of his sources be spelled
correctly? I was not thrilled to find my own name misspelled as ‘‘Kaplan’’ in several
places, even though it was spelled correctly elsewhere. Scott Straus’ name is also fre-
quently misspelled. It suggests a certain sloppiness about the work in general, and
calls the author’s credibility into question.
More consequential errors include the following examples. The RPF did not
‘‘force the Hutu army and militias west, past the French lines of Operation Tur-
quoise and into the DRC.’’ The French army, on its own initiative, allowed the ge´no-
cidaires to escape into Congo, setting the stage for the appalling tragedy that has
befallen the eastern part of that country in the last fifteen years. The French estab-
lishment must not be let off the hook by the assertion that the RPF was responsible
for France’s brazen negligence and their complicity with genocidal killers.
Jones seems confused, and certainly confuses us about the number of Hutu who
participated in the genocide. On page 28 he says ‘‘recent estimates . . . suggest that
projections place the number between 760,000 and one million,’’ and cites his inter-
view with J.B. Mutangana. But he fails to explain who J.B. Mutangana is. (In fact,
there is no appendix listing his interviewees and giving their backgrounds, a serious
omission in this kind of study.) Then in footnote 22 on page 103, he introduces
the ‘‘Scott Strauss’’ (sic) estimate of 200,000 perpetrators. But he never reconciles
these impossibly different estimates, even though the number of alleged perpetrators
directly affected the functioning of the justice system.
On page 39 he refers to a person with the last name of ‘‘Morgenthau,’’ who is
never identified and is not named in the index. A paragraph later he refers to
another individual called ‘‘Stimson’’ who is in the index but about whom not a word
of description is offered. Who are these people, and what is their expertise with rela-
tion to Rwandan history?
On page 67 he refers to the massacres of the 1960s as ‘‘early trial runs of geno-
cide.’’ This is a very problematic assertion and can’t be stated in such an absolute
way. But it’s possible he is simply reporting what a source said; this is a problem
we run into on several important occasions in the book, where it’s not clear whether
Jones is agreeing with a source or merely reporting an individual’s statement. He
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does this again on the same page, where he cites Kigabo as saying that ‘‘the Catholic
Church was not strong enough to prevent these people [Hutu] from going to kill
those people [Tutsi] because basically they [Church and state] had become one
body.’’ Does Jones agree with this statement? And who is Kigabo? This is yet another
interviewee about whom we know absolutely nothing. As to the statement, it lets the
Catholic Church off far too easily. The church had whatever agency it chose to exer-
cise, even if it was the virtually official state church of Rwanda, and those within the
hierarchy might even have been able to stop the genocide in its tracks. Not only did
the Church never come close to trying, it at least implicitly condoned the killings,
along with offering critical legitimacy to the government.
Some of these errors are related to the central issues of the Rwandan genocide,
which means they undermine the reader’s confidence in Jones’s grasp of the subject.
One of the worst examples is his description of the tension caused by the ‘‘lack of
concordance in the sentencing practices of the ICTR and the Rwandan courts.’’ Jones
basically states that the instigators and leaders of the genocide convicted in Arusha
would be sentenced to life imprisonment while those who played smaller, more local-
ized roles ‘‘are liable to receive the death penalty from Rwandan courts.’’ This is an
unacceptably distorted statement.
The post-genocide government hasn’t executed anyone since 1998, when twenty-
two convicted ge´nocidaires were hanged in public. The hangings resulted in outrage
from the international public, even though, nations such as the United States and
China still perform executions for less far-reaching and society-damaging crimes
than what were committed in Rwanda. The RPF government claims to disdain inter-
national opinion, having been betrayed by virtually the entire world during the geno-
cide. Yet it doesn’t always ignore its critics. By the time I got to Rwanda in 1999,
it was already believed that the executions had caused the government too much
unnecessary damage. At that time, it was widely expected that while criminals
might still be sentenced to death, they were unlikely to be hanged. As each year
passed and no death sentences were carried out, it became increasingly apparent
that none ever would be. Rwanda was abolitionist in practice.
This did not stop the ICTR or foreign governments from refusing to send accused
ge´nocidaires to Rwanda for trial on the grounds that the death penalty was still in
existence. In 2007, Rwanda formally abolished what it had informally stopped prac-
ticing years before. (Jones notes this in an entirely different part of the book, refer-
ring to ‘‘the recent decision’’ to abolish the death penalty.) Uganda and DRC have
still not eliminated the death penalty. Kenya has abolished it in practice, but not
legally. Fifty-eight countries around the world still retain the death sentence. Yet
the Kagame government can rightly argue that their practice of a decade ago re-
ceives greater criticism today than those countries that still retain the death penalty.
And Jones’s book will not assist in alleviating that sentiment.
Jones’s discussion of the ICTR adds little to what others have said long ago,
including my own report nine years ago for the Organization of African Unity’s
international panel on the genocide. The tribunal cost too much, and should have
prosecuted more defendants than it did, but it has produced highly valuable, path-
breaking jurisprudence in the area of genocide on which the International Criminal
Court can build. It should also be noted that for a book dated 2010, Jones’s data on
the number of convictions, acquittals, and appeals are already outdated.
On the gacaca trials, Jones has little to offer. He did most of his field research
just as the system was being fully launched. As a result, he was only able to watch
the preliminary trials. One wonders why he didn’t go back and see how the actual
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system worked in practice before he offered the world his observations. In fact, in
many ways the book already seems predominately out of date. Most of his written
sources are several years old. It is clear that the bulk of the writing was done several
years ago, along with the majority of his interviews. In a case like Rwanda’s, where
change is a constant and new developments are forever emerging, far more imme-
diacy is fundamental to a proper understanding of the situation.
Jones’s major contribution to the subject is to remind us of the unfairly high
standards that critics of the Rwandan justice system have demanded since the
moment the genocide ended. In fact, a double standard seems often to apply when
outsiders criticize Rwanda. My own view is that these critics somehow expect the
victims of genocide to live up to a higher morality than other mortals. Human rights
organizations have relentlessly demanded of Rwanda international legal standards
that are not only absent in many Africa countries but also are not fully practiced in
rich countries. Jones describes the utter devastation of the system during the 100
days and the long, difficult task of rebuilding—only one of the huge challenges facing
the neophyte government. To expect ideal Western or international standards under
such circumstances has never made sense, and the contempt of the Rwanda govern-
ment for many international organizations—duly earned during and immediately
after the genocide, when the Hutu escapees in the Kivus received far more attention
than the country itself—has only been strengthened by these persistent and un-
balanced criticisms.
Jones’s conclusions are typically confusing. On page 100 he argues that ‘‘there
remains evidence that the Rwandan government is seeking to create an environment
conducive to the realization of a justice system worthy of its name.’’ Yet on the
following page he concludes that ‘‘victor’s justice continues to be ever present [in
Rwanda], thereby continuing to severely undermine the government’s efforts in operat-
ing fair trials. The perceived and real operation of fair trials is crucial in progressing
towards national reconciliation’’ (101).
This last sentence is wholly speculative. Whether in Rwanda or elsewhere, there
is in fact no way of knowing, other than through intuition, whether fair trials impact
reconciliation one way or another, and Jones never discusses this important reality.
As for the victor’s justice, this refers to the high-profile failure of any jurisdiction
dealing with the genocide—ICTR, national courts, or gacaca—to prosecute the war
crimes of the ruling RPF. Jones refers to this deeply controversial issue many times,
as is appropriate, but without really examining the issue critically. It is true that the
RPF was guilty of war crimes before, during, and after the genocide; an entire chap-
ter of my report is dedicated to this matter. And from the first, the new government’s
critics, including major human rights organizations, have repeatedly demanded that
the RPF accused must be tried, just as ge´nocidaires were. But there are issues of
common sense, morality, and triage here.
When has anything other than the victor’s justice prevailed anywhere? Did any-
one advocate that the Allied bombers who firebombed German cities in World War II
be tried at Nuremberg alongside Nazi war criminals? Should the pilots who dropped
the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki–or their commanding officers—have
been put in the dock at the Tokyo war crimes trials? Even today, one would be cruci-
fied for raising these issues. Is genocide not the crime of crimes? Is it not arguing for
the moral equivalence of the ge´nocidaires and those who defeated them to demand
the prosecution of the RPF well before most of the leading ge´nocidaires have been
tried?
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And then there are the simple, practical issues of logistics and capacity. If the
ICTR cannot work its way through all the cases on its roster, how can we demand
that a whole new category be added? The same can be argued about the courts in
Rwanda. But those demanding the prosecutions of the RPF have shown little sym-
pathy for these practical realities.
Still, it is true that Rwanda pays a potentially severe penalty for the failure to go
after anyone but ge´nocidaires. To use language that is now situationally banned in
Rwanda, what has happened at every judicial level is that, with few exceptions,
only Hutu are being tried. Tutsi hardly ever are. Everyone knows this. That means
that the vast majority of Rwandans, who are of course Hutu, know it. It means that
the members of the Tutsi minority consider themselves the innocent victims of das-
tardly crimes of which only Hutu are guilty. When the slogan for the annual com-
memoration rituals includes only the genocide of the Tutsi, it is too easy to conclude
that all and only Tutsi were victims, and all and only Hutu were perpetrators. This
does not appear to be a formula for solidifying reconciliation, though few Rwandans
in the elite seem able to grasp this fairly obvious contradiction.
The complex world of justice is still in its long transitional phase in Rwanda. We
must hope for some penetrating new scholarship that illuminates the process and
offers useful directions for the future. Both the scholarship and the directions are
much needed.
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